From: "liaochang (A)" <liaochang1@huawei.com>
To: <guoren@kernel.org>, <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
<paul.walmsley@sifive.com>, <mhiramat@kernel.org>,
<conor.dooley@microchip.com>, <penberg@kernel.org>,
<mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: <linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Guo Ren <guoren@linux.alibaba.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] riscv: kprobe: Fixup kernel panic when probing an illegal position
Date: Sat, 28 Jan 2023 10:55:34 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <0871074a-cafb-a172-f062-6ada6d2a3a41@huawei.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230126130509.1418251-1-guoren@kernel.org>
在 2023/1/26 21:05, guoren@kernel.org 写道:
> From: Guo Ren <guoren@linux.alibaba.com>
>
> The kernel would panic when probed for an illegal position. eg:
>
> (CONFIG_RISCV_ISA_C=n)
>
> echo 'p:hello kernel_clone+0x16 a0=%a0' >> kprobe_events
> echo 1 > events/kprobes/hello/enable
> cat trace
>
> Kernel panic - not syncing: stack-protector: Kernel stack
> is corrupted in: __do_sys_newfstatat+0xb8/0xb8
> CPU: 0 PID: 111 Comm: sh Not tainted
> 6.2.0-rc1-00027-g2d398fe49a4d #490
> Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT)
> Call Trace:
> [<ffffffff80007268>] dump_backtrace+0x38/0x48
> [<ffffffff80c5e83c>] show_stack+0x50/0x68
> [<ffffffff80c6da28>] dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0x84
> [<ffffffff80c6da6c>] dump_stack+0x20/0x30
> [<ffffffff80c5ecf4>] panic+0x160/0x374
> [<ffffffff80c6db94>] generic_handle_arch_irq+0x0/0xa8
> [<ffffffff802deeb0>] sys_newstat+0x0/0x30
> [<ffffffff800158c0>] sys_clone+0x20/0x30
> [<ffffffff800039e8>] ret_from_syscall+0x0/0x4
> ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: stack-protector:
> Kernel stack is corrupted in: __do_sys_newfstatat+0xb8/0xb8 ]---
>
> That is because the kprobe's ebreak instruction broke the kernel's
> original code. The user should guarantee the correction of the probe
> position, but it couldn't make the kernel panic.
>
> This patch adds arch_check_kprobe in arch_prepare_kprobe to prevent an
> illegal position (Such as the middle of an instruction).
>
> Fixes: c22b0bcb1dd0 ("riscv: Add kprobes supported")
> Signed-off-by: Guo Ren <guoren@linux.alibaba.com>
> Signed-off-by: Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org>
> ---
> arch/riscv/kernel/probes/kprobes.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/probes/kprobes.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/probes/kprobes.c
> index f21592d20306..475989f06d6d 100644
> --- a/arch/riscv/kernel/probes/kprobes.c
> +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/probes/kprobes.c
> @@ -48,6 +48,21 @@ static void __kprobes arch_simulate_insn(struct kprobe *p, struct pt_regs *regs)
> post_kprobe_handler(p, kcb, regs);
> }
>
> +static bool __kprobes arch_check_kprobe(struct kprobe *p)
> +{
> + unsigned long tmp = (unsigned long)p->addr - p->offset;
> + unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)p->addr;
> +
> + while (tmp <= addr) {
> + if (tmp == addr)
> + return true;
> +
> + tmp += GET_INSN_LENGTH(*(kprobe_opcode_t *)tmp);
> + }
> +
> + return false;
> +}
LGTM.
I have submit a patch to fix the same problem, found at:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230127130541.1250865-11-chenguokai17@mails.ucas.ac.cn/
So this boundary check is necessary no matter CONFIG_RISCV_ISA_C is enable or not, right?
> +
> int __kprobes arch_prepare_kprobe(struct kprobe *p)
> {
> unsigned long probe_addr = (unsigned long)p->addr;
> @@ -55,6 +70,9 @@ int __kprobes arch_prepare_kprobe(struct kprobe *p)
> if (probe_addr & 0x1)
> return -EILSEQ;
>
> + if (!arch_check_kprobe(p))
> + return -EILSEQ;
> +
> /* copy instruction */
> p->opcode = *p->addr;
>
--
BR,
Liao, Chang
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-01-28 2:55 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-01-26 13:05 guoren
2023-01-28 2:55 ` liaochang (A) [this message]
2023-01-28 3:46 ` Guo Ren
2023-01-28 3:52 ` Guo Ren
2023-01-28 9:53 ` liaochang (A)
2023-01-28 5:22 ` Guo Ren
2023-01-28 9:53 ` liaochang (A)
2023-01-31 12:32 ` Björn Töpel
2023-01-31 13:01 ` Guo Ren
2023-02-01 2:57 ` Guo Ren
2023-02-01 9:30 ` Björn Töpel
2023-02-02 6:06 ` Guo Ren
2023-02-02 8:32 ` Björn Töpel
2023-02-01 3:49 ` liaochang (A)
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