From: Mykyta Yatsenko <mykyta.yatsenko5@gmail.com>
To: Ihor Solodrai <ihor.solodrai@linux.dev>,
Puranjay Mohan <puranjay@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>, Song Liu <song@kernel.org>,
Shakeel Butt <shakeel.butt@linux.dev>,
bpf@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
kernel-team@meta.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf v2 2/2] bpf: Avoid faultable build ID reads under mm locks
Date: Thu, 9 Apr 2026 15:51:15 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <ed1470d0-8894-4440-9234-a94e478a39e2@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <bf91eb90-1b6a-4bad-a0e5-072f9dce7daa@linux.dev>
On 4/9/26 5:20 AM, Ihor Solodrai wrote:
>
>
> On 4/8/26 6:06 PM, Ihor Solodrai wrote:
>> Sleepable build ID parsing can block in __kernel_read() [1], so the
>> stackmap sleepable path must not call it while holding mmap_lock or a
>> per-VMA read lock.
>>
>> The issue and the fix are conceptually similar to a recent procfs
>> patch [2].
>>
>> Resolve each covered VMA with a stable read-side reference, preferring
>> lock_vma_under_rcu() and falling back to mmap_read_lock() only long
>> enough to acquire the VMA read lock. Take a reference to the backing
>> file, drop the VMA lock, and then parse the build ID through
>> (sleepable) build_id_parse_file().
>>
>> [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251218005818.614819-1-shakeel.butt@linux.dev/
>> [2]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260128183232.2854138-1-andrii@kernel.org/
>>
>> Fixes: 777a8560fd29 ("lib/buildid: use __kernel_read() for sleepable context")
>> Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.4
>> Suggested-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay@kernel.org>
>> Signed-off-by: Ihor Solodrai <ihor.solodrai@linux.dev>
>> ---
>> kernel/bpf/stackmap.c | 139 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>> 1 file changed, 139 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c b/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c
>> index 4ef0fd06cea5..de3d89e20a1e 100644
>> --- a/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c
>> +++ b/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c
>> @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
>> #include <linux/perf_event.h>
>> #include <linux/btf_ids.h>
>> #include <linux/buildid.h>
>> +#include <linux/mmap_lock.h>
>> #include "percpu_freelist.h"
>> #include "mmap_unlock_work.h"
>>
>> @@ -158,6 +159,139 @@ static inline void stack_map_build_id_set_ip(struct bpf_stack_build_id *id)
>> memset(id->build_id, 0, BUILD_ID_SIZE_MAX);
>> }
>>
>> +enum stack_map_vma_lock_state {
>> + STACK_MAP_LOCKED_NONE = 0,
>> + STACK_MAP_LOCKED_VMA,
>> + STACK_MAP_LOCKED_MMAP,
>> +};
>> +
>> +struct stack_map_vma_lock {
>> + enum stack_map_vma_lock_state state;
>> + struct vm_area_struct *vma;
>> + struct mm_struct *mm;
>> +};
>> +
>> +static struct vm_area_struct *stack_map_lock_vma(struct stack_map_vma_lock *lock, unsigned long ip)
>> +{
>> + struct mm_struct *mm = lock->mm;
>> + struct vm_area_struct *vma;
>> +
>> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!mm))
>> + return NULL;
>> +
>> + vma = lock_vma_under_rcu(mm, ip);
>> + if (vma)
>> + goto vma_locked;
>> +
>> + if (!mmap_read_trylock(mm))
>> + return NULL;
>> +
>> + vma = vma_lookup(mm, ip);
>> + if (!vma) {
>> + mmap_read_unlock(mm);
>> + return NULL;
>> + }
>> +
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_PER_VMA_LOCK
>
> Puranjay and others,
>
> I tried to test this patch with CONFIG_PER_VMA_LOCK=n, and it turns
> out it's not easy to turn off.
>
> config PER_VMA_LOCK
> def_bool y
> depends on ARCH_SUPPORTS_PER_VMA_LOCK && MMU && SMP
>
> AFAIU this definition means that PER_VMA_LOCK is automatically true if
> it's dependencies are satisfied. The only practical way to do it
> appears to be disabling SMP, which is probably very unusual.
>
> So I am thinking, maybe instead of having to manage both mmap and vma
> lock in stackmap.c, we can assume CONFIG_PER_VMA_LOCK=y, and have
>
> #ifndef CONFIG_PER_VMA_LOCK
> return -ENOTSUPP
> #endif
>
> somewhere in the stack_map_get_build_id_offset() callstack?
> Say in __bpf_get_stackid()?
>
> Thoughts?
>
I looks like you are right, it should be safe to drop
CONFIG_PER_VMA_LOCK=n case, I understand all platforms that care about
BPF going to have it enabled.
>> + if (!vma_start_read_locked(vma)) {
>> + mmap_read_unlock(mm);
>> + return NULL;
>> + }
>> + mmap_read_unlock(mm);
>> +#else
>> + lock->state = STACK_MAP_LOCKED_MMAP;
>> + lock->vma = vma;
>> + return vma;
>> +#endif
>> +
>> +vma_locked:
>> + lock->state = STACK_MAP_LOCKED_VMA;
>> + lock->vma = vma;
>> + return vma;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static void stack_map_unlock_vma(struct stack_map_vma_lock *lock)
>> +{
>> + struct vm_area_struct *vma = lock->vma;
>> + struct mm_struct *mm = lock->mm;
>> +
>> + switch (lock->state) {
>> + case STACK_MAP_LOCKED_VMA:
>> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!vma))
>> + break;
>> + vma_end_read(vma);
>> + break;
>> + case STACK_MAP_LOCKED_MMAP:
>> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!mm))
>> + break;
>> + mmap_read_unlock(mm);
>> + break;
>> + default:
>> + break;
>> + }
>> +
>> + lock->state = STACK_MAP_LOCKED_NONE;
>> + lock->vma = NULL;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static void stack_map_get_build_id_offset_sleepable(struct bpf_stack_build_id *id_offs,
>> + u32 trace_nr)
>> +{
>> + struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
>> + struct stack_map_vma_lock lock = {
>> + .state = STACK_MAP_LOCKED_NONE,
>> + .vma = NULL,
>> + .mm = mm,
>> + };
>> + struct file *file, *prev_file = NULL;
>> + unsigned long vm_pgoff, vm_start;
>> + struct vm_area_struct *vma;
>> + const char *prev_build_id;
>> + u64 ip;
>> +
>> + for (u32 i = 0; i < trace_nr; i++) {
>> + ip = READ_ONCE(id_offs[i].ip);
>> + vma = stack_map_lock_vma(&lock, ip);
>> + if (!vma || !vma->vm_file) {
>> + stack_map_build_id_set_ip(&id_offs[i]);
>> + stack_map_unlock_vma(&lock);
>> + continue;
>> + }
>> +
>> + file = vma->vm_file;
>> + vm_pgoff = vma->vm_pgoff;
>> + vm_start = vma->vm_start;
>> +
>> + if (file == prev_file) {
>> + memcpy(id_offs[i].build_id, prev_build_id, BUILD_ID_SIZE_MAX);
>> + stack_map_unlock_vma(&lock);
>> + goto build_id_valid;
>> + }
>> +
>> + file = get_file(file);
>> + stack_map_unlock_vma(&lock);
>> +
>> + /* build_id_parse_file() may block on filesystem reads */
>> + if (build_id_parse_file(file, id_offs[i].build_id, NULL)) {
>> + stack_map_build_id_set_ip(&id_offs[i]);
>> + fput(file);
>> + continue;
>> + }
>> +
>> + if (prev_file)
>> + fput(prev_file);
>> + prev_file = file;
>> + prev_build_id = id_offs[i].build_id;
>> +
>> +build_id_valid:
>> + id_offs[i].offset = (vm_pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT) + ip - vm_start;
>> + id_offs[i].status = BPF_STACK_BUILD_ID_VALID;
>> + }
>> +
>> + if (prev_file)
>> + fput(prev_file);
>> +}
>> +
>> /*
>> * Expects all id_offs[i].ip values to be set to correct initial IPs.
>> * They will be subsequently:
>> @@ -178,6 +312,11 @@ static void stack_map_get_build_id_offset(struct bpf_stack_build_id *id_offs,
>> const char *prev_build_id;
>> int i;
>>
>> + if (may_fault && has_user_ctx) {
>> + stack_map_get_build_id_offset_sleepable(id_offs, trace_nr);
>> + return;
>> + }
>> +
>> /* If the irq_work is in use, fall back to report ips. Same
>> * fallback is used for kernel stack (!user) on a stackmap with
>> * build_id.
>
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-04-09 14:51 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-04-09 1:06 [PATCH bpf v2 0/2] bpf: Implement stack_map_get_build_id_offset_sleepable() Ihor Solodrai
2026-04-09 1:06 ` [PATCH bpf v2 1/2] bpf: Factor out stack_map_build_id_set_ip() in stackmap.c Ihor Solodrai
2026-04-09 14:01 ` Mykyta Yatsenko
2026-04-09 1:06 ` [PATCH bpf v2 2/2] bpf: Avoid faultable build ID reads under mm locks Ihor Solodrai
2026-04-09 4:20 ` Ihor Solodrai
2026-04-09 14:51 ` Mykyta Yatsenko [this message]
2026-04-09 16:34 ` Mykyta Yatsenko
2026-05-12 3:40 ` Ihor Solodrai
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