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From: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <x86@kernel.org>,
	<linux-coco@lists.linux.dev>, <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
	Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	K Prateek Nayak <kprateek.nayak@amd.com>,
	Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>,
	Naveen Rao <naveen.rao@amd.com>,
	David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>,
	Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Nathan Fontenot <nathan.fontenot@amd.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 2/8] x86/bugs: Allow spectre_v2=ibrs on x86 vendors other than Intel
Date: Wed, 30 Sep 2026 14:50:23 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <ec3073de-74b5-4321-8ca0-5d00ac288816@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260930030650.GDarx8yvplZzQtGDBz@fat_crate.local>

@Sean, @Paolo, Please consider merging the rest of this patchseries 
(patches 3-8), as they can go through the KVM tree directly as-is 
because they does not depend on this or the prior patch 1/8 other than 
for performance reasons.  Thank you!

On 9/29/26 10:06 PM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Fri, Sep 18, 2026 at 06:01:55PM -0500, Kim Phillips wrote:
>> SPEC_CTRL.IBRS is architectural and behaves on AMD just like it does on
>> Intel, but the kernel offers spectre_v2=ibrs on Intel only: the option is
>> rejected at parse time on other vendors, and MITIGATION_IBRS_ENTRY cannot
>> even be built into an AMD-only kernel.
>>
>> AMD's SNP BTB Isolation needs the kernel to toggle legacy IBRS in order to
>> optimize the VM exit-to-re-entry path, and right now there is no way to ask
>> for kernel IBRS on an AMD machine at all.
> Same comments as to the other one: We need:
>
> - a proper use case which is *actually* useful to users

How is optimizing the VM exit-to-re-entry path not "*actually* useful to 
users"?

If BTB Isolation users want to use BTB Isolation, they'd want what the 
AMD APM recommends: To use spectre_v2=ibrs: what is wrong with that?

For this Node-ID getting cpuid script that causes lots of VMEXITS:

for i in \`seq 0 1000\`; do sudo taskset -c 0 cpuid -1 -k -l 0x8000001e 
 > c0; done

I get these stats:

v2=(retpolines), btb-isol=off                   v2=(retpolines), btb-isol=on

8135634850      l1btb-accesses          8237924785 l1btb-accesses        
           101%
2292830105      l1btb-misses            2479438191 l1btb-misses          
           108%
2254370689      l2btb-misses            2462526637 l2btb-misses          
           109%
38479671        l2btb-hits              16912146        l2btb-hits       
               44%
2292846687      l2btb-accesses          2479437240 l2btb-accesses        
           108%

6.591965727     seconds time    6.410626779     seconds time elapsed 97%

v2=ibrs, btb-isol=off                   v2=ibrs, btb-isol=on

9079195678      l1btb-accesses          7735439435 l1btb-accesses        
           85%
3420759821      l1btb-misses            2264575904 l1btb-misses          
           66%
3385686214      l2btb-misses            2226743253 l2btb-misses          
           66%
35073337        l2btb-hits              37834099        l2btb-hits       
               108%
3420753266      l2btb-accesses          2264587491 l2btb-accesses        
           66%

7.019508776     seconds time    6.408415958     seconds time elapsed 91%

Does *that* help?

Kim

>
> - have it properly documented in Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/ along with
>    the potential impact so that people can make an *informed* decision whether
>    they really want it
>
> Without any justification for the added complexity to what already is
> a maintenance nightmare, there's no point.
>
> Thx.
>


  reply	other threads:[~2026-09-30 19:50 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-08-26 22:35 [PATCH v5 0/8] Add SEV-SNP BTB Isolation and IBPB-on-Entry guest features Kim Phillips
2026-08-26 22:35 ` [PATCH v5 1/8] x86/bugs: Allow forcing Automatic IBRS with SNP active using spectre_v2=eibrs Kim Phillips
2026-08-27  4:32   ` Pawan Gupta
2026-09-03  4:03   ` Borislav Petkov
2026-09-18 23:00     ` Kim Phillips
2026-09-24  1:45       ` Borislav Petkov
2026-09-24 18:45         ` Kim Phillips
2026-09-25 16:47           ` Borislav Petkov
2026-09-26  2:14             ` Kim Phillips
2026-08-26 22:35 ` [PATCH v5 2/8] x86/bugs: Allow spectre_v2=ibrs on x86 vendors other than Intel Kim Phillips
2026-08-27  4:33   ` Pawan Gupta
2026-09-09 21:01   ` Borislav Petkov
2026-09-18 23:01     ` Kim Phillips
2026-09-30  3:06       ` Borislav Petkov
2026-09-30 19:50         ` Kim Phillips [this message]
2026-10-01  0:12           ` Borislav Petkov
2026-08-26 22:35 ` [PATCH v5 3/8] KVM: SVM: Define SVM_SEV_FEAT_* flags using BIT_ULL() Kim Phillips
2026-08-26 22:35 ` [PATCH v5 4/8] KVM: selftests: sev_init2: Use BIT_ULL for VMSA feature bit definition Kim Phillips
2026-08-26 22:35 ` [PATCH v5 5/8] KVM: SEV: Disallow setting SNP-only features for non-SNP guests via a single mask Kim Phillips
2026-08-26 22:35 ` [PATCH v5 6/8] KVM: SEV: Advertise SVM_SEV_FEAT_SNP_ACTIVE Kim Phillips
2026-08-26 22:35 ` [PATCH v5 7/8] KVM: SEV: Add support for IBPB-on-Entry Kim Phillips
2026-08-26 22:35 ` [PATCH v5 8/8] KVM: SEV: Add support for SNP BTB Isolation Kim Phillips

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