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From: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
To: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>, tglx@linutronix.de
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org, gregkh@linux-foundation.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com,
	Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 06/12] x86/retpoline/crypto: Convert xen assembler indirect jumps
Date: Thu, 4 Jan 2018 07:48:16 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <ebed1004-7d89-a39d-2ca0-afe7fa2f7f89@suse.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180104020019.1173-7-andi@firstfloor.org>

On 04/01/18 03:00, Andi Kleen wrote:
> From: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
> 
> Convert all indirect jumps in xen inline assembler code to use
> non speculative sequences.
> 
> Based on code from David Woodhouse and Tim Chen
> 
> Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/crypto/camellia-aesni-avx2-asm_64.S | 1 +
>  arch/x86/include/asm/xen/hypercall.h         | 3 ++-
>  2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/camellia-aesni-avx2-asm_64.S b/arch/x86/crypto/camellia-aesni-avx2-asm_64.S
> index 1743e6850e00..9cd8450a2050 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/crypto/camellia-aesni-avx2-asm_64.S
> +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/camellia-aesni-avx2-asm_64.S
> @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
>  
>  #include <linux/linkage.h>
>  #include <asm/frame.h>
> +#include <asm/jump-asm.h>

I fail to connect this change to the patch title.

Maybe should be part of the crypto patch?

>  
>  #define CAMELLIA_TABLE_BYTE_LEN 272
>  
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/xen/hypercall.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/xen/hypercall.h
> index 7cb282e9e587..91de35bcce5e 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/xen/hypercall.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/xen/hypercall.h
> @@ -44,6 +44,7 @@
>  #include <asm/page.h>
>  #include <asm/pgtable.h>
>  #include <asm/smap.h>
> +#include <asm/jump-asm.h>
>  
>  #include <xen/interface/xen.h>
>  #include <xen/interface/sched.h>
> @@ -217,7 +218,7 @@ privcmd_call(unsigned call,
>  	__HYPERCALL_5ARG(a1, a2, a3, a4, a5);
>  
>  	stac();
> -	asm volatile("call *%[call]"
> +	asm volatile(NOSPEC_CALL("%[call]")
>  		     : __HYPERCALL_5PARAM
>  		     : [call] "a" (&hypercall_page[call])
>  		     : __HYPERCALL_CLOBBER5);
> 

Acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>


Juergen

  reply	other threads:[~2018-01-04  6:48 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-01-04  2:00 Avoid speculative indirect calls in kernel Andi Kleen
2018-01-04  2:00 ` [PATCH v2 01/12] x86/retpoline: Define retpoline indirect thunk and macros Andi Kleen
2018-01-04  2:15   ` Brian Gerst
2018-01-04  2:32     ` Alan Cox
2018-01-04  2:00 ` [PATCH v2 02/12] x86/retpoline/crypto: Convert crypto assembler indirect jumps Andi Kleen
2018-01-04  2:00 ` [PATCH v2 03/12] x86/retpoline/entry: Convert entry " Andi Kleen
2018-01-04  8:42   ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-04  2:00 ` [PATCH v2 04/12] x86/retpoline/ftrace: Convert ftrace " Andi Kleen
2018-01-04  2:00 ` [PATCH v2 05/12] x86/retpoline/hyperv: Convert " Andi Kleen
2018-01-04  2:00 ` [PATCH v2 06/12] x86/retpoline/crypto: Convert xen " Andi Kleen
2018-01-04  6:48   ` Juergen Gross [this message]
2018-01-04  6:50     ` Andi Kleen
2018-01-04  2:00 ` [PATCH v2 07/12] x86/retpoline/checksum32: Convert " Andi Kleen
2018-01-04  2:00 ` [PATCH v2 08/12] x86/retpoline/irq32: " Andi Kleen
2018-01-04  2:00 ` [PATCH v2 09/12] x86/retpoline: Finally enable retpoline for C code Andi Kleen
2018-01-04  2:00 ` [PATCH v2 10/12] retpoline/taint: Taint kernel for missing retpoline in compiler Andi Kleen
2018-01-04  2:00 ` [PATCH v2 11/12] retpoline/objtool: Disable some objtool warnings Andi Kleen
2018-01-04 14:38   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-04 14:46     ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-04 15:59     ` Andi Kleen
2018-01-04 16:06       ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-04 16:13         ` Andi Kleen
2018-01-04 16:32           ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-04 17:35             ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-04  2:00 ` [PATCH v2 12/12] retpoline: Attempt to quiten objtool warning for unreachable code Andi Kleen
2018-01-04 11:49 ` Avoid speculative indirect calls in kernel Pavel Machek
2018-01-04 12:09   ` Alan Cox
2018-01-04 13:32     ` Pavel Machek

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