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Fri, 25 Oct 2024 12:00:19 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [10.125.226.166] ([185.25.67.249]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id a640c23a62f3a-a9b1dec802csm100247366b.13.2024.10.25.12.00.18 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 bits=128/128); Fri, 25 Oct 2024 12:00:19 -0700 (PDT) Message-ID: Date: Fri, 25 Oct 2024 20:00:17 +0100 Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 User-Agent: Mozilla Thunderbird Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86: fix user address masking non-canonical speculation issue To: Linus Torvalds , Linux Kernel Mailing List Cc: x86@kernel.org, Josh Poimboeuf , Borislav Petkov References: <20241024013214.129639-1-torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Content-Language: en-GB From: Andrew Cooper Autocrypt: addr=andrew.cooper3@citrix.com; keydata= xsFNBFLhNn8BEADVhE+Hb8i0GV6mihnnr/uiQQdPF8kUoFzCOPXkf7jQ5sLYeJa0cQi6Penp VtiFYznTairnVsN5J+ujSTIb+OlMSJUWV4opS7WVNnxHbFTPYZVQ3erv7NKc2iVizCRZ2Kxn srM1oPXWRic8BIAdYOKOloF2300SL/bIpeD+x7h3w9B/qez7nOin5NzkxgFoaUeIal12pXSR Q354FKFoy6Vh96gc4VRqte3jw8mPuJQpfws+Pb+swvSf/i1q1+1I4jsRQQh2m6OTADHIqg2E ofTYAEh7R5HfPx0EXoEDMdRjOeKn8+vvkAwhviWXTHlG3R1QkbE5M/oywnZ83udJmi+lxjJ5 YhQ5IzomvJ16H0Bq+TLyVLO/VRksp1VR9HxCzItLNCS8PdpYYz5TC204ViycobYU65WMpzWe LFAGn8jSS25XIpqv0Y9k87dLbctKKA14Ifw2kq5OIVu2FuX+3i446JOa2vpCI9GcjCzi3oHV e00bzYiHMIl0FICrNJU0Kjho8pdo0m2uxkn6SYEpogAy9pnatUlO+erL4LqFUO7GXSdBRbw5 gNt25XTLdSFuZtMxkY3tq8MFss5QnjhehCVPEpE6y9ZjI4XB8ad1G4oBHVGK5LMsvg22PfMJ ISWFSHoF/B5+lHkCKWkFxZ0gZn33ju5n6/FOdEx4B8cMJt+cWwARAQABzSlBbmRyZXcgQ29v cGVyIDxhbmRyZXcuY29vcGVyM0BjaXRyaXguY29tPsLBegQTAQgAJAIbAwULCQgHAwUVCgkI CwUWAgMBAAIeAQIXgAUCWKD95wIZAQAKCRBlw/kGpdefoHbdD/9AIoR3k6fKl+RFiFpyAhvO 59ttDFI7nIAnlYngev2XUR3acFElJATHSDO0ju+hqWqAb8kVijXLops0gOfqt3VPZq9cuHlh IMDquatGLzAadfFx2eQYIYT+FYuMoPZy/aTUazmJIDVxP7L383grjIkn+7tAv+qeDfE+txL4 SAm1UHNvmdfgL2/lcmL3xRh7sub3nJilM93RWX1Pe5LBSDXO45uzCGEdst6uSlzYR/MEr+5Z JQQ32JV64zwvf/aKaagSQSQMYNX9JFgfZ3TKWC1KJQbX5ssoX/5hNLqxMcZV3TN7kU8I3kjK mPec9+1nECOjjJSO/h4P0sBZyIUGfguwzhEeGf4sMCuSEM4xjCnwiBwftR17sr0spYcOpqET ZGcAmyYcNjy6CYadNCnfR40vhhWuCfNCBzWnUW0lFoo12wb0YnzoOLjvfD6OL3JjIUJNOmJy RCsJ5IA/Iz33RhSVRmROu+TztwuThClw63g7+hoyewv7BemKyuU6FTVhjjW+XUWmS/FzknSi dAG+insr0746cTPpSkGl3KAXeWDGJzve7/SBBfyznWCMGaf8E2P1oOdIZRxHgWj0zNr1+ooF /PzgLPiCI4OMUttTlEKChgbUTQ+5o0P080JojqfXwbPAyumbaYcQNiH1/xYbJdOFSiBv9rpt TQTBLzDKXok86M7BTQRS4TZ/ARAAkgqudHsp+hd82UVkvgnlqZjzz2vyrYfz7bkPtXaGb9H4 Rfo7mQsEQavEBdWWjbga6eMnDqtu+FC+qeTGYebToxEyp2lKDSoAsvt8w82tIlP/EbmRbDVn 7bhjBlfRcFjVYw8uVDPptT0TV47vpoCVkTwcyb6OltJrvg/QzV9f07DJswuda1JH3/qvYu0p vjPnYvCq4NsqY2XSdAJ02HrdYPFtNyPEntu1n1KK+gJrstjtw7KsZ4ygXYrsm/oCBiVW/OgU g/XIlGErkrxe4vQvJyVwg6YH653YTX5hLLUEL1NS4TCo47RP+wi6y+TnuAL36UtK/uFyEuPy wwrDVcC4cIFhYSfsO0BumEI65yu7a8aHbGfq2lW251UcoU48Z27ZUUZd2Dr6O/n8poQHbaTd 6bJJSjzGGHZVbRP9UQ3lkmkmc0+XCHmj5WhwNNYjgbbmML7y0fsJT5RgvefAIFfHBg7fTY/i kBEimoUsTEQz+N4hbKwo1hULfVxDJStE4sbPhjbsPCrlXf6W9CxSyQ0qmZ2bXsLQYRj2xqd1 bpA+1o1j2N4/au1R/uSiUFjewJdT/LX1EklKDcQwpk06Af/N7VZtSfEJeRV04unbsKVXWZAk uAJyDDKN99ziC0Wz5kcPyVD1HNf8bgaqGDzrv3TfYjwqayRFcMf7xJaL9xXedMcAEQEAAcLB XwQYAQgACQUCUuE2fwIbDAAKCRBlw/kGpdefoG4XEACD1Qf/er8EA7g23HMxYWd3FXHThrVQ HgiGdk5Yh632vjOm9L4sd/GCEACVQKjsu98e8o3ysitFlznEns5EAAXEbITrgKWXDDUWGYxd pnjj2u+GkVdsOAGk0kxczX6s+VRBhpbBI2PWnOsRJgU2n10PZ3mZD4Xu9kU2IXYmuW+e5KCA vTArRUdCrAtIa1k01sPipPPw6dfxx2e5asy21YOytzxuWFfJTGnVxZZSCyLUO83sh6OZhJkk b9rxL9wPmpN/t2IPaEKoAc0FTQZS36wAMOXkBh24PQ9gaLJvfPKpNzGD8XWR5HHF0NLIJhgg 4ZlEXQ2fVp3XrtocHqhu4UZR4koCijgB8sB7Tb0GCpwK+C4UePdFLfhKyRdSXuvY3AHJd4CP 4JzW0Bzq/WXY3XMOzUTYApGQpnUpdOmuQSfpV9MQO+/jo7r6yPbxT7CwRS5dcQPzUiuHLK9i nvjREdh84qycnx0/6dDroYhp0DFv4udxuAvt1h4wGwTPRQZerSm4xaYegEFusyhbZrI0U9tJ B8WrhBLXDiYlyJT6zOV2yZFuW47VrLsjYnHwn27hmxTC/7tvG3euCklmkn9Sl9IAKFu29RSo d5bD8kMSCYsTqtTfT6W4A3qHGvIDta3ptLYpIAOD2sY3GYq2nf3Bbzx81wZK14JdDDHUX2Rs 6+ahAA== In-Reply-To: <20241024013214.129639-1-torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit On 24/10/2024 2:31 am, Linus Torvalds wrote: > It turns out that AMD has a "Meltdown Lite(tm)" issue with non-canonical > accesses in kernel space. And so using just the high bit to decide > whether an access is in user space or kernel space ends up with the good > old "leak speculative data" if you have the right gadget using the > result: > > CVE-2020-12965 “Transient Execution of Non-Canonical Accesses“ > > Now, the kernel surrounds the access with a STAC/CLAC pair, and those > instructions end up serializing execution on older Zen architectures, > which closes the speculation window. > > But that was true only up until Zen 5, which renames the AC bit [1]. > That improves performance of STAC/CLAC a lot, but also means that the > speculation window is now open. > > Note that this affects not just the new address masking, but also the > regular valid_user_address() check used by access_ok(), and the asm > version of the sign bit check in the get_user() helpers. > > It does not affect put_user() or clear_user() variants, since there's no > speculative result to be used in a gadget for those operations. > > Reported-by: Andrew Cooper > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/80d94591-1297-4afb-b510-c665efd37f10@citrix.com/ > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241023094448.GAZxjFkEOOF_DM83TQ@fat_crate.local/ [1] > Link: https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security/bulletin/amd-sb-1010.html > Link: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2108.10771 > Cc: Josh Poimboeuf > Cc: Borislav Petkov > Fixes: 2865baf54077 ("x86: support user address masking instead of non-speculative conditional") > Fixes: 6014bc27561f ("x86-64: make access_ok() independent of LAM") > Fixes: b19b74bc99b1 ("x86/mm: Rework address range check in get_user() and put_user()") > Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Thankyou.  This looks a whole lot safer than the prior options. Tentatively Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper , but it's probably worth trying to get AMD to rubber stamp it too.