From: 1sh1ro <yangguikun19@qq.com>
To: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Cc: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnacek@gmail.com>,
selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [BUG REPORT] selinux: general protection fault in avtab_search_node() during an AVC lookup
Date: Mon, 12 Oct 2026 22:38:24 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <tencent_96F9E846FDA4A67FF38C7C393D985A44690A@qq.com> (raw)
Hi Paul, Stephen,
fuzzing with syzkaller on a 7.3.0-rc5 KASAN kernel (SELinux enabled,
permissive) produced a general protection fault in avtab_search_node() from
the AVC lookup path. The policy's avtab appears to contain garbage: the
first fault reads a non-canonical address, and it is followed by thousands
of further Oopses (8850 in this run) as later lookups keep hitting the
broken structure.
The crash
---------
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xe06f3dc280000000: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access in range [0x037a0e1400000000-0x037a0e1400000007]
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 14271 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 7.3.0-rc5 #2 PREEMPT(lazy)
Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:avtab_search_node+0x24d/0x4d0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
cond_compute_av+0x59/0x340
context_struct_compute_av+0x7f2/0x11f0
security_compute_av+0x558/0xd60
avc_compute_av+0x86/0x820
avc_perm_nonode+0x9b/0x170
avc_has_perm+0x27b/0x2f0
selinux_inode_follow_link+0x226/0x380
security_inode_follow_link+0x96/0xe0
pick_link+0x447/0x1570
step_into_slowpath+0x928/0xdd0
link_path_walk+0xdae/0x1b20
path_lookupat+0x70/0xb80
filename_lookup+0x213/0x5e0
filename_setxattr+0x89/0x1b0
path_setxattrat+0x1cc/0x2a0
__x64_sys_setxattr+0xc6/0x140
do_syscall_64+0xec/0x4e0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
</TASK>
Context
-------
- The task is systemd-udevd (uid 0) in setxattr() (ORIG_RAX 0xbc), which
follows a symlink while walking the path; the first AVC decision for the
symlink hits the corrupt avtab.
- The same crash appeared on three runs of this fuzzing instance:
2026-10-08 23:39 UTC, 2026-10-12 04:50 UTC and 2026-10-12 10:48 UTC.
- The kernel log of the crashing run shows only avc denials
(permissive=1) and no policy (re)load, so the avtab was already corrupt
when this lookup happened. From this run alone I cannot tell whether the
corruption originates in SELinux or comes from an unrelated memory
corruption bug in the same fuzzing session (that instance also produced
unrelated memory-safety crashes around the same time).
- No reproducer: the instance ran with syzkaller's reproduce disabled. I
can rerun it with reproduce enabled if you would like one.
7.3-rc5 already contains the recent policy-load validation fixes (class and
permission counts, level category sets, boolean values), so this looks like
a separate instance of the avtab-corruption family rather than one of those.
Thanks,
1sh1ro
next reply other threads:[~2026-10-12 14:38 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-10-12 14:38 1sh1ro [this message]
2026-10-12 15:23 ` Stephen Smalley
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