From: "Nikunj A. Dadhania" <nikunj@amd.com>
To: thomas.lendacky@amd.com, x86@kernel.org
Cc: dionnaglaze@google.com, pgonda@google.com, seanjc@google.com,
pbonzini@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 00/14] Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests
Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2023 09:17:23 +0530 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <f200403b-c460-5ebb-fec5-c5caf0cdb006@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230814055222.1056404-1-nikunj@amd.com>
On 8/14/2023 11:22 AM, Nikunj A Dadhania wrote:
> Secure TSC allows guests to securely use RDTSC/RDTSCP instructions as the
> parameters being used cannot be changed by hypervisor once the guest is
> launched. More details in the AMD64 APM Vol 2, Section "Secure TSC".
>
> During the boot-up of the secondary cpus, SecureTSC enabled guests need to query
> TSC info from AMD Security Processor. This communication channel is encrypted
> between the AMD Security Processor and the guest, the hypervisor is just the
> conduit to deliver the guest messages to the AMD Security Processor. Each
> message is protected with an AEAD (AES-256 GCM). See "SEV Secure Nested Paging
> Firmware ABI Specification" document (currently at
> https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/56860.pdf) section "TSC Info"
>
> Use a minimal GCM library to encrypt/decrypt SNP Guest messages to communicate
> with the AMD Security Processor which is available at early boot.
>
> SEV-guest driver has the implementation for guest and AMD Security Processor
> communication. As the TSC_INFO needs to be initialized during early boot before
> smp cpus are started, move most of the sev-guest driver code to kernel/sev.c and
> provide well defined APIs to the sev-guest driver to use the interface to avoid
> code-duplication.
>
> Patches:
> 01-07: Preparation and movement of sev-guest driver code
> 08-14: SecureTSC enablement patches.
>
> Testing SecureTSC
> -----------------
>
> SecureTSC hypervisor patches based on top of SEV-SNP UPM series:
> https://github.com/nikunjad/linux/tree/snp-host-latest-securetsc
>
> QEMU changes:
> https://github.com/nikunjad/qemu/tree/snp_securetsc
>
> QEMU commandline SEV-SNP-UPM with SecureTSC:
>
> qemu-system-x86_64 -cpu EPYC-Milan-v2,+secure-tsc \
> -object memory-backend-memfd-private,id=ram1,size=1G,share=true \
> -object sev-snp-guest,id=sev0,cbitpos=51,reduced-phys-bits=1,secure-tsc=on \
> -machine q35,confidential-guest-support=sev0,memory-backend=ram1,kvm-type=protected \
> ...
>
> Changelog:
> ----------
> v4:
> * Drop handle_guest_request() and handle_guest_request_ext()
> * Drop NULL check for key
> * Corrected commit subject
> * Added Reviewed-by from Tom
A gentle reminder.
Regards
Nikunj
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-08-28 3:48 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-08-14 5:52 Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-08-14 5:52 ` [PATCH v4 01/14] virt: sev-guest: Use AES GCM crypto library Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-10-11 18:56 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-10-12 4:40 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2023-10-12 7:45 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-10-12 8:27 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2023-08-14 5:52 ` [PATCH v4 02/14] virt: sev-guest: Move mutex to SNP guest device structure Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-08-14 5:52 ` [PATCH v4 03/14] virt: sev-guest: Replace dev_dbg with pr_debug Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-08-14 5:52 ` [PATCH v4 04/14] virt: sev-guest: Add SNP guest request structure Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-08-14 5:52 ` [PATCH v4 05/14] virt: sev-guest: Add vmpck_id to snp_guest_dev struct Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-08-14 5:52 ` [PATCH v4 06/14] x86/sev: Cache the secrets page address Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-08-14 5:52 ` [PATCH v4 07/14] x86/sev: Move and reorganize sev guest request api Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-08-14 5:52 ` [PATCH v4 08/14] x86/mm: Add generic guest initialization hook Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-08-14 5:52 ` [PATCH v4 09/14] x86/sev: Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-08-14 5:52 ` [PATCH v4 10/14] x86/sev: Change TSC MSR behavior for Secure TSC enabled guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-08-14 5:52 ` [PATCH v4 11/14] x86/sev: Prevent RDTSC/RDTSCP interception " Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-08-14 5:52 ` [PATCH v4 12/14] x86/kvmclock: Skip kvmclock when Secure TSC is available Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-08-14 5:52 ` [PATCH v4 13/14] x86/tsc: Mark Secure TSC as reliable clocksource Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-08-14 5:52 ` [PATCH v4 14/14] x86/sev: Enable Secure TSC for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-08-28 3:47 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania [this message]
2023-10-04 5:35 ` [PATCH v4 00/14] Add Secure TSC support " Nikunj A. Dadhania
2023-10-04 7:01 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-10-05 13:57 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2023-10-05 14:32 ` Borislav Petkov
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