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From: Tanya Agarwal <tanyaagarwal25699@gmail.com>
To: john.johansen@canonical.com, paul@paul-moore.com,
	jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, skhan@linuxfoundation.org,
	anupnewsmail@gmail.com,
	Tanya Agarwal <tanyaagarwal25699@gmail.com>,
	Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Subject: [PATCH] apparmor: fix typos and spelling errors
Date: Fri, 24 Jan 2025 00:51:00 +0530	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250123192058.2558-1-tanyaagarwal25699@gmail.com> (raw)

From: Tanya Agarwal <tanyaagarwal25699@gmail.com>

Fix typos and spelling errors in apparmor module comments that were
identified using the codespell tool.
No functional changes - documentation only.

Signed-off-by: Tanya Agarwal <tanyaagarwal25699@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
---
This patch set is split into individual patches for each LSM
to facilitate easier review by respective maintainers. 

Original discussion:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250112072925.1774-1-tanyaagarwal25699@gmail.com

 security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c | 6 +++---
 security/apparmor/domain.c     | 4 ++--
 security/apparmor/label.c      | 2 +-
 security/apparmor/lsm.c        | 2 +-
 security/apparmor/policy.c     | 4 ++--
 5 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
index 2c0185ebc900..0c2f248d31bf 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@
  * The interface is split into two main components based on their function
  * a securityfs component:
  *   used for static files that are always available, and which allows
- *   userspace to specificy the location of the security filesystem.
+ *   userspace to specify the location of the security filesystem.
  *
  *   fns and data are prefixed with
  *      aa_sfs_
@@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ static struct file_system_type aafs_ops = {
 /**
  * __aafs_setup_d_inode - basic inode setup for apparmorfs
  * @dir: parent directory for the dentry
- * @dentry: dentry we are seting the inode up for
+ * @dentry: dentry we are setting the inode up for
  * @mode: permissions the file should have
  * @data: data to store on inode.i_private, available in open()
  * @link: if symlink, symlink target string
@@ -2244,7 +2244,7 @@ static void *p_next(struct seq_file *f, void *p, loff_t *pos)
 /**
  * p_stop - stop depth first traversal
  * @f: seq_file we are filling
- * @p: the last profile writen
+ * @p: the last profile written
  *
  * Release all locking done by p_start/p_next on namespace tree
  */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
index 5939bd9a9b9b..d959931eac28 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
@@ -755,7 +755,7 @@ static int profile_onexec(const struct cred *subj_cred,
 		/* change_profile on exec already granted */
 		/*
 		 * NOTE: Domain transitions from unconfined are allowed
-		 * even when no_new_privs is set because this aways results
+		 * even when no_new_privs is set because this always results
 		 * in a further reduction of permissions.
 		 */
 		return 0;
@@ -926,7 +926,7 @@ int apparmor_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	 *
 	 * NOTE: Domain transitions from unconfined and to stacked
 	 * subsets are allowed even when no_new_privs is set because this
-	 * aways results in a further reduction of permissions.
+	 * always results in a further reduction of permissions.
 	 */
 	if ((bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS) &&
 	    !unconfined(label) &&
diff --git a/security/apparmor/label.c b/security/apparmor/label.c
index 91483ecacc16..8bcff51becb8 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/label.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/label.c
@@ -1456,7 +1456,7 @@ bool aa_update_label_name(struct aa_ns *ns, struct aa_label *label, gfp_t gfp)
 
 /*
  * cached label name is present and visible
- * @label->hname only exists if label is namespace hierachical
+ * @label->hname only exists if label is namespace hierarchical
  */
 static inline bool use_label_hname(struct aa_ns *ns, struct aa_label *label,
 				   int flags)
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 1edc12862a7d..04bf5d2f6e00 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -2006,7 +2006,7 @@ static int __init alloc_buffers(void)
 	 * two should be enough, with more CPUs it is possible that more
 	 * buffers will be used simultaneously. The preallocated pool may grow.
 	 * This preallocation has also the side-effect that AppArmor will be
-	 * disabled early at boot if aa_g_path_max is extremly high.
+	 * disabled early at boot if aa_g_path_max is extremely high.
 	 */
 	if (num_online_cpus() > 1)
 		num = 4 + RESERVE_COUNT;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c
index d0244fab0653..5cec3efc4794 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c
@@ -463,7 +463,7 @@ static struct aa_policy *__lookup_parent(struct aa_ns *ns,
 }
 
 /**
- * __create_missing_ancestors - create place holders for missing ancestores
+ * __create_missing_ancestors - create place holders for missing ancestors
  * @ns: namespace to lookup profile in (NOT NULL)
  * @hname: hierarchical profile name to find parent of (NOT NULL)
  * @gfp: type of allocation.
@@ -1068,7 +1068,7 @@ ssize_t aa_replace_profiles(struct aa_ns *policy_ns, struct aa_label *label,
 		goto out;
 
 	/* ensure that profiles are all for the same ns
-	 * TODO: update locking to remove this constaint. All profiles in
+	 * TODO: update locking to remove this constraint. All profiles in
 	 *       the load set must succeed as a set or the load will
 	 *       fail. Sort ent list and take ns locks in hierarchy order
 	 */
-- 
2.39.5


             reply	other threads:[~2025-01-23 19:30 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-01-23 19:21 Tanya Agarwal [this message]
2025-01-23 19:43 ` Ryan Lee
2025-01-24 23:04 ` John Johansen
2025-01-25 10:58   ` Tanya Agarwal

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