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From: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
To: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 3/6] kvm: x86: Emulate split-lock access as a write
Date: Tue, 11 Feb 2020 22:02:55 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <f6d37da1-ce56-7a11-63d8-32126b76094a@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <d690c2e3-e9ef-a504-ede3-d0059ec1e0f6@redhat.com>

On 2/11/2020 9:34 PM, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> On 11/02/20 14:22, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
>> Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> writes:
>>> On 03/02/20 16:16, Xiaoyao Li wrote:
>>>> A sane guest should never tigger emulation on a split-lock access, but
>>>> it cannot prevent malicous guest from doing this. So just emulating the
>>>> access as a write if it's a split-lock access to avoid malicous guest
>>>> polluting the kernel log.
>>>
>>> Saying that anything doing a split lock access is malicious makes little
>>> sense.
>>
>> Correct, but we also have to accept, that split lock access can be used
>> in a malicious way, aka. DoS.
> 
> Indeed, a more accurate emulation such as temporarily disabling
> split-lock detection in the emulator would allow the guest to use split
> lock access as a vehicle for DoS, but that's not what the commit message
> says.  If it were only about polluting the kernel log, there's
> printk_ratelimited for that.  (In fact, if we went for incorrect
> emulation as in this patch, a rate-limited pr_warn would be a good idea).
> 
> It is much more convincing to say that since this is pretty much a
> theoretical case, we can assume that it is only done with the purpose of
> DoS-ing the host or something like that, and therefore we kill the guest.

So you think there is no need to emulate this feature and return #AC to 
guest?
Anyway, I'm fine with killing the guest.

BTW, Can it really be used for DoS purpose by malicious guest? Since 
it's in kvm emulator so it needs vm-exit first and won't the die() in 
kernel handler kill KVM? (Actually I'm not clear about KVM after die())

>>> Split lock detection is essentially a debugging feature, there's a
>>> reason why the MSR is called "TEST_CTL".  So you don't want to make the
>>
>> The fact that it ended up in MSR_TEST_CTL does not say anything. That's
>> where they it ended up to be as it was hastily cobbled together for
>> whatever reason.
> 
> Or perhaps it was there all the time in test silicon or something like
> that...  That would be a very plausible reason for all the quirks behind it.

Alright, I don't know the history of TEST_CTRL, there is a bit 31 in it 
which means "Disable LOCK# assertion for split locked access" when set. 
Bit 31 exists for a long period, but linux seems not use it so I guess 
it may be a testing purpose bit.

However, when it comes to bit 29, split lock #AC, the main purpose is to 
prevent any split lock more than debugging.

BTW, I guess the reason putting it in MSR_TEST_CTRL is that it's related 
with split lock as bit 31.

> Paolo
> 


  reply	other threads:[~2020-02-11 14:03 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-02-03 15:16 [PATCH v2 0/6] kvm/split_lock: Add feature split lock detection support in kvm Xiaoyao Li
2020-02-03 15:16 ` [PATCH v2 1/6] x86/split_lock: Add and export get_split_lock_detect_state() Xiaoyao Li
2020-02-03 21:45   ` Sean Christopherson
2020-02-03 15:16 ` [PATCH v2 2/6] x86/split_lock: Add and export split_lock_detect_set() Xiaoyao Li
2020-02-03 15:16 ` [PATCH v2 3/6] kvm: x86: Emulate split-lock access as a write Xiaoyao Li
2020-02-03 20:54   ` Sean Christopherson
2020-02-04  2:55     ` Xiaoyao Li
2020-02-11 12:20   ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-02-11 13:22     ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-02-11 13:34       ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-02-11 14:02         ` Xiaoyao Li [this message]
2020-02-11 14:34           ` David Laight
2020-02-27  0:11         ` Sean Christopherson
2020-03-12 11:42           ` Xiaoyao Li
2020-03-12 15:00             ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-02-03 15:16 ` [PATCH v2 4/6] kvm: vmx: Extend VMX's #AC handding for split lock in guest Xiaoyao Li
2020-02-03 21:14   ` Sean Christopherson
2020-02-04  6:46     ` Xiaoyao Li
2020-02-10 21:30       ` Sean Christopherson
2020-02-03 15:16 ` [PATCH v2 5/6] kvm: x86: Emulate MSR IA32_CORE_CAPABILITIES Xiaoyao Li
2020-02-03 21:43   ` Sean Christopherson
2020-02-04  9:19     ` Xiaoyao Li
2020-02-04  9:37       ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-02-11  3:52         ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-02-11 12:38           ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-02-03 15:16 ` [PATCH v2 6/6] x86: vmx: virtualize split lock detection Xiaoyao Li
2020-02-03 15:58   ` Xiaoyao Li
2020-02-03 18:52   ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-02-03 21:42   ` Sean Christopherson
2020-02-04  2:52     ` Xiaoyao Li
2020-02-04  5:35       ` Sean Christopherson

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