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From: "Huang, Kai" <kai.huang@intel.com>
To: "tglx@linutronix.de" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
	"khaliidcaliy@gmail.com" <khaliidcaliy@gmail.com>,
	"mingo@redhat.com" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"bp@alien8.de" <bp@alien8.de>,
	"dave.hansen@linux.intel.com" <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: "hpa@zytor.com" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4] x86/boot: Don't return encryption mask from __startup_64()
Date: Mon, 23 Jun 2025 11:26:14 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <f81447e67af13eb211ddb97511657931cd95f2f4.camel@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250619073652.719-1-khaliidcaliy@gmail.com>

On Thu, 2025-06-19 at 07:36 +0000, Khalid Ali wrote:
> Avoid returning the SME encryption mask from __startup_64(), and instead
> let the function handle encryption directly as needed. 
> 

Some nits below:

"the function" here is confusing, since it sounds like you are referring to
__startup_64(), but I think you actually meant its caller.

So, "the function" -> "the caller".


> The encryption
> mask is already available to callers and can be accessed via 

"callers" -> "users", since only functions can have callers?

Or just:

  The encryption mask is already available after sme_enable() and ...

? 

> sme_get_me_mask() in C code, or directly through the sme_me_mask symbol
> in assembly, if CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT is enabled.
> 
> This change aligns with how secondary_startup_64_no_verify handles SME
> and keeps the behavior consistent. For Intel CPUs, SME is not relevant,
> so there is no need to retrieve the mask unless CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
> is enabled.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Khalid Ali <khaliidcaliy@gmail.com>

Overall I think this patch makes code logic clearer, so:

Acked-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>

  reply	other threads:[~2025-06-23 11:26 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-06-19  7:36 Khalid Ali
2025-06-23 11:26 ` Huang, Kai [this message]
2025-06-25  6:40 ` kernel test robot
2025-06-25 10:55 ` Huang, Kai
2025-06-25 12:34   ` Khalid Ali

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