From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
To: Marc Orr <marcorr@google.com>, Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
Cc: kvm list <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
stable@vger.kernel.org, LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH V2] KVM: SEV: Acquire vcpu mutex when updating VMSA
Date: Tue, 21 Sep 2021 19:54:19 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <f911af87-ba9e-fca4-7950-61c636499c7d@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAA03e5E=qi4+4c0SUv7u4P4ouJOTN9XUmD_Q2h-kBtBhwKLVDA@mail.gmail.com>
On 16/09/21 00:40, Marc Orr wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 15, 2021 at 10:18 AM Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com> wrote:
>>
>> Adds vcpu mutex guard to the VMSA updating code. Refactors out
>> __sev_launch_update_vmsa() function to deal with per vCPU parts
>> of sev_launch_update_vmsa().
>
> Can you expand the changelog, and perhaps add a comment into the
> source code as well, to explain what grabbing the mutex protects us
> from? I assume that it's a poorly behaved user-space, rather than a
> race condition in a well-behaved user-space VMM, but I'm not certain.
>
> Other than that, the patch itself seems fine to me.
I added this:
The update-VMSA ioctl touches data stored in struct kvm_vcpu, and
therefore should not be performed concurrently with any VCPU ioctl
that might cause KVM or the processor to use the same data.
Paolo
>>
>> Fixes: ad73109ae7ec ("KVM: SVM: Provide support to launch and run an SEV-ES guest")
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
>> Cc: Marc Orr <marcorr@google.com>
>> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
>> Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
>> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
>> Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
>> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
>> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
>> ---
>>
>> V2
>> * Refactor per vcpu work to separate function.
>> * Remove check to skip already initialized VMSAs.
>> * Removed vmsa struct zeroing.
>>
>> ---
>> arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
>> 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
>> index 75e0b21ad07c..766510fe3abb 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
>> @@ -595,43 +595,50 @@ static int sev_es_sync_vmsa(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
>> return 0;
>> }
>>
>> -static int sev_launch_update_vmsa(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
>> +static int __sev_launch_update_vmsa(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
>> + int *error)
>> {
>> - struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
>> struct sev_data_launch_update_vmsa vmsa;
>> + struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
>> + int ret;
>> +
>> + /* Perform some pre-encryption checks against the VMSA */
>> + ret = sev_es_sync_vmsa(svm);
>> + if (ret)
>> + return ret;
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * The LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA command will perform in-place encryption of
>> + * the VMSA memory content (i.e it will write the same memory region
>> + * with the guest's key), so invalidate it first.
>> + */
>> + clflush_cache_range(svm->vmsa, PAGE_SIZE);
>> +
>> + vmsa.reserved = 0;
>> + vmsa.handle = to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info.handle;
>> + vmsa.address = __sme_pa(svm->vmsa);
>> + vmsa.len = PAGE_SIZE;
>> + return sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA, &vmsa, error);
>> +}
>> +
>> +static int sev_launch_update_vmsa(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
>> +{
>> struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
>> int i, ret;
>>
>> if (!sev_es_guest(kvm))
>> return -ENOTTY;
>>
>> - vmsa.reserved = 0;
>> -
>> - kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm) {
>> - struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
>> -
>> - /* Perform some pre-encryption checks against the VMSA */
>> - ret = sev_es_sync_vmsa(svm);
>> + kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm) {
>> + ret = mutex_lock_killable(&vcpu->mutex);
>> if (ret)
>> return ret;
>>
>> - /*
>> - * The LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA command will perform in-place
>> - * encryption of the VMSA memory content (i.e it will write
>> - * the same memory region with the guest's key), so invalidate
>> - * it first.
>> - */
>> - clflush_cache_range(svm->vmsa, PAGE_SIZE);
>> + ret = __sev_launch_update_vmsa(kvm, vcpu, &argp->error);
>>
>> - vmsa.handle = sev->handle;
>> - vmsa.address = __sme_pa(svm->vmsa);
>> - vmsa.len = PAGE_SIZE;
>> - ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA, &vmsa,
>> - &argp->error);
>> + mutex_unlock(&vcpu->mutex);
>> if (ret)
>> return ret;
>> -
>> - svm->vcpu.arch.guest_state_protected = true;
>> }
>>
>> return 0;
>> --
>> 2.33.0.464.g1972c5931b-goog
>>
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-09-21 17:54 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-09-15 17:17 Peter Gonda
2021-09-15 22:40 ` Marc Orr
2021-09-21 17:54 ` Paolo Bonzini [this message]
2021-09-21 17:54 ` Paolo Bonzini
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