From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 88718C32793 for ; Wed, 18 Jan 2023 10:45:56 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S229499AbjARKpv (ORCPT ); Wed, 18 Jan 2023 05:45:51 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:37868 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229642AbjARKnQ (ORCPT ); Wed, 18 Jan 2023 05:43:16 -0500 Received: from www62.your-server.de (www62.your-server.de [213.133.104.62]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 31B8A676DE; Wed, 18 Jan 2023 01:49:14 -0800 (PST) Received: from sslproxy02.your-server.de ([78.47.166.47]) by www62.your-server.de with esmtpsa (TLS1.3) tls TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (Exim 4.94.2) (envelope-from ) id 1pI544-000GsH-Jt; Wed, 18 Jan 2023 10:49:04 +0100 Received: from [85.1.206.226] (helo=linux.home) by sslproxy02.your-server.de with esmtpsa (TLSv1.3:TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from ) id 1pI543-000TL6-U9; Wed, 18 Jan 2023 10:49:03 +0100 Subject: Re: [PATCH V2] bpf: security enhancement by limiting the offensive eBPF helpers To: Yi He , yhs@meta.com Cc: andrii@kernel.org, ast@kernel.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org, haoluo@google.com, john.fastabend@gmail.com, jolsa@kernel.org, kpsingh@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-trace-kernel@vger.kernel.org, martin.lau@linux.dev, mhiramat@kernel.org, rostedt@goodmis.org, sdf@google.com, song@kernel.org, yhs@fb.com References: <20230118005432.634229-1-clangllvm@126.com> From: Daniel Borkmann Message-ID: Date: Wed, 18 Jan 2023 10:49:03 +0100 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:60.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/60.7.2 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <20230118005432.634229-1-clangllvm@126.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8; format=flowed Content-Language: en-US Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Authenticated-Sender: daniel@iogearbox.net X-Virus-Scanned: Clear (ClamAV 0.103.7/26785/Wed Jan 18 09:42:40 2023) Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On 1/18/23 1:54 AM, Yi He wrote: > The bpf_send_singal, bpf_send_singal_thread and bpf_override_return > is similar to bpf_write_user and can affect userspace processes. > Thus, these three helpers should also be restricted by security lockdown. > > Signed-off-by: Yi He > --- > V1 -> V2: add security lockdown to bpf_send_singal_thread and remove > the unused LOCKDOWN_OFFENSIVE_BPF_MAX. > > include/linux/security.h | 2 ++ > kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 9 ++++++--- > 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h > index 5b67f208f..42420e620 100644 > --- a/include/linux/security.h > +++ b/include/linux/security.h > @@ -123,6 +123,8 @@ enum lockdown_reason { > LOCKDOWN_DEBUGFS, > LOCKDOWN_XMON_WR, > LOCKDOWN_BPF_WRITE_USER, > + LOCKDOWN_BPF_SEND_SIGNAL, > + LOCKDOWN_BPF_OVERRIDE_RETURN, > LOCKDOWN_DBG_WRITE_KERNEL, > LOCKDOWN_RTAS_ERROR_INJECTION, > LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX, I'm not applying this.. i) this means by default you effectively remove these helpers from existing users in the wild given integrity mode is default for secure boot, but also ii) should we lock-down and remove the ability for other privileged entities like processes to send signals, seccomp to ret_kill, ptrace, etc given they all "can affect userspace processes". For the other one, check out already existing FUNCTION_ERROR_INJECTION kernel config. > diff --git a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c > index 3bbd3f0c8..fdb94868d 100644 > --- a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c > +++ b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c > @@ -1463,9 +1463,11 @@ bpf_tracing_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func_id, const struct bpf_prog *prog) > return &bpf_cgrp_storage_delete_proto; > #endif > case BPF_FUNC_send_signal: > - return &bpf_send_signal_proto; > + return security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_BPF_SEND_SIGNAL) < 0 ? > + NULL : &bpf_send_signal_proto; > case BPF_FUNC_send_signal_thread: > - return &bpf_send_signal_thread_proto; > + return security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_BPF_SEND_SIGNAL) < 0 ? > + NULL : &bpf_send_signal_thread_proto; > case BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read_value: > return &bpf_perf_event_read_value_proto; > case BPF_FUNC_get_ns_current_pid_tgid: > @@ -1531,7 +1533,8 @@ kprobe_prog_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func_id, const struct bpf_prog *prog) > return &bpf_get_stack_proto; > #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_KPROBE_OVERRIDE > case BPF_FUNC_override_return: > - return &bpf_override_return_proto; > + return security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_BPF_OVERRIDE_RETURN) < 0 ? > + NULL : &bpf_override_return_proto; > #endif > case BPF_FUNC_get_func_ip: > return prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_KPROBE_MULTI ? >