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From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: "Thomas Hellström (VMware)" <thomas_os@shipmail.org>,
	x86@kernel.org, "Christoph Hellwig" <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	"Thomas Hellstrom" <thellstrom@vmware.com>,
	"Dave Hansen" <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"Peter Zijlstra" <peterz@infradead.org>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Christian König" <christian.koenig@amd.com>,
	"Marek Szyprowski" <m.szyprowski@samsung.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 1/2] x86: Don't let pgprot_modify() change the page encryption bit
Date: Mon, 16 Mar 2020 14:43:40 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <eb422a3d-9f0e-5101-ebb6-c16f90219c3c@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200304114527.3636-2-thomas_os@shipmail.org>

On 3/4/20 5:45 AM, Thomas Hellström (VMware) wrote:
> From: Thomas Hellstrom <thellstrom@vmware.com>
> 
> When SEV or SME is enabled and active, vm_get_page_prot() typically
> returns with the encryption bit set. This means that users of
> pgprot_modify(, vm_get_page_prot()) (mprotect_fixup, do_mmap) end up with
> a value of vma->vm_pg_prot that is not consistent with the intended
> protection of the PTEs. This is also important for fault handlers that
> rely on the VMA vm_page_prot to set the page protection. Fix this by
> not allowing pgprot_modify() to change the encryption bit, similar to
> how it's done for PAT bits.
> 
> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
> Cc: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
> Cc: Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski@samsung.com>
> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> Signed-off-by: Thomas Hellstrom <thellstrom@vmware.com>
> Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>

Acked-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>

> ---
>  arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h       | 7 +++++--
>  arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h | 2 +-
>  2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
> index d9925b10e326..c4615032c5ef 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
> @@ -627,12 +627,15 @@ static inline pmd_t pmd_modify(pmd_t pmd, pgprot_t newprot)
>  	return __pmd(val);
>  }
>  
> -/* mprotect needs to preserve PAT bits when updating vm_page_prot */
> +/*
> + * mprotect needs to preserve PAT and encryption bits when updating
> + * vm_page_prot
> + */
>  #define pgprot_modify pgprot_modify
>  static inline pgprot_t pgprot_modify(pgprot_t oldprot, pgprot_t newprot)
>  {
>  	pgprotval_t preservebits = pgprot_val(oldprot) & _PAGE_CHG_MASK;
> -	pgprotval_t addbits = pgprot_val(newprot);
> +	pgprotval_t addbits = pgprot_val(newprot) & ~_PAGE_CHG_MASK;
>  	return __pgprot(preservebits | addbits);
>  }
>  
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h
> index 0239998d8cdc..65c2ecd730c5 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h
> @@ -118,7 +118,7 @@
>   */
>  #define _PAGE_CHG_MASK	(PTE_PFN_MASK | _PAGE_PCD | _PAGE_PWT |		\
>  			 _PAGE_SPECIAL | _PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_DIRTY |	\
> -			 _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY | _PAGE_DEVMAP)
> +			 _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY | _PAGE_DEVMAP | _PAGE_ENC)
>  #define _HPAGE_CHG_MASK (_PAGE_CHG_MASK | _PAGE_PSE)
>  
>  /*
> 

  reply	other threads:[~2020-03-16 19:43 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-03-04 11:45 [PATCH v4 0/2] Fix SEV user-space mapping of unencrypted coherent memory Thomas Hellström (VMware)
2020-03-04 11:45 ` [PATCH v3 1/2] x86: Don't let pgprot_modify() change the page encryption bit Thomas Hellström (VMware)
2020-03-16 19:43   ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2020-03-17 14:57   ` [tip: x86/mm] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Hellstrom
2020-03-04 11:45 ` [PATCH v3 2/2] dma-mapping: Fix dma_pgprot() for unencrypted coherent pages Thomas Hellström (VMware)
2020-03-05 15:36   ` Christoph Hellwig
2020-03-16 19:44   ` Tom Lendacky
2020-03-17 14:57   ` [tip: x86/mm] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Hellstrom
2020-03-16 12:42 ` [PATCH v4 0/2] Fix SEV user-space mapping of unencrypted coherent memory Thomas Hellström (VMware)
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2019-09-17 13:01 [PATCH v3 " Thomas Hellström (VMware)
2019-09-17 13:01 ` [PATCH v3 1/2] x86: Don't let pgprot_modify() change the page encryption bit Thomas Hellström (VMware)
2019-09-18 17:57   ` Dave Hansen
2019-10-01  5:54     ` Thomas Hellstrom
2019-10-01 16:07       ` Dave Hansen

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