From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1759608AbYEYTfV (ORCPT ); Sun, 25 May 2008 15:35:21 -0400 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S1754531AbYEYTfI (ORCPT ); Sun, 25 May 2008 15:35:08 -0400 Received: from main.gmane.org ([80.91.229.2]:38176 "EHLO ciao.gmane.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1754180AbYEYTfH (ORCPT ); Sun, 25 May 2008 15:35:07 -0400 X-Injected-Via-Gmane: http://gmane.org/ To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: Benny Amorsen Subject: Re: [PATCH] drivers/net: remove network drivers' last few uses of IRQF_SAMPLE_RANDOM Date: Sun, 25 May 2008 21:33:45 +0200 Message-ID: References: <20080515142154.0595e475@core> <36D9DB17C6DE9E40B059440DB8D95F52052D71BB@orsmsx418.amr.corp.intel.com> <482C7B18.6060003@garzik.org> <482C7E53.3050300@hp.com> <482C8184.2030906@garzik.org> <482C8550.5000909@intel.com> <482C8D4D.3040702@garzik.org> <20080516132107.GA11304@csclub.uwaterloo.ca> <20080516161029.44ded734@core> <20080516173610.GA27126@csclub.uwaterloo.ca> <20080516191125.46f59ad6@core> <1211727722.5913.63.camel@andromache> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii X-Complaints-To: usenet@ger.gmane.org X-Gmane-NNTP-Posting-Host: hd5b9080a.c45-01-12.sta.perspektivbredband.net User-Agent: Gnus/5.11 (Gnus v5.11) Emacs/22.2 (gnu/linux) Cancel-Lock: sha1:K4vVtu+avRRV1buS+7/z9unDtpQ= Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Glen Turner writes: > On Fri, 2008-05-16 at 22:34 +0200, Benny Amorsen wrote: > >> Perhaps it would be possible to make most types of interrupts add >> entropy, but not credit any entropy? > > You need to be certain that those sources are not able > to be influenced by a hostile party, otherwise the entropy > pool can be degraded to be less random over successive samples > than its entropy score suggests. Not if we don't credit any entropy. /dev/random is engineered to be safe against getting non-random input, as long as that input isn't credited with entropy. /dev/random is even world writable by default. /Benny