From: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@kernel.org>
To: Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng@google.com>,
linux-coco@lists.linux.dev, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Alex Williamson <alex@shazbot.org>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>,
David Hildenbrand <david@kernel.org>,
Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>,
"Joerg Roedel (AMD)" <joro@8bytes.org>,
Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>, Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@amd.com>,
Xu Yilun <yilun.xu@linux.intel.com>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>,
Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>,
Fred Griffoul <griffoul@gmail.com>,
iommu@lists.linux.dev, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
john.starks@microsoft.com, jacob.pan@linux.microsoft.com,
gourry@gourry.net, vannapurve@google.com, fvdl@google.com,
tabba@google.com, dave.jiang@intel.com
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v1 0/6] KVM/VFIO: guest_memfd support for device MMIO resources
Date: Fri, 16 Oct 2026 10:31:27 +0530 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <yq5a1p9qxmqg.fsf@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAEvNRgGfjHhVCxHhew8AMKhXrX6XDrbrw5zpQM9LaODhJHRYYg@mail.gmail.com>
Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng@google.com> writes:
> Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@kernel.org> writes:
>
>> Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng@google.com> writes:
>>
>>> "Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)" <aneesh.kumar@kernel.org> writes:
>>>
[ ... 65 lines skipped ... ]
>
>>>
>>>> and GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_INIT_SHARED. Eligible BAR
>>>> intervals are registered as guest_memfd memslots. File offsets use the
>>>> existing VFIO region-offset namespace, allowing one guest_memfd to cover
>>>> multiple BAR intervals. Device-backed guest_memfd rejects mmap and
>>>> fallocate; shared guest faults obtain bare BAR PFNs from the provider
>>>> instead of resolving the memslot HVA or allocating folios.
>>>>
>>>
>>> The model I have in mind is kind of opposite from above. Instead of the
>>> guest_memfd rejecting mmap(), I'm thinking that the VFIO fd should be
>>> the one that rejects mmap(), read() and write() once guest_memfd
>>> attaches to it.
>>>
>>> If userspace needed to mmap() the VFIO fd, it should instead mmap() the
>>> guest_memfd fd. guest_memfd doesn't support read() and write() now, but
>>> support can be added. The read/write for guest_memfd just forwards to
>>> vfio if the offset range is shared and blocks if the range is
>>> private.
>>>
>>> For mmap(), for regular memory, mmap() is always allowed, but faulting
>>> dependsd on shared/private status. It would be nice if the same logic
>>> could apply to guest_memfds that wrap VFIO.
>>>
>>> I prefer the userspace accesses to go through guest_memfd to VFIO so
>>> that the shared/private-ness can be enforced from guest_memfd.
>>>
>>
>> Sure, I can implement this. I guess read(), write(), and ioeventfd will
>> continue to go through the VFIO fd?
>>
>
> If you agree to having mmap() go through guest_memfd, then read() and
> write() should also go through guest_memfd imo. I think it makes sense
> since guest_memfd gates accesses based on shared/private status.
>
> guest_memfd already had plans to support write() [4], so I think
> supporting read() should be fine too.
>
> [4] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251020161352.69257-1-kalyazin@amazon.com/
>
>
> I'm not super familiar with ioeventfd, let me know if this makes sense:
> ioeventfd is a kind of config, like mmap() is a config, but faulting is
> where the actual access can happen.
>
> guest_memfd always allows mmap(), but only allows faults on shared
> offset ranges.
>
> If userspace sets up some link between a private range and some eventfd,
> I think that's ok, since it's not actually doing accesses. When the
> signalling actually happens, then guest_memfd needs to gate that.
>
> Going by that, I think if the ioeventfd ioctls are just setting up
> links/mapping, then it can go through the VFIO fd.
>
> Between going via the VFIO fd and guest_memfd, I think if "everything is
> wrapped by guest_memfd" a simpler mental model to go with, then maybe we
> could just go with swapping the entire f_ops with guest_memfd's
> intercepted version?
>
>
I omitted the rest of the email so that we can focus on the above. While
implementing mmap redirection through guest_memfd, I found that it
results in code duplication in both the VMM and the kernel. The VMM
already uses the VFIO fd for these operations. I think we should allow
it to continue using the existing flow, with additional checks to ensure
that it accesses only shared regions. Requiring the VMM to use
guest_memfd as the file descriptor for accessing CoCo guest resources
introduces unnecessary duplication.
We cannot move all provider fd ioctls to guest_memfd. Providers may have
different ioctls that access shared regions, and supporting all of them
through guest_memfd would not be practical. VFIO_DEVICE_IOEVENTFD is one
example. If ioctls cannot be moved, the provider code will need access
checks anyway. For example, for VFIO I do:
modified drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_rdwr.c
@@ -44,7 +44,9 @@ int vfio_pci_core_iowrite##size(struct vfio_pci_core_device *vdev, \
{ \
if (test_mem) { \
down_read(&vdev->memory_lock); \
- if (!__vfio_pci_memory_enabled(vdev)) { \
+ if (!__vfio_pci_memory_enabled(vdev) || \
+ !vfio_pci_gmem_io_access_allowed(vdev, io, \
+ sizeof(u##size))) { \
up_read(&vdev->memory_lock); \
return -EIO; \
} \
@@ -70,7 +72,9 @@ int vfio_pci_core_ioread##size(struct vfio_pci_core_device *vdev, \
{ \
if (test_mem) { \
down_read(&vdev->memory_lock); \
- if (!__vfio_pci_memory_enabled(vdev)) { \
+ if (!__vfio_pci_memory_enabled(vdev) || \
+ !vfio_pci_gmem_io_access_allowed(vdev, io, \
+ sizeof(u##size))) { \
up_read(&vdev->memory_lock); \
return -EIO; \
} \
@@ -380,7 +384,10 @@ static int vfio_pci_ioeventfd_handler(void *opaque, void *unused)
if (ioeventfd->test_mem) {
if (!down_read_trylock(&vdev->memory_lock))
return 1; /* Lock contended, use thread */
- if (!__vfio_pci_memory_enabled(vdev)) {
+ if (!__vfio_pci_memory_enabled(vdev) ||
+ !vfio_pci_gmem_access_allowed(vdev,
+ VFIO_PCI_INDEX_TO_OFFSET(ioeventfd->bar) +
+ ioeventfd->pos, ioeventfd->count)) {
up_read(&vdev->memory_lock);
return 0;
}
If we are going to do this, it should also be OK to perform the check on
the fault path. For VFIO, that is much simpler.
@@ -1766,6 +1764,14 @@ vm_fault_t vfio_pci_vmf_insert_pfn(struct vfio_pci_core_device *vdev,
if (vdev->pm_runtime_engaged || !__vfio_pci_memory_enabled(vdev))
return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
+ /* Check each page separately while guest_memfd controls BAR access. */
+ if (order && vdev->gmem)
+ return VM_FAULT_FALLBACK;
+ /* memory_lock keeps revocation from racing admission and PTE insertion. */
+ if (!vfio_pci_gmem_access_allowed(vdev,
+ (u64)vmf->pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT, PAGE_SIZE))
+ return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
+
if (!order)
return vmf_insert_pfn(vmf->vma, vmf->address, pfn);
Given the above, it seems much simpler to allow mmap(), read(), write(),
and ioctls through the VFIO fd. Attach should require
GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_MMAP, and mmap() on the VFIO fd should be allowed only
when that flag is set.
I can post a series demonstrating the implementation duplication if that
would help.
-aneesh
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-10-16 5:01 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-10-10 7:24 Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-10 7:24 ` [RFC PATCH v1 1/6] KVM: guest_memfd: attach and bind device resources Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-10 7:25 ` [RFC PATCH v1 2/6] KVM: guest_memfd: Support private/shared conversion of device memory Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-10 7:25 ` [RFC PATCH v1 3/6] iommufd: Support MMIO provider attachment to vDEVICEs Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-10 7:25 ` [RFC PATCH v1 4/6] vfio/pci: Provide guest_memfd backing for PCI BARs Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-10 7:25 ` [RFC PATCH v1 5/6] KVM/VFIO: Remove device mappings during guest_memfd teardown Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-10 7:25 ` [RFC PATCH v1 6/6] KVM: Invalidate guest_memfd mappings before removing memslot bindings Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-14 0:57 ` [RFC PATCH v1 0/6] KVM/VFIO: guest_memfd support for device MMIO resources Ackerley Tng
2026-10-14 8:38 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-10-14 19:53 ` Ackerley Tng
2026-10-16 5:01 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V [this message]
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=yq5a1p9qxmqg.fsf@kernel.org \
--to=aneesh.kumar@kernel.org \
--cc=ackerleytng@google.com \
--cc=aik@amd.com \
--cc=alex@shazbot.org \
--cc=catalin.marinas@arm.com \
--cc=dave.jiang@intel.com \
--cc=david@kernel.org \
--cc=dwmw2@infradead.org \
--cc=fvdl@google.com \
--cc=gourry@gourry.net \
--cc=griffoul@gmail.com \
--cc=iommu@lists.linux.dev \
--cc=jacob.pan@linux.microsoft.com \
--cc=jgg@ziepe.ca \
--cc=john.starks@microsoft.com \
--cc=joro@8bytes.org \
--cc=kevin.tian@intel.com \
--cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-coco@lists.linux.dev \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
--cc=robin.murphy@arm.com \
--cc=seanjc@google.com \
--cc=steven.price@arm.com \
--cc=suzuki.poulose@arm.com \
--cc=tabba@google.com \
--cc=vannapurve@google.com \
--cc=will@kernel.org \
--cc=yilun.xu@linux.intel.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox
all inboxes | Powered by JetHome®