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From: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>
To: martin.nvme.dev@gmail.com,
	John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>,
	Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>,
	Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	Eric Dumazet <edumazet@kernel.org>,
	Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>, Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
	Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
	Hannes Reinecke <hare@kernel.org>, Chuck Lever <cel@kernel.org>,
	kernel-tls-handshake@lists.linux.dev,
	linux-nvme@lists.infradead.org,
	Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>,
	Martin Belanger <martin.belanger@dell.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC net-next v2 2/5] tls: add socket options to register the traffic secrets
Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2026 15:13:52 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <08ce23d6-94a6-4539-bedc-6bb4b77a35b2@suse.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261028-keyupdate-rfc-v2-2-eb5143b4c487@gmail.com>

On 10/28/26 2:52 PM, Martin Belanger via B4 Relay wrote:
> From: Martin Belanger <martin.belanger@dell.com>
> 
> kTLS holds the key and IV of each direction, but not the traffic secret
> they were derived from. The derivation is one-way, so the kernel cannot
> compute the next generation for a KeyUpdate on its own.
> 
> Add TLS_TX_TRAFFIC_SECRET and TLS_RX_TRAFFIC_SECRET. The owner of the
> socket passes the TLS 1.3 application traffic secret of a direction after
> installing its key. The cipher of the installed key selects the hash, so
> the option takes only the secret. A socket without a registered secret
> behaves as before.
> 
> The secret must give the installed key and IV, or the option fails with
> -EINVAL. A wrong secret would otherwise fail only at the first
> KeyUpdate.
> 
> The TX secret can be registered alone. The RX secret needs the TX secret
> first: a received KeyUpdate can ask for one in reply, and since the
> kernel consumes the record, only the kernel can send that reply.
> 
> Installing a new key with TLS_TX or TLS_RX removes the secrets that no
> longer apply. The secrets are cleared when the context is freed and
> cannot be read back.
> 
> Assisted-by: LLM
> Signed-off-by: Martin Belanger <martin.belanger@dell.com>
> ---
>   Documentation/networking/tls.rst |  26 ++++++++
>   include/net/tls.h                |  13 ++++
>   include/uapi/linux/tls.h         |   2 +
>   net/tls/tls_main.c               | 139 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
>   4 files changed, 179 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/Documentation/networking/tls.rst b/Documentation/networking/tls.rst
> index 980c442d7161..2e011bd1ce4a 100644
> --- a/Documentation/networking/tls.rst
> +++ b/Documentation/networking/tls.rst
> @@ -300,6 +300,32 @@ extra byte used by the ContentType field.
>   
>   [1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8449
>   
> +TLS_TX_TRAFFIC_SECRET and TLS_RX_TRAFFIC_SECRET
> +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> +
> +``TLS_TX_TRAFFIC_SECRET`` registers the TLS 1.3 application traffic secret
> +of the transmit direction, ``TLS_RX_TRAFFIC_SECRET`` that of the receive
> +direction. With a registered secret, the kernel performs KeyUpdate for that
> +direction itself (RFC 9846, section 4.7.3). The value is the secret itself.
> +TLS 1.3 only, software path only.
> +
> +Install the key of the direction first, with the ``TLS_TX`` or ``TLS_RX``
> +socket option described above. The cipher of that key selects the hash, and
> +the secret must have the length of that hash: 32 bytes for SHA-256
> +(AES-128-GCM, AES-128-CCM, ChaCha20-Poly1305) or 48 bytes for SHA-384
> +(AES-256-GCM). Other ciphers return ``EOPNOTSUPP``.
> +
> +Each secret can be registered once. ``TLS_RX_TRAFFIC_SECRET`` needs
> +``TLS_TX_TRAFFIC_SECRET`` first: a received KeyUpdate can ask for one in
> +reply, and only the kernel sees it. ``TLS_TX_TRAFFIC_SECRET`` alone is
> +allowed.
> +
> +If the application installs a new key itself with ``TLS_TX``, both secrets
> +are removed. With ``TLS_RX``, the RX secret is removed. KeyUpdate for that
> +direction is then left to the application again.
> +
> +The secrets cannot be read back.
> +
>   Statistics
>   ==========
>   
> diff --git a/include/net/tls.h b/include/net/tls.h
> index e57bef58851e..aacc6d12226e 100644
> --- a/include/net/tls.h
> +++ b/include/net/tls.h
> @@ -65,6 +65,9 @@ struct tls_rec;
>   
>   #define TLS_AAD_SPACE_SIZE		13
>   
> +/* SHA-384, the longest hash of a TLS 1.3 cipher suite kTLS supports */
> +#define TLS_MAX_TRAFFIC_SECRET_SIZE	48
> +
>   #define TLS_MAX_IV_SIZE			16
>   #define TLS_MAX_SALT_SIZE		4
>   #define TLS_TAG_SIZE			16
> @@ -224,6 +227,12 @@ struct tls_prot_info {
>   	u16 tail_size;
>   };
>   
> +/* A TLS 1.3 application traffic secret. len is 0 if none is registered. */
> +struct tls_traffic_secret {
> +	u8 data[TLS_MAX_TRAFFIC_SECRET_SIZE];
> +	u8 len;
> +};
> +
>   struct tls_context {
>   	/* read-only cache line */
>   	struct tls_prot_info prot_info;
> @@ -266,6 +275,10 @@ struct tls_context {
>   	union tls_crypto_context crypto_send;
>   	union tls_crypto_context crypto_recv;
>   
> +	/* Registered for KeyUpdate, protected by the socket lock */
> +	struct tls_traffic_secret tx_secret;
> +	struct tls_traffic_secret rx_secret;
> +
>   	struct list_head list;
>   	refcount_t refcount;
>   	struct rcu_head rcu;
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/tls.h b/include/uapi/linux/tls.h
> index 1245ab38afc1..d1b136ecea96 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/tls.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/tls.h
> @@ -42,6 +42,8 @@
>   #define TLS_TX_ZEROCOPY_RO	3	/* TX zerocopy (only sendfile now) */
>   #define TLS_RX_EXPECT_NO_PAD	4	/* Attempt opportunistic zero-copy */
>   #define TLS_TX_MAX_PAYLOAD_LEN	5	/* Maximum plaintext size */
> +#define TLS_TX_TRAFFIC_SECRET	6	/* TLS 1.3 TX traffic secret */
> +#define TLS_RX_TRAFFIC_SECRET	7	/* TLS 1.3 RX traffic secret */
>   
>   /* Supported versions */
>   #define TLS_VERSION_MINOR(ver)	((ver) & 0xFF)
> diff --git a/net/tls/tls_main.c b/net/tls/tls_main.c
> index 8bdb78718a8d..8bb1b2773f3f 100644
> --- a/net/tls/tls_main.c
> +++ b/net/tls/tls_main.c
> @@ -31,6 +31,8 @@
>    * SOFTWARE.
>    */
>   
> +#include <crypto/sha2.h>
> +#include <crypto/utils.h>
>   #include <linux/module.h>
>   
>   #include <net/tcp.h>
> @@ -325,6 +327,8 @@ void tls_ctx_free(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *ctx)
>   
>   	memzero_explicit(&ctx->crypto_send, sizeof(ctx->crypto_send));
>   	memzero_explicit(&ctx->crypto_recv, sizeof(ctx->crypto_recv));
> +	memzero_explicit(&ctx->tx_secret, sizeof(ctx->tx_secret));
> +	memzero_explicit(&ctx->rx_secret, sizeof(ctx->rx_secret));
>   	mutex_destroy(&ctx->tx_lock);
>   
>   	if (sk)
> @@ -757,8 +761,16 @@ static int do_tls_setsockopt_conf(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval,
>   		ctx->rx_conf = conf;
>   	update_sk_prot(sk, ctx);
>   
> -	if (update)
> +	if (update) {
> +		/* The registered secret no longer matches the key. The RX
> +		 * secret also needs the TX one, see do_tls_setsockopt_secret().
> +		 */
> +		if (tx)
> +			memzero_explicit(&ctx->tx_secret,
> +					 sizeof(ctx->tx_secret));
> +		memzero_explicit(&ctx->rx_secret, sizeof(ctx->rx_secret));
>   		return 0;
> +	}
>   
>   	if (tx) {
>   		ctx->sk_write_space = sk->sk_write_space;
> @@ -857,6 +869,124 @@ static int do_tls_setsockopt_tx_payload_len(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval,
>   	return 0;
>   }
>   
> +/* Length of the TLS 1.3 traffic secret for @cipher_type, the size of
> + * its hash. 0 if KeyUpdate is not supported for the cipher.
> + */
> +static int tls_traffic_secret_len(u16 cipher_type)
> +{
> +	switch (cipher_type) {
> +	case TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128:
> +	case TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128:
> +	case TLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305:
> +		return SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE;
> +	case TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256:
> +		return SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE;
> +	default:
> +		return 0;
> +	}
> +}
> +
> +/* The installed key and IV must be the ones that @secret gives. Each
> + * KeyUpdate derives the next key from the secret, so a wrong secret
> + * fails only at the first KeyUpdate, with no clear cause.
> + */
> +static int tls_check_traffic_secret(struct tls_crypto_info *crypto_info,
> +				    const u8 *secret, int len)
> +{
> +	const struct tls_cipher_desc *cipher_desc;
> +	u8 iv[TLS_MAX_SALT_SIZE + TLS_MAX_IV_SIZE];
> +	u8 key[TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256_KEY_SIZE];
> +	int rc;
> +
> +	cipher_desc = get_cipher_desc(crypto_info->cipher_type);
> +	if (!cipher_desc || cipher_desc->key > sizeof(key) ||
> +	    cipher_desc->salt + cipher_desc->iv > sizeof(iv))
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +
> +	rc = tls_hkdf_expand_label(secret, len, "key", key, cipher_desc->key);
> +	if (rc)
> +		goto out;
> +
> +	rc = tls_hkdf_expand_label(secret, len, "iv", iv,
> +				   cipher_desc->salt + cipher_desc->iv);
> +	if (rc)
> +		goto out;
> +

You could add a comment that this follows the rules for key derivation
from RFC 8446, to be clear what we are doing here.

But aside from the:

Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@kernel.org>

Cheers,

Hannes
-- 
Dr. Hannes Reinecke                  Kernel Storage Architect
hare@suse.de                                +49 911 74053 688
SUSE Software Solutions GmbH, Frankenstr. 146, 90461 Nürnberg
HRB 36809 (AG Nürnberg), GF: I. Totev, A. McDonald, W. Knoblich

  reply	other threads:[~2026-10-28 14:13 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-10-28 13:52 [PATCH RFC net-next v2 0/5] tls: perform TLS 1.3 KeyUpdate in the kernel Martin Belanger via B4 Relay
2026-10-28 13:52 ` [PATCH RFC net-next v2 1/5] tls: add HKDF-Expand-Label for the TLS 1.3 key schedule Martin Belanger via B4 Relay
2026-10-28 13:52 ` [PATCH RFC net-next v2 2/5] tls: add socket options to register the traffic secrets Martin Belanger via B4 Relay
2026-10-28 14:13   ` Hannes Reinecke [this message]
2026-10-28 13:52 ` [PATCH RFC net-next v2 3/5] tls: update the RX key when a KeyUpdate is received Martin Belanger via B4 Relay
2026-10-28 14:19   ` Hannes Reinecke
2026-10-28 17:13     ` Martin Belanger
2026-10-28 13:52 ` [PATCH RFC net-next v2 4/5] tls: send a KeyUpdate at the record limit and on request Martin Belanger via B4 Relay
2026-10-28 14:23   ` Hannes Reinecke
2026-10-28 17:18     ` Martin Belanger
2026-10-28 13:52 ` [PATCH RFC net-next v2 5/5] selftests/tls: add KeyUpdate tests Martin Belanger via B4 Relay
2026-10-28 14:24   ` Hannes Reinecke
2026-10-28 14:21 ` [PATCH RFC net-next v2 0/5] tls: perform TLS 1.3 KeyUpdate in the kernel Chuck Lever
2026-10-28 14:42   ` Hannes Reinecke
     [not found]     ` <CAPG1HMsnUDa=Q5O4fwZOU=Pd+m7ahzu574Cs+mWoB_9KUT5ASA@mail.gmail.com>
2026-10-28 15:01       ` Chuck Lever
2026-10-28 15:12         ` Martin Belanger
2026-10-28 15:04     ` Martin Belanger

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