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From: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
To: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
	Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
	David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
	Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>,
	Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>,
	Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>,
	Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>, Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org
Subject: [Patch v5 09/16] x86/smt: Convert cpu_smt_control check to cpu_smt_enabled static key
Date: Fri, 16 Nov 2018 17:53:52 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <ff3d60388c52043b477a16100b76114c6d8fbaee.1542418937.git.tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1542418936.git.tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
In-Reply-To: <cover.1542418936.git.tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>

The checks to cpu_smt_control outside of kernel/cpu.c can be converted
to use cpu_smt_enabled key to run SMT specific code.

Save the export of cpu_smt_control and convert usage of cpu_smt_control
to cpu_smt_enabled outside of kernel/cpu.c.

Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 21 +++++++++++++++------
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c         |  2 +-
 include/linux/cpu.h        |  8 --------
 kernel/cpu.c               |  9 ++++++++-
 4 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index e4cfc4a..6e1b910 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -356,15 +356,16 @@ void arch_smt_update(void)
 
 	mutex_lock(&spec_ctrl_mutex);
 	mask = x86_spec_ctrl_base;
-	if (cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_ENABLED)
+	if (static_branch_likely(&cpu_smt_enabled))
 		mask |= SPEC_CTRL_STIBP;
 	else
 		mask &= ~SPEC_CTRL_STIBP;
 
 	if (mask != x86_spec_ctrl_base) {
-		pr_info("Spectre v2 cross-process SMT mitigation: %s STIBP\n",
-				cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_ENABLED ?
-				"Enabling" : "Disabling");
+		if (static_branch_likely(&cpu_smt_enabled))
+			pr_info("Spectre v2 cross-process SMT mitigation: Enabling STIBP\n");
+		else
+			pr_info("Spectre v2 cross-process SMT mitigation: Disabling STIBP\n");
 		x86_spec_ctrl_base = mask;
 		on_each_cpu(update_stibp_msr, NULL, 1);
 	}
@@ -840,6 +841,14 @@ static const char *l1tf_vmx_states[] = {
 	[VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NOT_REQUIRED]	= "flush not necessary"
 };
 
+static char *l1tf_show_smt_vulnerable(void)
+{
+	if (static_branch_likely(&cpu_smt_enabled))
+		return "vulnerable";
+	else
+		return "disabled";
+}
+
 static ssize_t l1tf_show_state(char *buf)
 {
 	if (l1tf_vmx_mitigation == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO)
@@ -847,13 +856,13 @@ static ssize_t l1tf_show_state(char *buf)
 
 	if (l1tf_vmx_mitigation == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_EPT_DISABLED ||
 	    (l1tf_vmx_mitigation == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER &&
-	     cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_ENABLED))
+	     static_branch_likely(&cpu_smt_enabled)))
 		return sprintf(buf, "%s; VMX: %s\n", L1TF_DEFAULT_MSG,
 			       l1tf_vmx_states[l1tf_vmx_mitigation]);
 
 	return sprintf(buf, "%s; VMX: %s, SMT %s\n", L1TF_DEFAULT_MSG,
 		       l1tf_vmx_states[l1tf_vmx_mitigation],
-		       cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_ENABLED ? "vulnerable" : "disabled");
+		       l1tf_show_smt_vulnerable());
 }
 #else
 static ssize_t l1tf_show_state(char *buf)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
index 4555077..accfd2c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
@@ -11607,7 +11607,7 @@ static int vmx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
 			 * Warn upon starting the first VM in a potentially
 			 * insecure environment.
 			 */
-			if (cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_ENABLED)
+			if (static_branch_likely(&cpu_smt_enabled))
 				pr_warn_once(L1TF_MSG_SMT);
 			if (l1tf_vmx_mitigation == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER)
 				pr_warn_once(L1TF_MSG_L1D);
diff --git a/include/linux/cpu.h b/include/linux/cpu.h
index b54f085..00af2ae 100644
--- a/include/linux/cpu.h
+++ b/include/linux/cpu.h
@@ -170,15 +170,7 @@ void cpuhp_report_idle_dead(void);
 static inline void cpuhp_report_idle_dead(void) { }
 #endif /* #ifdef CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU */
 
-enum cpuhp_smt_control {
-	CPU_SMT_ENABLED,
-	CPU_SMT_DISABLED,
-	CPU_SMT_FORCE_DISABLED,
-	CPU_SMT_NOT_SUPPORTED,
-};
-
 #if defined(CONFIG_SMP) && defined(CONFIG_HOTPLUG_SMT)
-extern enum cpuhp_smt_control cpu_smt_control;
 extern void cpu_smt_disable(bool force);
 extern void cpu_smt_check_topology_early(void);
 extern void cpu_smt_check_topology(void);
diff --git a/kernel/cpu.c b/kernel/cpu.c
index e216154..54cf3f6 100644
--- a/kernel/cpu.c
+++ b/kernel/cpu.c
@@ -368,8 +368,15 @@ static void lockdep_release_cpus_lock(void)
 #endif	/* CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_HOTPLUG_SMT
+
+enum cpuhp_smt_control {
+        CPU_SMT_ENABLED,
+        CPU_SMT_DISABLED,
+        CPU_SMT_FORCE_DISABLED,
+        CPU_SMT_NOT_SUPPORTED,
+};
+
 enum cpuhp_smt_control cpu_smt_control __read_mostly = CPU_SMT_ENABLED;
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(cpu_smt_control);
 DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE(cpu_smt_enabled);
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(cpu_smt_enabled);
 
-- 
2.9.4


  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-11-17  2:27 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 64+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-11-17  1:53 [Patch v5 00/16] Provide task property based options to enable Spectre v2 userspace-userspace protection Tim Chen
2018-11-17  1:53 ` [Patch v5 01/16] x86/speculation: Clean up spectre_v2_parse_cmdline() Tim Chen
2018-11-17  1:53 ` [Patch v5 02/16] x86/speculation: Remove unnecessary ret variable in cpu_show_common() Tim Chen
2018-11-17  1:53 ` [Patch v5 03/16] x86/speculation: Reorganize cpu_show_common() Tim Chen
2018-11-17  1:53 ` [Patch v5 04/16] x86/speculation: Add X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_ENHANCED Tim Chen
2018-11-17  1:53 ` [Patch v5 05/16] x86/speculation: Disable STIBP when enhanced IBRS is in use Tim Chen
2018-11-17  1:53 ` [Patch v5 06/16] x86/speculation: Rename SSBD update functions Tim Chen
2018-11-17  1:53 ` [Patch v5 07/16] x86/speculation: Reorganize speculation control MSRs update Tim Chen
2018-11-17  1:53 ` [Patch v5 08/16] smt: Create cpu_smt_enabled static key for SMT specific code Tim Chen
2018-11-19 12:58   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-19 20:50     ` Tim Chen
2018-11-19 14:57   ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-11-19 18:08     ` Tim Chen
2018-11-19 19:03       ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-19 19:25         ` Tim Chen
2018-11-17  1:53 ` Tim Chen [this message]
2018-11-19 12:48   ` [Patch v5 09/16] x86/smt: Convert cpu_smt_control check to cpu_smt_enabled static key Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-19 12:59     ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-17  1:53 ` [Patch v5 10/16] x86/speculation: Turn on or off STIBP according to a task's TIF_STIBP Tim Chen
2018-11-17  1:53 ` [Patch v5 11/16] x86/speculation: Add Spectre v2 app to app protection modes Tim Chen
2018-11-17  9:47   ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-18 22:59     ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-19 13:36       ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-19 13:49         ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-19 13:51           ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-19 14:00             ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-19 18:31               ` Tim Chen
2018-11-19 19:32           ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-11-19 19:39             ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-19 21:40               ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-11-19 21:33             ` Dave Hansen
2018-11-19 23:16               ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-11-19 23:25                 ` Dave Hansen
2018-11-19 23:45                   ` Andrea Arcangeli
2018-11-20  0:22                 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-19 13:32   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-20  0:08     ` Tim Chen
2018-11-20  0:30       ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-20  1:14         ` Tim Chen
2018-11-20  1:17         ` Andi Kleen
2018-11-19 15:00   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-19 18:27     ` Tim Chen
2018-11-19 18:31       ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-19 20:21   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-19 22:44     ` Tim Chen
2018-11-19 20:46   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-19 20:55     ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-19 21:12       ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-19 22:48       ` Tim Chen
2018-11-19 23:01         ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-19 23:23           ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-20  0:00             ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-20  0:24               ` Tim Chen
2018-11-19 23:39           ` Dave Hansen
2018-11-19 23:49             ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-20  0:02               ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-17  1:53 ` [Patch v5 12/16] x86/speculation: Create PRCTL interface to restrict indirect branch speculation Tim Chen
2018-11-17  9:53   ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-19 18:29     ` Tim Chen
2018-11-17  1:53 ` [Patch v5 13/16] security: Update speculation restriction of a process when modifying its dumpability Tim Chen
2018-11-17  1:53 ` [Patch v5 14/16] x86/speculation: Use STIBP to restrict speculation on non-dumpable task Tim Chen
2018-11-17  1:53 ` [Patch v5 15/16] x86/speculation: Update comment on TIF_SSBD Tim Chen
2018-11-17  1:53 ` [Patch v5 16/16] x86: Group thread info flags by functionality Tim Chen
2018-11-17  9:34 ` [Patch v5 00/16] Provide task property based options to enable Spectre v2 userspace-userspace protection Jiri Kosina

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