From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
To: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
x86@kernel.org
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Roxana Bradescu <roxabee@chromium.org>,
Adam Langley <agl@google.com>, Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
"Jason A . Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>,
Pawan Kumar Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@intel.com>,
Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86: enable Data Operand Independent Timing Mode
Date: Fri, 3 Feb 2023 10:25:56 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <fbf8d93e-2426-67f7-33c6-fe7d1a1a15b2@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230125012801.362496-1-ebiggers@kernel.org>
BTW, I'm basically moving forward assuming that we're going to apply
this patch in _some_ form. I'm going to make some changes, but I'll
discuss them in this thread to make sure we're all on the same page first.
On 1/24/23 17:28, Eric Biggers wrote:
> +Affected CPUs
> +-------------
> +
> +This vulnerability affects Intel Core family processors based on the Ice Lake
> +and later microarchitectures, and Intel Atom family processors based on the
> +Gracemont and later microarchitectures. For more information, see Intel's
> +documentation [1]_.
I had a hard time following the docs in this area.
But I'm not sure this statement is correct. The docs actually say:
For Intel® Core™ family processors based on microarchitectures
before Ice Lake and Intel Atom® family processors based on
microarchitectures before Gracemont that do not enumerate
IA32_UARCH_MISC_CTL, developers may assume that the instructions
listed here operate as if DOITM is enabled.
A processor needs to be before "Ice Lake" and friends *AND* not
enumerate IA32_UARCH_MISC_CTL to be unaffected.
There's also another tweak that's needed because:
Processors that do not enumerate IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES[DOITM]
when the latest microcode is applied do not need to set
IA32_UARCH_MISC_CTL [DOITM] in order to have the behavior
described in this document...
First, we need to mention the "latest microcode" thing in the kernel
docs. I also _think_ the whole "microarchitectures before" stuff is
rather irrelevant and we can simplify this down to:
This vulnerability affects all Intel processors that support
MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES and set MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES[DOITM]
when the latest microcode is applied.
Which reminds me. This:
> +void update_doitm_msr(void)
> +{
> + u64 msr;
> +
> + if (doitm_off)
> + return;
> +
> + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_UARCH_MISC_CTL, msr);
> + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_UARCH_MISC_CTL, msr | UARCH_MISC_DOITM);
> +}
should probably be:
void update_doitm_msr(void)
{
u64 msr;
/*
* All processors that enumerate support for DOIT
* are affected *and* have the mitigation available.
*/
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_DODT))
return;
rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_UARCH_MISC_CTL, msr);
if (doitm_off)
msr &= ~UARCH_MISC_DOITM;
else
msr |= UARCH_MISC_DOITM;
wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_UARCH_MISC_CTL, msr);
}
in case the CPU isn't actually coming out of reset, like if kexec() left
DOITM=1.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-02-03 18:26 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-01-25 1:28 Eric Biggers
2023-01-25 3:07 ` Bagas Sanjaya
2023-01-25 15:29 ` Dave Hansen
2023-01-25 16:15 ` Dave Hansen
2023-01-25 16:22 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2023-01-25 16:45 ` Dave Hansen
2023-01-26 10:20 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2023-01-26 13:52 ` Jann Horn
2023-01-26 16:40 ` Dave Hansen
2023-01-26 17:52 ` Jann Horn
2023-01-26 19:12 ` Dave Hansen
2023-01-26 22:37 ` Eric Biggers
2023-01-26 23:58 ` Dave Hansen
2023-01-31 22:48 ` Dave Hansen
2023-02-01 6:54 ` Eric Biggers
2023-02-01 18:09 ` Dave Hansen
2023-02-01 22:33 ` Josh Triplett
2023-02-03 16:25 ` Dave Hansen
2026-03-18 15:33 ` Marvin Häuser
2026-03-18 15:44 ` Dave Hansen
2026-03-18 16:15 ` Eric Biggers
2026-03-18 16:23 ` Dave Hansen
[not found] ` <D5B3C493-BADA-4906-BB34-E5D60182F611@rptu.de>
2026-03-18 20:16 ` Marvin Häuser
2023-02-03 18:25 ` Dave Hansen [this message]
2023-03-03 3:32 ` Roxana Bradescu
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