From: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
To: "Alejandro Colomar (man-pages)" <alx.manpages@gmail.com>,
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: "Aleksa Sarai" <cyphar@cyphar.com>,
"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
"Casey Schaufler" <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
"Christian Brauner" <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>,
"Christian Heimes" <christian@python.org>,
"Deven Bowers" <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>,
"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>,
"Eric Biggers" <ebiggers@kernel.org>,
"Eric Chiang" <ericchiang@google.com>,
"Florian Weimer" <fweimer@redhat.com>,
"Geert Uytterhoeven" <geert@linux-m68k.org>,
"James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>, "Jan Kara" <jack@suse.cz>,
"Jann Horn" <jannh@google.com>,
"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
"Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>,
"Lakshmi Ramasubramanian" <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>,
"Madhavan T . Venkataraman" <madvenka@linux.microsoft.com>,
"Matthew Garrett" <mjg59@google.com>,
"Matthew Wilcox" <willy@infradead.org>,
"Miklos Szeredi" <mszeredi@redhat.com>,
"Mimi Zohar" <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
"Philippe Trébuchet" <philippe.trebuchet@ssi.gouv.fr>,
"Scott Shell" <scottsh@microsoft.com>,
"Shuah Khan" <shuah@kernel.org>,
"Steve Dower" <steve.dower@python.org>,
"Steve Grubb" <sgrubb@redhat.com>,
"Thibaut Sautereau" <thibaut.sautereau@ssi.gouv.fr>,
"Vincent Strubel" <vincent.strubel@ssi.gouv.fr>,
"Yin Fengwei" <fengwei.yin@intel.com>,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
"Mickaël Salaün" <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v16 1/3] fs: Add trusted_for(2) syscall implementation and related sysctl
Date: Sun, 14 Nov 2021 13:09:06 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <ebaba192-1f0b-eb5e-0914-a0c885afdac6@digikod.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <34779736-e875-c3e0-75d5-0f0a55d729aa@gmail.com>
On 13/11/2021 20:56, Alejandro Colomar (man-pages) wrote:
> Hi Mickaël,
>
> On 11/13/21 14:02, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
>>> TL;DR:
>>>
>>> ISO C specifies that for the following code:
>>>
>>> enum foo {BAR};
>>>
>>> enum foo foobar;
>>>
>>> typeof(foo) shall be int
>>> typeof(foobar) is implementation-defined
>>
>> I tested with some version of GCC (from 4.9 to 11) and clang (10 and 11)
>> with different optimizations and the related sizes are at least the same
>> as for the int type.
>
> GCC has -fshort-enums to make enum types be as short as possible. I
> expected -Os to turn this on, since it saves space, but it doesn't.
>
> Still, not relying on enum == int is better, IMO.
>
>>
>>>
>>> Since foobar = BAR; assigns an int, the best thing to do to avoid
>>> implementation-defined behavior, is to declare foobar as int too.
>>
>> OK, so it should be enough to change the syscall argument type from enum
>> trusted_for_usage to int, but we can keep the UAPI with the enum (i.e.
>> we don't need to change the value to #define TRUSTED_FOR_EXECUTION 1)
>> right?
>
> Correct. The enumerations are guaranteed to be int (except in case of
> UB, see below), so they'll be (almost) the same as a #define after the
> preprocessor.
Thanks for the detailed explanation! I'll send a new patch taking into
account your suggestion.
>
>
> If you do
>
> enum foo {
> FOO = 1L << INT_WIDTH
> };
>
> since that doesn't fit in either int or unsigned int,
> it is Undefined Behavior,
> and here GCC decides to use long for FOO.
>
> +++++++++ UB example ++++++++++++++
>
> $ cat foo.c
> #include <limits.h>
> #include <stdio.h>
>
>
> enum foo {
> FOO = 1L << UINT_WIDTH
> };
>
> int main(void)
> {
> printf("\tsizeof(enum foo) = %zu\n", sizeof(enum foo));
> printf("\tsizeof(FOO) = %zu\n", sizeof(FOO));
> }
>
> $ cc foo.c -Wall -Wextra -Werror -Wpedantic -pedantic-errors -std=c2x
> foo.c:6:23: error: ISO C restricts enumerator values to range of 'int'
> [-Wpedantic]
> 6 | FOO = 1L << UINT_WIDTH
> | ^~
> $ cc foo.c -Wall -Wextra -Werror -std=c2x
> $ ./a.out
> sizeof(enum foo) = 8
> sizeof(FOO) = 8
>
> +++++++++++++ -fshort-enums example +++++++++++++++
>
> $ cat foo.c
> #include <stdio.h>
>
>
> enum foo {
> FOO = 1
> };
>
> int main(void)
> {
> printf("\tsizeof(enum foo) = %zu\n", sizeof(enum foo));
> printf("\tsizeof(FOO) = %zu\n", sizeof(FOO));
> }
>
> $ cc foo.c -Wall -Wextra -Werror -Wpedantic -pedantic-errors -fshort-enums
> $ ./a.out
> sizeof(enum foo) = 1
> sizeof(FOO) = 4
>
> ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>
> Cheers,
> Alex
>
>
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> diff --git a/include/linux/syscalls.h b/include/linux/syscalls.h
>>>> index 528a478dbda8..c535e0e43cc8 100644
>>>> --- a/include/linux/syscalls.h
>>>> +++ b/include/linux/syscalls.h
>>>> @@ -462,6 +463,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_fallocate(int fd, int mode,
>>>> loff_t offset, loff_t len);
>>>> asmlinkage long sys_faccessat(int dfd, const char __user *filename,
>>>> int mode);
>>>> asmlinkage long sys_faccessat2(int dfd, const char __user *filename,
>>>> int mode,
>>>> int flags);
>>>> +asmlinkage long sys_trusted_for(int fd, enum trusted_for_usage usage,
>>>> u32 flags);
>>>
>>> Same here.
>>>
>>>> asmlinkage long sys_chdir(const char __user *filename);
>>>> asmlinkage long sys_fchdir(unsigned int fd);
>>>> asmlinkage long sys_chroot(const char __user *filename);
>>>
>>> Thanks,
>>> Alex
>>>
>>>
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-11-14 12:09 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-11-10 19:06 [PATCH v16 0/3] Add trusted_for(2) (was O_MAYEXEC) Mickaël Salaün
2021-11-10 19:06 ` [PATCH v16 1/3] fs: Add trusted_for(2) syscall implementation and related sysctl Mickaël Salaün
2021-11-12 19:16 ` Alejandro Colomar (man-pages)
2021-11-13 13:02 ` Mickaël Salaün
2021-11-13 19:56 ` Alejandro Colomar (man-pages)
2021-11-14 12:09 ` Mickaël Salaün [this message]
2021-11-14 15:32 ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2021-11-14 15:45 ` Alejandro Colomar (man-pages)
2021-11-10 19:06 ` [PATCH v16 2/3] arch: Wire up trusted_for(2) Mickaël Salaün
2021-11-10 19:06 ` [PATCH v16 3/3] selftest/interpreter: Add tests for trusted_for(2) policies Mickaël Salaün
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