From: tip-bot for Gary Hook <tipbot@zytor.com>
To: linux-tip-commits@vger.kernel.org
Cc: bigeasy@linutronix.de, andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com,
tglx@linutronix.de, kent.overstreet@gmail.com,
dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, peterz@infradead.org,
lirongqing@baidu.com, bp@suse.de, colyli@suse.de,
mingo@redhat.com, bbrezillon@kernel.org, Gary.Hook@amd.com,
luto@kernel.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org, willy@infradead.org,
gary.hook@amd.com, mingo@kernel.org, keescook@chromium.org,
alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com,
yamada.masahiro@socionext.com, hpa@zytor.com,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org
Subject: [tip:x86/urgent] x86/mm/mem_encrypt: Disable all instrumentation for early SME setup
Date: Tue, 30 Apr 2019 09:04:15 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <tip-b51ce3744f115850166f3d6c292b9c8cb849ad4f@git.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <155657657552.7116.18363762932464011367.stgit@sosrh3.amd.com>
Commit-ID: b51ce3744f115850166f3d6c292b9c8cb849ad4f
Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/b51ce3744f115850166f3d6c292b9c8cb849ad4f
Author: Gary Hook <Gary.Hook@amd.com>
AuthorDate: Mon, 29 Apr 2019 22:22:58 +0000
Committer: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
CommitDate: Tue, 30 Apr 2019 17:59:08 +0200
x86/mm/mem_encrypt: Disable all instrumentation for early SME setup
Enablement of AMD's Secure Memory Encryption feature is determined very
early after start_kernel() is entered. Part of this procedure involves
scanning the command line for the parameter 'mem_encrypt'.
To determine intended state, the function sme_enable() uses library
functions cmdline_find_option() and strncmp(). Their use occurs early
enough such that it cannot be assumed that any instrumentation subsystem
is initialized.
For example, making calls to a KASAN-instrumented function before KASAN
is set up will result in the use of uninitialized memory and a boot
failure.
When AMD's SME support is enabled, conditionally disable instrumentation
of these dependent functions in lib/string.c and arch/x86/lib/cmdline.c.
[ bp: Get rid of intermediary nostackp var and cleanup whitespace. ]
Fixes: aca20d546214 ("x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption")
Reported-by: Li RongQing <lirongqing@baidu.com>
Signed-off-by: Gary R Hook <gary.hook@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Boris Brezillon <bbrezillon@kernel.org>
Cc: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de>
Cc: "dave.hansen@linux.intel.com" <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@gmail.com>
Cc: "luto@kernel.org" <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: "mingo@redhat.com" <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "peterz@infradead.org" <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/155657657552.7116.18363762932464011367.stgit@sosrh3.amd.com
---
arch/x86/lib/Makefile | 12 ++++++++++++
lib/Makefile | 11 +++++++++++
2 files changed, 23 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/Makefile b/arch/x86/lib/Makefile
index 140e61843a07..3cb3af51ec89 100644
--- a/arch/x86/lib/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/Makefile
@@ -6,6 +6,18 @@
# Produces uninteresting flaky coverage.
KCOV_INSTRUMENT_delay.o := n
+# Early boot use of cmdline; don't instrument it
+ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+KCOV_INSTRUMENT_cmdline.o := n
+KASAN_SANITIZE_cmdline.o := n
+
+ifdef CONFIG_FUNCTION_TRACER
+CFLAGS_REMOVE_cmdline.o = -pg
+endif
+
+CFLAGS_cmdline.o := $(call cc-option, -fno-stack-protector)
+endif
+
inat_tables_script = $(srctree)/arch/x86/tools/gen-insn-attr-x86.awk
inat_tables_maps = $(srctree)/arch/x86/lib/x86-opcode-map.txt
quiet_cmd_inat_tables = GEN $@
diff --git a/lib/Makefile b/lib/Makefile
index 3b08673e8881..18c2be516ab4 100644
--- a/lib/Makefile
+++ b/lib/Makefile
@@ -17,6 +17,17 @@ KCOV_INSTRUMENT_list_debug.o := n
KCOV_INSTRUMENT_debugobjects.o := n
KCOV_INSTRUMENT_dynamic_debug.o := n
+# Early boot use of cmdline, don't instrument it
+ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+KASAN_SANITIZE_string.o := n
+
+ifdef CONFIG_FUNCTION_TRACER
+CFLAGS_REMOVE_string.o = -pg
+endif
+
+CFLAGS_string.o := $(call cc-option, -fno-stack-protector)
+endif
+
lib-y := ctype.o string.o vsprintf.o cmdline.o \
rbtree.o radix-tree.o timerqueue.o xarray.o \
idr.o int_sqrt.o extable.o \
prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-04-30 16:06 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-04-29 22:22 [PATCH 2] x86/mm/mem_encrypt: Disable all instrumentation for SME early files Hook, Gary
2019-04-30 16:04 ` tip-bot for Gary Hook [this message]
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