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From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Jordan Glover <Golden_Miller83@protonmail.ch>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
	Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>,
	Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
	Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
	LSM <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	"open list:DOCUMENTATION" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH security-next v5 00/30] LSM: Explict ordering
Date: Thu, 11 Oct 2018 16:48:14 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <f68e5f4b-6360-a9e7-597f-89d1d3ca73c1@canonical.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5j+kekUdcE2EhUu__8MXJ1O+D=-zTXLGNCRVa_VyDxePpw@mail.gmail.com>

On 10/11/2018 04:09 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Thu, Oct 11, 2018 at 3:58 PM, Jordan Glover
> <Golden_Miller83@protonmail.ch> wrote:
>> On Thursday, October 11, 2018 7:57 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
>>>     To switch to SELinux at boot time with
>>>     "CONFIG_LSM=yama,loadpin,integrity,apparmor", the old way continues to
>>>     work:
>>>
>>>     selinux=1 security=selinux
>>>
>>>     This will work still, since it will enable selinux (selinux=1) and
>>>     disable all other major LSMs (security=selinux).
>>>
>>>     The new way to enable selinux would be using
>>>     "lsm=yama,loadpin,integrity,selinux".
>>>
>>
>> It seems to me that legacy way is more user friendly than the new one.
>> AppArmor and SElinux are households names but the rest may be enigmatic
>> for most users and the need for explicit passing them all may be
>> troublesome. Especially when the new ones like sara,landlock or cows :)
>> will be incoming. Moreover to knew what you have to pass there, you need
>> to look at CONFIG_LSM in kernel config (which will vary across distros
>> and also mean copy-paste from the web source may won't work as expected)
>> which again most users don't do.
>>
>> I think there is risk that users will end up with "lsm=selinux" without
>> realizing that they may disable something along the way.
>>
>> I would prefer for "lsm=" to work as override to "CONFIG_LSM=" with
>> below assumptions:
>>
>> I. lsm="$lsm" will append "$lsm" at the end of string. Before extreme
>> stacking it will also remove the other major (explicit) lsm from it.
>>
>> II. lsm="!$lsm" will remove "$lsm" from the string.
>>
>> III. If "$lsm" already exist in the string, it's moved at the end of it
>> (this will cover ordering).
> 
> We've had things sort of like this proposed, but if you can convince
> James and others, I'm all for it. I think the standing objection from
> James and John about this is that the results of booting with
> "lsm=something" ends up depending on CONFIG_LSM= for that distro. So
> you end up with different behaviors instead of a consistent behavior
> across all distros.
> 

Its certainly a point that could confuse the user. I do have concerns
about it, but not something that is on a must haves list

> Now, in the future blob and extreme stacking world, having the
> explicit lsm= list shouldn't be too bad since LSMs will effectively
> ALL be initialized -- but they'll be inactive since they have no
> policy loaded.
> 

you are more optimistic about this than I am, but there will be at
least some movement towards this.

> But I still agree with you: I'd like a friendlier way to
> disable/enable specific LSMs, but an explicit lsm= seems to be the
> only way.
> 

Hrmmm, I don't know about the only way, but a way to provide the
explicit list, and also set a specific set as the default in the
Kconfig is a hard requirement.

The initial lsm.ebable, lsm.disable had too many issues, and for
various reasons I never managed to get back to kees' proposal
for using +.

That said, I do think the right approach for the initial pass is
the explicit list. It moves the arguments to the side and allows
this work to move forward.

>> It's possible that something lime this was discussed already
>> but without full examples it was hard to me for tracking things.
> 
> It's been a painful thread. ;)
> 

Indeed

  reply	other threads:[~2018-10-11 23:48 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 52+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-10-11  0:18 Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 01/30] LSM: Correctly announce start of LSM initialization Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 02/30] vmlinux.lds.h: Avoid copy/paste of security_init section Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 03/30] LSM: Rename .security_initcall section to .lsm_info Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 04/30] LSM: Remove initcall tracing Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 05/30] LSM: Convert from initcall to struct lsm_info Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 06/30] vmlinux.lds.h: Move LSM_TABLE into INIT_DATA Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 07/30] LSM: Convert security_initcall() into DEFINE_LSM() Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 08/30] LSM: Record LSM name in struct lsm_info Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 09/30] LSM: Provide init debugging infrastructure Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 10/30] LSM: Don't ignore initialization failures Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 11/30] LSM: Introduce LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 12/30] LSM: Provide separate ordered initialization Kees Cook
2018-11-02 18:13   ` Mimi Zohar
2018-11-02 20:49     ` Kees Cook
2018-11-05 14:13       ` Mimi Zohar
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 13/30] LoadPin: Rename boot param "enabled" to "enforce" Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 14/30] LSM: Plumb visibility into optional "enabled" state Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 15/30] LSM: Lift LSM selection out of individual LSMs Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 16/30] LSM: Build ordered list of LSMs to initialize Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 17/30] LSM: Introduce CONFIG_LSM Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 18/30] LSM: Introduce "lsm=" for boottime LSM selection Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 19/30] LSM: Tie enabling logic to presence in ordered list Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 20/30] LSM: Prepare for reorganizing "security=" logic Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 21/30] LSM: Refactor "security=" in terms of enable/disable Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 22/30] LSM: Separate idea of "major" LSM from "exclusive" LSM Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 23/30] apparmor: Remove SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 24/30] selinux: Remove SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 25/30] LSM: Add all exclusive LSMs to ordered initialization Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 26/30] LSM: Split LSM preparation from initialization Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 27/30] LoadPin: Initialize as ordered LSM Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 28/30] Yama: " Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 29/30] LSM: Introduce enum lsm_order Kees Cook
2018-10-11  0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 30/30] capability: Initialize as LSM_ORDER_FIRST Kees Cook
2018-10-11  3:45 ` [PATCH security-next v5 00/30] LSM: Explict ordering James Morris
2018-10-11 15:14   ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11 15:52     ` James Morris
2018-10-11 17:57 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11 22:58   ` Jordan Glover
2018-10-11 23:09     ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11 23:48       ` John Johansen [this message]
2018-10-12  0:11         ` Jordan Glover
2018-10-12  1:19           ` John Johansen
2018-10-12 11:31             ` Jordan Glover
2018-10-12 18:24               ` John Johansen
2018-10-12 19:01                 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-23 16:48                   ` Casey Schaufler
2018-10-23 18:50                     ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11 23:53       ` Jordan Glover
2018-10-12  0:26         ` John Johansen
2018-10-12 11:31           ` Jordan Glover
2018-10-12 18:11             ` John Johansen

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