From: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
To: Rudolf Polzer <debian-ne@durchnull.de>
Cc: Horms <horms@verge.net.au>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, 334113@bugs.debian.org,
Alastair McKinstry <mckinstry@debian.org>,
security@kernel.org, team@security.debian.org,
secure-testing-team@lists.alioth.debian.org
Subject: Re: kernel allows loadkeys to be used by any user, allowing for local root compromise
Date: Tue, 18 Oct 2005 20:41:19 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <m3fyqyhdm8.fsf@defiant.localdomain> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20051018171645.GA59028%atfield-dt@durchnull.de> (Rudolf Polzer's message of "Tue, 18 Oct 2005 19:16:45 +0200")
Rudolf Polzer <debian-ne@durchnull.de> writes:
> That does not help against the loadkeys issue if the attacking user is still
> logged in on another virtual console. Even when tty1 is active, a user owning
> tty6 can use loadkeys.
Sure. The problem is that mappings are shared between VCs but anyway
it's solved by disabling user changes.
I don't think there is a solution here, easier than hardware reset.
As for "server" machines (not simple terminals), physical locking is
critical.
> Well, sometimes you have problems that powercycling would "hide" so you can't
> track them down if you powercycle the whole computer every time.
In security-sensitive instalation, you simply don't expose the computers
to non-admins.
> For using foreign languages and keyboard mappings.
Hope they don't change the keys in the process.
Anyway, most people don't need that nor they need suid-wrapper.
BTW: there are similar problems with serial access: users can play
with termio(s) settings (especially CLOCAL flag) and fake
login/password requests. Unless the getty programs are fixed,
you don't want to connect dial-in modems to a machine with user
accounts. Not a kernel thing, though - Linux has termios locking
for 10+ yrs.
--
Krzysztof Halasa
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2005-10-18 18:41 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <E1EQofT-0001WP-00@master.debian.org>
2005-10-18 4:41 ` Horms
2005-10-18 6:52 ` [Security] " Andrew Morton
2005-10-18 8:59 ` Horms
2005-10-18 14:42 ` Krzysztof Halasa
2005-10-18 17:16 ` Rudolf Polzer
2005-10-18 18:41 ` Krzysztof Halasa [this message]
2005-10-18 20:49 ` Rudolf Polzer
2005-10-19 11:18 ` Krzysztof Halasa
2005-10-19 13:23 ` Rudolf Polzer
2005-10-19 19:32 ` Krzysztof Halasa
2005-10-19 20:24 ` Rudolf Polzer
2005-10-19 22:57 ` Krzysztof Halasa
2005-10-19 23:12 ` Rudolf Polzer
2005-10-20 15:05 ` Krzysztof Halasa
2005-10-19 4:14 ` [Secure-testing-team] " Anthony DeRobertis
2005-10-19 11:00 ` Krzysztof Halasa
2005-10-20 2:42 ` Paul Jakma
2005-10-20 23:22 ` Bill Davidsen
2005-10-18 21:19 ` [Secure-testing-team] " Moritz Muehlenhoff
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