From: "Kalra, Ashish" <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
To: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
"Maciej W. Rozycki" <macro@orcam.me.uk>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Kevin Loughlin <kevinloughlin@google.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/tdx: Fix crash on kexec with CONFIG_EISA
Date: Fri, 30 Aug 2024 15:47:50 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <fe39a04d-2b3a-476f-9505-b874e3ad93b4@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <gnxxp3bzk7cc5eidwvqvqb5hz2ojgjdadujpthweufxms2gjsc@ibcbkjst3pzf>
Hello Kirill,
On 8/29/2024 7:53 AM, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> On Wed, Aug 28, 2024 at 02:43:23PM -0500, Kalra, Ashish wrote:
>> Hello Kirill,
>>
>> On 8/28/2024 1:21 AM, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
>>>>>> memremap()
>>>>>> arch_memremap_wb()
>>>>>> ioremap_cache()
>>>>>> __ioremap_caller(.encrytped = false)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I think arch_memremap_wb() should be mapped ioremap_encrypted() in x86
>>>>>> case. See the patch below.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It seems to be working fine on TDX, but I am not sure about SEV.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Tom, any comments?
>>>>> I haven't dug through the code that thoroughly, but I don't think making
>>>>> arch_memremap_wb() be ioremap_encrypted() will work for SME, where some
>>>>> data, e.g. setup data, is unencrypted and needs to be mapped shared.
>>>>>
>>>>> Let me add @Ashish to the thread and have him investigate this since he
>>>>> has been working on the kexec support under SNP. Can someone provide the
>>>>> specific kernel options that need to be in place?
>>>> As Tom asked for, please provide the specific kernel options to test
>>>> with this configuration.
>>> It is not about testing a specific configuration. The question is if it
>>> safe for memremap() to map all WB memory as encrypted by default.
>>>
>>> Looks like it is safe for TDX, but I am not sure about SME/SEV.
>> For SEV it may make sense, but for SME we don't want memremap() to map
>> all WB memory as encrypted by default.
> Could you elaborate why?
>
> I mean if it is specific memory ranges that can be identified as such we
> could make exception for them.
Looks like that the exception is already made for some of these memory ranges with MEMREMAP_DEC flag set along with MEMREMAP_WB.
>>> Maybe we want a specific flag to make memremap() map WB memory as
>>> decrypted/shared. Make everything encrypted by default seems like a sane
>>> default.
>> What are MEMREMAP_ENC, MEMREMAP_DEC flags being used for currently ?
> Good question.
>
> I see zero use of MEMREMAP_ENC in the kernel. And MEMREMAP_DEC only used
> for setup data which I believe AMD thing.
>
> If it is the only memory that must be decrypted, I guess we can make it
> work with encrypted by default.
Yes, and this looks pretty much covered with:
arch_memremap_can_ram_remap(..)
-> if (CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_REMAP)
--> memremap_is_setup_data()
---> memremap(.., MEMREMAP_WB | MEMREMAP_DEC);
It does look like that it can work with encrypted by default and any memory ranges which need special handling and need to be setup as decrypted can use MEMREMAP_WB | MEMREMAP_DEC flag.
Thanks, Ashish
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-08-30 20:47 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-08-22 9:51 Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-08-24 22:29 ` Maciej W. Rozycki
2024-08-26 12:25 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-08-26 15:52 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-08-27 22:15 ` Kalra, Ashish
2024-08-28 6:21 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-08-28 19:43 ` Kalra, Ashish
2024-08-29 12:53 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2024-08-30 20:47 ` Kalra, Ashish [this message]
2024-09-10 12:58 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
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