From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To: Chandru <chandru@in.ibm.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC]: Possible race condition on an SMP between proc_lookupfd and tasks on other cpus
Date: Fri, 13 Oct 2006 10:29:08 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <m1hcy8gox7.fsf@ebiederm.dsl.xmission.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <452F8364.9050803@in.ibm.com> (chandru@in.ibm.com's message of "Fri, 13 Oct 2006 17:45:32 +0530")
Chandru <chandru@in.ibm.com> writes:
> Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>> You certain seem to be in one of the proc stress conditions so this
>> may not be a unique bug.
>>
>> Digging through the disassembly and figuring out which access you died
>> on would be interesting, so we could know with precision which part
>> of tid_fd_revalidate we are dying in. My ppc64 isn't good enough especially
>> without the matching binaries to figure that out though.
>> All I know is that you are about 25 instructions into
>> tid_fd_revalidate.
>>
> From the disassembly in xmon, the code that failed while running was in
> fcheck_files() called from tid_fd_revalidate()
> Further the contents of 'struct files_struct *files' were all filled with
> '0x6b's. I tried to look in to for which task the lookup was being done and the
> task seemed to be 'execve04'. Also noticed that another cpu ( cpu #1) was
> running on an execve code path ( do not have the state of the system right now
> to copy it's backtrace :( ).
Which kernel version did you say you were running.
This appears to be a case of calling put_files_struct without changing
the pointer in the task_struct. So we are reading a stale pointer
in get_files_struct.
It looks like the patch below added fixed a bug that has the same symptoms
as what you are describing. So I suspect this is fixed in linus's tree
already.
>commit 3b9b8ab65d8eed784b9164d03807cb2bda7b5cd6
>Author: Kirill Korotaev <dev@sw.ru>
>Date: Fri Sep 29 02:00:05 2006 -0700
>
> [PATCH] Fix unserialized task->files changing
>
> Fixed race on put_files_struct on exec with proc. Restoring files on
> current on error path may lead to proc having a pointer to already kfree-d
> files_struct.
>
> ->files changing at exit.c and khtread.c are safe as exit_files() makes all
> things under lock.
>
> Found during OpenVZ stress testing.
>
> [akpm@osdl.org: add export]
> Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelianov <xemul@openvz.org>
> Signed-off-by: Kirill Korotaev <dev@openvz.org>
> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Eric
prev parent reply other threads:[~2006-10-13 16:30 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2006-10-11 9:16 Chandru
2006-10-12 19:29 ` Eric W. Biederman
2006-10-13 12:15 ` Chandru
2006-10-13 16:29 ` Eric W. Biederman [this message]
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