From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from mx1.secunet.com (mx1.secunet.com [62.96.220.36]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 6E6B33612F1; Tue, 6 Oct 2026 07:06:28 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=62.96.220.36 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1791270390; cv=none; b=Ejq6yxr62nOMoSSpiGNX7iuxC1kDVW9RU8URm94kJKveD2UX8O2zOeU5FVnlfI/FzVxBT71arSOp72WcQtNIp/OiOkGjHT3P7Yb8zzDHoDGB//Xlti93IVSqtww+7HOjWAXLQepjHJOKPgAVPLwhJNnK47b5FnpwEegCWtFsqQ0= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1791270390; c=relaxed/simple; bh=ZH1f/H8Fh4vX/luAQ/6zICcJVZllTWTaFdoYU3cENBo=; h=From:To:CC:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version:Content-Type; b=KlRc3CPeqZMHIh5UP5Hi32Sl2imAU3raPg4N902aVawBHHm61Zq0ucqWud3Z0VmB0z52KUOG4mfK8uc6v2PHxnNMndwsCcHo7QZTxXJBI4gCmhWj7Ji7bCgjmH3PuMJZWu27+rYdWg2ry/Dy0eRfvs591t1uw1mc1h3eTflYM8o= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=secunet.com; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=secunet.com; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=secunet.com header.i=@secunet.com header.b=qtS2PQA1; arc=none smtp.client-ip=62.96.220.36 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=secunet.com Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=secunet.com Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=secunet.com header.i=@secunet.com header.b="qtS2PQA1" Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mx1.secunet.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id A9D4420704; Tue, 6 Oct 2026 09:06:26 +0200 (CEST) X-Virus-Scanned: by secunet Received: from mx1.secunet.com ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (mx1.secunet.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id Gv7eelCQ0xXA; Tue, 6 Oct 2026 09:06:25 +0200 (CEST) Received: from EXCH-02.secunet.de (rl2.secunet.de [10.32.0.232]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mx1.secunet.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D4907206D2; Tue, 6 Oct 2026 09:06:25 +0200 (CEST) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 mx1.secunet.com D4907206D2 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=secunet.com; s=202301; t=1791270385; bh=FqDZ4i4jaXyz88J2KJyeoWP+h/RJz+6Kip2B/Ve/k0A=; h=From:To:CC:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=qtS2PQA1MYBFDULZUmXH8PW0qhDOjif60mjjG1800kg34jjtRN8phLePY4IzCQakY BBQd74qKuVb/9OqRDQ8OxK7SoPMNpd5iZ1enw+345g0zui6KvP2GQRAXIfputdbiMf REOcG9hFAu1suKJgLak8XdV+cg6dSMkDJyiqce8QhgAXjFx3WoM7++gDo89MOFsEyf syYClAyospDOpkcWeB8E+rF1X8+CM7RNqPbRiU5TMKGNg/Dbwy5C5ILRZG9GN0Bhxq /TSGwIamSTl41FWGIt45D9bUtt3eNIKAXmDKD1uGdsqr45zLWXqJrvbFT3U0oUCMTd 6FLEHbN77ELvw== Received: from moon.secunet.de (172.18.149.1) by EXCH-02.secunet.de (10.32.0.172) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) id 15.2.2562.49; Tue, 6 Oct 2026 09:06:23 +0200 From: Antony Antony To: Antony Antony , Steffen Klassert , Herbert Xu , "David S. Miller" , Eric Dumazet , Jakub Kicinski , Paolo Abeni , Simon Horman , David Ahern , Jamal Hadi Salim , Shuah Khan , Paul Chaignon , Louis DeLosSantos , Jonathan Corbet , Shuah Khan , Randy Dunlap CC: Sabrina Dubroca , , Yan Yan , Tobias Brunner , Florian Westphal , , , Sashiko Subject: [PATCH ipsec v4 7/9] xfrm: include mark in MIGRATE_STATE SA collision check Date: Tue, 6 Oct 2026 09:06:13 +0200 Message-ID: X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.39.5 In-Reply-To: References: Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" X-Mailer: b4 0.16-dev Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-ClientProxiedBy: EXCH-03.secunet.de (10.32.0.183) To EXCH-02.secunet.de (10.32.0.172) The SA lookup tuple is (daddr, spi, proto, family, mark), but the EEXIST pre-check and the xfrm_state_insert() vs xfrm_state_add() decision only considered daddr and family, ignoring mark. A migration that only changes the mark inserts a duplicate SA tuple into the hash tables. The collision check is implemented as xfrm_state_mark_collides(), which walks the SPI hash bucket for the target tuple and excludes the state being migrated by pointer, rather than doing a separate exact-match lookup followed by a wildcard lookup and comparing the result against self. Before: root@west:~# ip xfrm state add src 10.1.1.1 dst 10.1.1.2 proto esp \ spi 0x1000 reqid 100 mode tunnel aead "rfc4106(gcm(aes))" \ 0x1111111111111111111111111111111111111111 96 \ mark 0x1 mask 0xff root@west:~# ip xfrm state add src 10.1.1.1 dst 10.1.1.2 proto esp \ spi 0x1000 reqid 100 mode tunnel aead "rfc4106(gcm(aes))" \ 0x1111111111111111111111111111111111111111 96 \ mark 0x2 mask 0xff root@west:~# ip xfrm state migrate dst 10.1.1.2 proto esp spi 0x1000 \ mark 0x1 mask 0xff \ new-dst 10.1.1.2 new-src 10.1.1.1 new-reqid 100 \ new-mark 0x2 mask 0xff ip x s src 10.1.1.1 dst 10.1.1.2 proto esp spi 0x00001000 reqid 100 mode tunnel replay-window 0 mark 0x2/0xff aead rfc4106(gcm(aes)) 0x1111111111111111111111111111111111111111 96 anti-replay context: seq 0x0, oseq 0x0, bitmap 0x00000000 src 10.1.1.1 dst 10.1.1.2 proto esp spi 0x00001000 reqid 100 mode tunnel replay-window 0 mark 0x2/0xff aead rfc4106(gcm(aes)) 0x1111111111111111111111111111111111111111 96 anti-replay context: seq 0x0, oseq 0x0, bitmap 0x00000000 sel src 0.0.0.0/0 dst 0.0.0.0/0 Notice two states with same mark 0x2/0xff. After: Error: New SA tuple already occupied. Fixes: a9d155ea9b44 ("xfrm: add XFRM_MSG_MIGRATE_STATE for single SA migration") Reported-by: Sashiko Signed-off-by: Antony Antony --- v1->v2: pre-check used wildcard lookup; factored the check into xfrm_state_mark_collides() excluding self directly instead of lookup_exact()+lookup() with a pointer comparison --- include/net/xfrm.h | 4 ++++ net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 17 ++++++++--------- 3 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/net/xfrm.h b/include/net/xfrm.h index 9e053388aa4b..26dd4b570588 100644 --- a/include/net/xfrm.h +++ b/include/net/xfrm.h @@ -1751,6 +1751,10 @@ struct xfrm_state *xfrm_state_lookup_byaddr(struct net *net, u32 mark, struct xfrm_state *xfrm_state_lookup_exact(struct net *net, const struct xfrm_mark *mark, const xfrm_address_t *daddr, __be32 spi, u8 proto, unsigned short family); +bool xfrm_state_mark_collides(struct net *net, u32 mark, + const xfrm_address_t *daddr, __be32 spi, + u8 proto, unsigned short family, + const struct xfrm_state *self); #ifdef CONFIG_XFRM_SUB_POLICY void xfrm_tmpl_sort(struct xfrm_tmpl **dst, struct xfrm_tmpl **src, int n, unsigned short family); diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c index f1e04df8d501..65663c7ba836 100644 --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c @@ -2202,10 +2202,12 @@ int xfrm_state_migrate_install(const struct xfrm_state *x, struct netlink_ext_ack *extack) { if (m->new_family == m->old_family && - xfrm_addr_equal(&x->id.daddr, &m->new_daddr, m->new_family)) { + xfrm_addr_equal(&x->id.daddr, &m->new_daddr, m->new_family) && + xc->mark.v == x->mark.v && xc->mark.m == x->mark.m) { /* - * Care is needed when the destination address of the state is - * to be updated as it is a part of triplet. + * Care is needed when the destination address or mark of the + * state is to be updated, as they are part of the lookup + * triplet. */ xfrm_state_insert(xc); } else { @@ -2440,6 +2442,38 @@ xfrm_state_lookup_exact(struct net *net, const struct xfrm_mark *mark, } EXPORT_SYMBOL(xfrm_state_lookup_exact); +/* True if some OTHER state at this tuple would wildcard-match "mark". + * Used by MIGRATE_STATE, which must exclude the state being migrated. + */ +bool xfrm_state_mark_collides(struct net *net, u32 mark, + const xfrm_address_t *daddr, __be32 spi, + u8 proto, unsigned short family, + const struct xfrm_state *self) +{ + struct xfrm_hash_state_ptrs state_ptrs; + unsigned int h; + struct xfrm_state *x; + bool collides = false; + + rcu_read_lock(); + xfrm_hash_ptrs_get(net, &state_ptrs); + h = __xfrm_spi_hash(daddr, spi, proto, family, state_ptrs.hmask); + + hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(x, state_ptrs.byspi + h, byspi) { + if (x != self && x->props.family == family && + x->id.spi == spi && x->id.proto == proto && + xfrm_addr_equal(&x->id.daddr, daddr, family) && + (mark & x->mark.m) == x->mark.v) { + collides = true; + break; + } + } + rcu_read_unlock(); + + return collides; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(xfrm_state_mark_collides); + struct xfrm_state * xfrm_find_acq(struct net *net, const struct xfrm_mark *mark, u8 mode, u32 reqid, u32 if_id, u32 pcpu_num, u8 proto, const xfrm_address_t *daddr, diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c index 4de8c401eb44..a5fbe38839c4 100644 --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c @@ -3476,15 +3476,14 @@ static int xfrm_do_migrate_state(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh, x->nat_keepalive_interval); if (m.new_family != um->id.family || - !xfrm_addr_equal(&m.new_daddr, &um->id.daddr, um->id.family)) { - u32 new_mark_key = m.new_mark ? m.new_mark->v & m.new_mark->m : - m.old_mark.v & m.old_mark.m; - struct xfrm_state *x_new; - - x_new = xfrm_state_lookup(net, new_mark_key, &m.new_daddr, - um->id.spi, um->id.proto, m.new_family); - if (x_new) { - xfrm_state_put(x_new); + !xfrm_addr_equal(&m.new_daddr, &um->id.daddr, um->id.family) || + (m.new_mark && (m.new_mark->v != x->mark.v || + m.new_mark->m != x->mark.m))) { + const struct xfrm_mark *new_mark = m.new_mark ? m.new_mark : &x->mark; + + if (xfrm_state_mark_collides(net, new_mark->v & new_mark->m, + &m.new_daddr, um->id.spi, + um->id.proto, m.new_family, x)) { NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "New SA tuple already occupied"); err = -EEXIST; goto out; -- 2.47.3