From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S969279AbeEXNed (ORCPT ); Thu, 24 May 2018 09:34:33 -0400 Received: from usa-sjc-mx-foss1.foss.arm.com ([217.140.101.70]:44914 "EHLO foss.arm.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S965784AbeEXNe3 (ORCPT ); Thu, 24 May 2018 09:34:29 -0400 Subject: Re: [PATCH 04/14] arm64: Add ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 probing To: Will Deacon Cc: Marc Zyngier , linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu, Kees Cook , Catalin Marinas , Andy Lutomirski , Greg Kroah-Hartman , Thomas Gleixner References: <20180522150648.28297-1-marc.zyngier@arm.com> <20180522150648.28297-5-marc.zyngier@arm.com> <6c3e7b31-0bb6-353b-1b82-7ebdf3be1323@arm.com> <20180524113933.GA8689@arm.com> From: Suzuki K Poulose Message-ID: Date: Thu, 24 May 2018 14:34:25 +0100 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:52.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/52.7.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <20180524113933.GA8689@arm.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii; format=flowed Content-Language: en-US Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On 24/05/18 12:39, Will Deacon wrote: > On Thu, May 24, 2018 at 10:58:43AM +0100, Suzuki K Poulose wrote: >> On 22/05/18 16:06, Marc Zyngier wrote: >>> As for Spectre variant-2, we rely on SMCCC 1.1 to provide the >>> discovery mechanism for detecting the SSBD mitigation. >>> >>> A new capability is also allocated for that purpose, and a >>> config option. >>> >>> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier >> >> >>> +static bool has_ssbd_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, >>> + int scope) >>> +{ >>> + struct arm_smccc_res res; >>> + bool supported = true; >>> + >>> + WARN_ON(scope != SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU || preemptible()); >>> + >>> + if (psci_ops.smccc_version == SMCCC_VERSION_1_0) >>> + return false; >>> + >>> + /* >>> + * The probe function return value is either negative >>> + * (unsupported or mitigated), positive (unaffected), or zero >>> + * (requires mitigation). We only need to do anything in the >>> + * last case. >>> + */ >>> + switch (psci_ops.conduit) { >>> + case PSCI_CONDUIT_HVC: >>> + arm_smccc_1_1_hvc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID, >>> + ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2, &res); >>> + if ((int)res.a0 != 0) >>> + supported = false; >>> + break; >>> + >>> + case PSCI_CONDUIT_SMC: >>> + arm_smccc_1_1_smc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID, >>> + ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2, &res); >>> + if ((int)res.a0 != 0) >>> + supported = false; >>> + break; >>> + >>> + default: >>> + supported = false; >>> + } >>> + >>> + if (supported) { >>> + __this_cpu_write(arm64_ssbd_callback_required, 1); >>> + do_ssbd(true); >>> + } >> >> >> Marc, >> >> As discussed, we have minor issue with the "corner case". If a CPU >> is hotplugged in which requires the mitigation, after the system has >> finalised the cap to "not available", the CPU could go ahead and >> do the "work around" as above, while not effectively doing anything >> about it at runtime for KVM guests (as thats the only place where >> we rely on the CAP being set). >> >> But, yes this is real corner case. There is no easy way to solve it >> other than >> >> 1) Allow late modifications to CPU hwcaps >> >> OR >> >> 2) Penalise the fastpath to always check per-cpu setting. > > Shouldn't we just avoid bring up CPUs that require the mitigation after > we've finalised the capability to say that it's not required? Assuming this > is just another issue with maxcpus=, then I don't much care for it. Ah! Sorry, yes we do kill the CPU. But it is just that it will set the ssbd_callback_required flag and issue the do_ssbd(), which is not an issue. Yes this can only be triggered by maxcpus=. Suzuki