From: Josh Law <hlcj1234567@gmail.com>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Josh Law <objecting@objecting.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] lib/ts_bm: fix integer overflow in pattern length calculation
Date: Sun, 8 Mar 2026 20:06:12 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <f8bdab89-dc0e-4fc4-a2d3-d1a9ed711aca@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260308125519.dc842722209726977a8e14cc@linux-foundation.org>
8 Mar 2026 19:55:20 Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>:
> On Sun, 8 Mar 2026 18:10:53 +0000 Josh Law <hlcj1234567@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> From: Josh Law <objecting@objecting.org>
>>
>> The ts_bm algorithm computes the required allocation size by
>> multiplying the pattern length by the size of an integer. If the
>> pattern length is sufficiently large, this can overflow the 32-bit
>> unsigned int before it is widened to size_t. This could result in an
>> undersized allocation and a subsequent heap buffer overflow when
>> copying the pattern.
>>
>> Fix this by explicitly checking that the length does not exceed
>> the maximum safe threshold before calculating the buffer sizes.
>>
>> ...
>>
>> --- a/lib/ts_bm.c
>> +++ b/lib/ts_bm.c
>> @@ -166,6 +166,9 @@ static struct ts_config *bm_init(const void *pattern, unsigned int len,
>> unsigned int prefix_tbl_len = len * sizeof(unsigned int);
>> size_t priv_size = sizeof(*bm) + len + prefix_tbl_len;
>
> The above description is referring to this expression?
>
> I think the uints will be promoted to size_t before the addition occurs?
>
> If you're referring to the prefix_tbl_len initialization then yes,
> overflow could happen.
>
>> + if (unlikely(len == 0 || len > (UINT_MAX - sizeof(*bm)) / (sizeof(unsigned int) + 1)))
>> + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
>
> Seems odd to perform these (uncommented!) checks after having performed
> the problematic operations. Something like:
>
> unsigned int prefix_tbl_len;
> size_t priv_size;
>
> /* Explanatory comment goes here */
> /* Can this actually happen? */
> if (unlikely(len == 0))
> return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
>
> /* Explanatory comment goes here */
> if (unlikely(len > (UINT_MAX - sizeof(*bm)) / (sizeof(unsigned int) + 1))
> return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
>
> prefix_tbl_len = len * sizeof(unsigned int);
> priv_size = sizeof(*bm) + len + prefix_tbl_len;
>
>
> Also, please check the various helpers in overflow.h.
Yeah, I'm fixing that now, I also submitted a couple other patches you may want to have a look at
V/R
Josh law
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-03-08 20:06 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-03-08 18:10 Josh Law
2026-03-08 18:10 ` [PATCH v2 2/2] lib/ts_kmp: " Josh Law
2026-03-08 19:55 ` [PATCH v2 1/2] lib/ts_bm: " Andrew Morton
2026-03-08 20:06 ` Josh Law [this message]
2026-03-08 20:15 ` Josh Law
2026-03-08 20:17 ` [PATCH v3 " Josh Law
2026-03-08 20:17 ` [PATCH v3 2/2] lib/ts_kmp: " Josh Law
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=f8bdab89-dc0e-4fc4-a2d3-d1a9ed711aca@gmail.com \
--to=hlcj1234567@gmail.com \
--cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=objecting@objecting.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox
all inboxes | Powered by JetHome®