From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1755001AbYEaCBV (ORCPT ); Fri, 30 May 2008 22:01:21 -0400 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S1750914AbYEaCBE (ORCPT ); Fri, 30 May 2008 22:01:04 -0400 Received: from out02.mta.xmission.com ([166.70.13.232]:49052 "EHLO out02.mta.xmission.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1750714AbYEaCBB (ORCPT ); Fri, 30 May 2008 22:01:01 -0400 From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman) To: Stephen Hemminger Cc: akpm@linuxfoundation.org, Chris Wright , stephen.hemminger@vyatta.com, adobriyan@gmail.com, morgan@kernel.org, xemul@openvz.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org References: <200805292349.m4TNneua029348@imap1.linux-foundation.org> <20080530161857.25e3fbc5@extreme> Date: Fri, 30 May 2008 18:59:26 -0700 In-Reply-To: <20080530161857.25e3fbc5@extreme> (Stephen Hemminger's message of "Fri, 30 May 2008 16:18:57 -0700") Message-ID: User-Agent: Gnus/5.110006 (No Gnus v0.6) Emacs/21.4 (gnu/linux) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 24.130.11.59 X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: ebiederm@xmission.com X-Spam-DCC: XMission; sa03 1397; Body=1 Fuz1=1 Fuz2=1 X-Spam-Combo: ;Stephen Hemminger X-Spam-Report: * -1.8 ALL_TRUSTED Passed through trusted hosts only via SMTP * 0.0 T_TM2_M_HEADER_IN_MSG BODY: T_TM2_M_HEADER_IN_MSG * -1.1 BAYES_05 BODY: Bayesian spam probability is 1 to 5% * [score: 0.0395] * -0.0 DCC_CHECK_NEGATIVE Not listed in DCC * [sa03 1397; Body=1 Fuz1=1 Fuz2=1] * 0.0 XM_SPF_Neutral SPF-Neutral Subject: Re: [PATCH] sysctl: allow override of /proc/sys/net with CAP_NET_ADMIN X-SA-Exim-Version: 4.2 (built Thu, 03 Mar 2005 10:44:12 +0100) X-SA-Exim-Scanned: Yes (on mgr1.xmission.com) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Stephen Hemminger writes: > Extend the permission check for networking sysctl's to allow > modification when current process has CAP_NET_ADMIN capability and > is not root. This version uses the until now unused permissions hook > to override the mode value for /proc/sys/net if accessed by a user > with capabilities. Looks reasonable but a little incomplete. Could you modify register_net_sysctl_table to set this attribute? Or alternatively all of the tables registered with register_net_sysctl. Otherwise I this will not affect all of the sysctls under /proc/sys/net. Which appears to be your intent. > Found while working with Quagga. It is impossible to turn forwarding > on/off through the command interface because Quagga uses secure coding > practice of dropping privledges during initialization and only raising > via capabilities when necessary. Since the dameon has reset real/effective > uid after initialization, all attempts to access /proc/sys/net variables > will fail. Eric