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From: "liaochang (A)" <liaochang1@huawei.com>
To: <guoren@kernel.org>, <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
	<paul.walmsley@sifive.com>, <mhiramat@kernel.org>,
	<conor.dooley@microchip.com>, <penberg@kernel.org>,
	<mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: <linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Guo Ren <guoren@linux.alibaba.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] riscv: kprobe: Fixup kernel panic when probing an illegal position
Date: Sat, 28 Jan 2023 10:55:34 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <0871074a-cafb-a172-f062-6ada6d2a3a41@huawei.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230126130509.1418251-1-guoren@kernel.org>



在 2023/1/26 21:05, guoren@kernel.org 写道:
> From: Guo Ren <guoren@linux.alibaba.com>
> 
> The kernel would panic when probed for an illegal position. eg:
> 
> (CONFIG_RISCV_ISA_C=n)
> 
> echo 'p:hello kernel_clone+0x16 a0=%a0' >> kprobe_events
> echo 1 > events/kprobes/hello/enable
> cat trace
> 
> Kernel panic - not syncing: stack-protector: Kernel stack
> is corrupted in: __do_sys_newfstatat+0xb8/0xb8
> CPU: 0 PID: 111 Comm: sh Not tainted
> 6.2.0-rc1-00027-g2d398fe49a4d #490
> Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT)
> Call Trace:
> [<ffffffff80007268>] dump_backtrace+0x38/0x48
> [<ffffffff80c5e83c>] show_stack+0x50/0x68
> [<ffffffff80c6da28>] dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0x84
> [<ffffffff80c6da6c>] dump_stack+0x20/0x30
> [<ffffffff80c5ecf4>] panic+0x160/0x374
> [<ffffffff80c6db94>] generic_handle_arch_irq+0x0/0xa8
> [<ffffffff802deeb0>] sys_newstat+0x0/0x30
> [<ffffffff800158c0>] sys_clone+0x20/0x30
> [<ffffffff800039e8>] ret_from_syscall+0x0/0x4
> ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: stack-protector:
> Kernel stack is corrupted in: __do_sys_newfstatat+0xb8/0xb8 ]---
> 
> That is because the kprobe's ebreak instruction broke the kernel's
> original code. The user should guarantee the correction of the probe
> position, but it couldn't make the kernel panic.
> 
> This patch adds arch_check_kprobe in arch_prepare_kprobe to prevent an
> illegal position (Such as the middle of an instruction).
> 
> Fixes: c22b0bcb1dd0 ("riscv: Add kprobes supported")
> Signed-off-by: Guo Ren <guoren@linux.alibaba.com>
> Signed-off-by: Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org>
> ---
>  arch/riscv/kernel/probes/kprobes.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
>  1 file changed, 18 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/probes/kprobes.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/probes/kprobes.c
> index f21592d20306..475989f06d6d 100644
> --- a/arch/riscv/kernel/probes/kprobes.c
> +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/probes/kprobes.c
> @@ -48,6 +48,21 @@ static void __kprobes arch_simulate_insn(struct kprobe *p, struct pt_regs *regs)
>  	post_kprobe_handler(p, kcb, regs);
>  }
>  
> +static bool __kprobes arch_check_kprobe(struct kprobe *p)
> +{
> +	unsigned long tmp  = (unsigned long)p->addr - p->offset;
> +	unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)p->addr;
> +
> +	while (tmp <= addr) {
> +		if (tmp == addr)
> +			return true;
> +
> +		tmp += GET_INSN_LENGTH(*(kprobe_opcode_t *)tmp);
> +	}
> +
> +	return false;
> +}

LGTM.

I have submit a patch to fix the same problem, found at:

https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230127130541.1250865-11-chenguokai17@mails.ucas.ac.cn/

So this boundary check is necessary no matter CONFIG_RISCV_ISA_C is enable or not, right?


> +
>  int __kprobes arch_prepare_kprobe(struct kprobe *p)
>  {
>  	unsigned long probe_addr = (unsigned long)p->addr;
> @@ -55,6 +70,9 @@ int __kprobes arch_prepare_kprobe(struct kprobe *p)
>  	if (probe_addr & 0x1)
>  		return -EILSEQ;
>  
> +	if (!arch_check_kprobe(p))
> +		return -EILSEQ;
> +
>  	/* copy instruction */
>  	p->opcode = *p->addr;
>  

-- 
BR,
Liao, Chang

  reply	other threads:[~2023-01-28  2:55 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-01-26 13:05 guoren
2023-01-28  2:55 ` liaochang (A) [this message]
2023-01-28  3:46   ` Guo Ren
2023-01-28  3:52     ` Guo Ren
2023-01-28  9:53       ` liaochang (A)
2023-01-28  5:22   ` Guo Ren
2023-01-28  9:53     ` liaochang (A)
2023-01-31 12:32 ` Björn Töpel
2023-01-31 13:01   ` Guo Ren
2023-02-01  2:57   ` Guo Ren
2023-02-01  9:30     ` Björn Töpel
2023-02-02  6:06       ` Guo Ren
2023-02-02  8:32         ` Björn Töpel
2023-02-01  3:49   ` liaochang (A)

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