From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
To: Tanya Agarwal <tanyaagarwal25699@gmail.com>,
paul@paul-moore.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, skhan@linuxfoundation.org,
anupnewsmail@gmail.com, Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] apparmor: fix typos and spelling errors
Date: Fri, 24 Jan 2025 15:04:34 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <00e63eb5-e8b4-43af-b1bb-764f3c5230ca@canonical.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250123192058.2558-1-tanyaagarwal25699@gmail.com>
On 1/23/25 11:21, Tanya Agarwal wrote:
> From: Tanya Agarwal <tanyaagarwal25699@gmail.com>
>
> Fix typos and spelling errors in apparmor module comments that were
> identified using the codespell tool.
> No functional changes - documentation only.
>
> Signed-off-by: Tanya Agarwal <tanyaagarwal25699@gmail.com>
> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
I have pulled this into my tree
> ---
> This patch set is split into individual patches for each LSM
> to facilitate easier review by respective maintainers.
>
> Original discussion:
> https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250112072925.1774-1-tanyaagarwal25699@gmail.com
>
> security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c | 6 +++---
> security/apparmor/domain.c | 4 ++--
> security/apparmor/label.c | 2 +-
> security/apparmor/lsm.c | 2 +-
> security/apparmor/policy.c | 4 ++--
> 5 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
> index 2c0185ebc900..0c2f248d31bf 100644
> --- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
> +++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
> @@ -43,7 +43,7 @@
> * The interface is split into two main components based on their function
> * a securityfs component:
> * used for static files that are always available, and which allows
> - * userspace to specificy the location of the security filesystem.
> + * userspace to specify the location of the security filesystem.
> *
> * fns and data are prefixed with
> * aa_sfs_
> @@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ static struct file_system_type aafs_ops = {
> /**
> * __aafs_setup_d_inode - basic inode setup for apparmorfs
> * @dir: parent directory for the dentry
> - * @dentry: dentry we are seting the inode up for
> + * @dentry: dentry we are setting the inode up for
> * @mode: permissions the file should have
> * @data: data to store on inode.i_private, available in open()
> * @link: if symlink, symlink target string
> @@ -2244,7 +2244,7 @@ static void *p_next(struct seq_file *f, void *p, loff_t *pos)
> /**
> * p_stop - stop depth first traversal
> * @f: seq_file we are filling
> - * @p: the last profile writen
> + * @p: the last profile written
> *
> * Release all locking done by p_start/p_next on namespace tree
> */
> diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
> index 5939bd9a9b9b..d959931eac28 100644
> --- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
> +++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
> @@ -755,7 +755,7 @@ static int profile_onexec(const struct cred *subj_cred,
> /* change_profile on exec already granted */
> /*
> * NOTE: Domain transitions from unconfined are allowed
> - * even when no_new_privs is set because this aways results
> + * even when no_new_privs is set because this always results
> * in a further reduction of permissions.
> */
> return 0;
> @@ -926,7 +926,7 @@ int apparmor_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
> *
> * NOTE: Domain transitions from unconfined and to stacked
> * subsets are allowed even when no_new_privs is set because this
> - * aways results in a further reduction of permissions.
> + * always results in a further reduction of permissions.
> */
> if ((bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS) &&
> !unconfined(label) &&
> diff --git a/security/apparmor/label.c b/security/apparmor/label.c
> index 91483ecacc16..8bcff51becb8 100644
> --- a/security/apparmor/label.c
> +++ b/security/apparmor/label.c
> @@ -1456,7 +1456,7 @@ bool aa_update_label_name(struct aa_ns *ns, struct aa_label *label, gfp_t gfp)
>
> /*
> * cached label name is present and visible
> - * @label->hname only exists if label is namespace hierachical
> + * @label->hname only exists if label is namespace hierarchical
> */
> static inline bool use_label_hname(struct aa_ns *ns, struct aa_label *label,
> int flags)
> diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> index 1edc12862a7d..04bf5d2f6e00 100644
> --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> @@ -2006,7 +2006,7 @@ static int __init alloc_buffers(void)
> * two should be enough, with more CPUs it is possible that more
> * buffers will be used simultaneously. The preallocated pool may grow.
> * This preallocation has also the side-effect that AppArmor will be
> - * disabled early at boot if aa_g_path_max is extremly high.
> + * disabled early at boot if aa_g_path_max is extremely high.
> */
> if (num_online_cpus() > 1)
> num = 4 + RESERVE_COUNT;
> diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c
> index d0244fab0653..5cec3efc4794 100644
> --- a/security/apparmor/policy.c
> +++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c
> @@ -463,7 +463,7 @@ static struct aa_policy *__lookup_parent(struct aa_ns *ns,
> }
>
> /**
> - * __create_missing_ancestors - create place holders for missing ancestores
> + * __create_missing_ancestors - create place holders for missing ancestors
> * @ns: namespace to lookup profile in (NOT NULL)
> * @hname: hierarchical profile name to find parent of (NOT NULL)
> * @gfp: type of allocation.
> @@ -1068,7 +1068,7 @@ ssize_t aa_replace_profiles(struct aa_ns *policy_ns, struct aa_label *label,
> goto out;
>
> /* ensure that profiles are all for the same ns
> - * TODO: update locking to remove this constaint. All profiles in
> + * TODO: update locking to remove this constraint. All profiles in
> * the load set must succeed as a set or the load will
> * fail. Sort ent list and take ns locks in hierarchy order
> */
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-01-24 23:04 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-01-23 19:21 Tanya Agarwal
2025-01-23 19:43 ` Ryan Lee
2025-01-24 23:04 ` John Johansen [this message]
2025-01-25 10:58 ` Tanya Agarwal
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