From: Yunseong Kim <yunseong.kim@est.tech>
To: Alice Ryhl <aliceryhl@google.com>
Cc: "Greg Kroah-Hartman" <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
"Arve Hjønnevåg" <arve@android.com>,
"Todd Kjos" <tkjos@android.com>,
"Christian Brauner" <brauner@kernel.org>,
"Carlos Llamas" <cmllamas@google.com>,
"Brian Swetland" <swetland@google.com>,
"Miguel Ojeda" <ojeda@kernel.org>,
"Boqun Feng" <boqun@kernel.org>, "Gary Guo" <gary@garyguo.net>,
"Björn Roy Baron" <bjorn3_gh@protonmail.com>,
"Benno Lossin" <lossin@kernel.org>,
"Andreas Hindborg" <a.hindborg@kernel.org>,
"Trevor Gross" <tmgross@umich.edu>,
"Danilo Krummrich" <dakr@kernel.org>,
"Greg Kroah-Hartman" <gregkh@suse.de>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, rust-for-linux@vger.kernel.org,
"Yunseong Kim" <ysk@kzalloc.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/4] binder: cap max_threads and reject duplicate looper entry
Date: Thu, 4 Jun 2026 22:27:19 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <0dd33a00-8fe9-49e1-a32f-565c4a312429@est.tech> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAH5fLgh664qa63CBqWY1CVNkdMwJbOPNzzPawpm8Ctz4U219gw@mail.gmail.com>
Hi Alice,
On 6/3/26 20:57, Alice Ryhl wrote:
> On Wed, Jun 3, 2026 at 8:02 PM Yunseong Kim <yunseong.kim@est.tech> wrote:
>> [snip..]
>
> So invoking BC_ENTER_LOOPER twice doesn't error and the second call is
> a no-op. What's the problem?
You're right — |= ENTERED when already ENTERED is idempotent at the
bit level. There's no corruption. I'll drop this patch.
>> --- ulimit bypass PoC (beyond_ulimit.c) ---
>>
>> /*
>> * Demonstrates RLIMIT_NPROC bypass via binder.
>> * With ulimit -u 50, creates 300 threads.
>> * Build: gcc -static -pthread -o beyond_ulimit beyond_ulimit.c
>> * Run: ulimit -u 50; ./beyond_ulimit
>> */
>>
>> struct binder_write_read {
>> int64_t write_size, write_consumed;
>> uint64_t write_buffer;
>> int64_t read_size, read_consumed;
>> uint64_t read_buffer;
>> };
>>
>> static void *binder_thread(void *arg)
>> {
>> int fd = open("/dev/binderfs/binder", O_RDWR);
>> if (fd < 0) fd = open("/dev/binder", O_RDWR);
>> if (fd < 0) return NULL;
>> mmap(NULL, 128*1024, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, fd, 0);
>> uint32_t max = 0xFFFFFFFF;
>> ioctl(fd, BINDER_SET_MAX_THREADS, &max);
>> uint32_t cmd = BC_REGISTER_LOOPER;
>> struct binder_write_read bwr = {
>> .write_size = sizeof(cmd),
>> .write_buffer = (uint64_t)(unsigned long)&cmd,
>> };
>> ioctl(fd, BINDER_WRITE_READ, &bwr);
>> close(fd);
>> return NULL;
>> }
>>
>> int main(void)
>> {
>> printf("pid=%d uid=%d\n", getpid(), getuid());
>> int created = 0;
>> pthread_attr_t attr;
>> pthread_attr_init(&attr);
>> pthread_attr_setstacksize(&attr, 16384);
>> for (int i = 0; i < 300; i++) {
>> pthread_t t;
>> if (pthread_create(&t, &attr, binder_thread, NULL)) break;
>> pthread_detach(t);
>> created++;
>> }
>> usleep(500000);
>> printf("Threads created: %d (ulimit was 50)\n", created);
>> if (created > 50)
>> printf("VULNERABLE: RLIMIT_NPROC bypassed!\n");
>> return 0;
>> }
>
> My understanding is that the only thing BINDER_SET_MAX_THREADS does is
> cause the kernel to tell userspace "please spawn more threads" when
> all threads are in use and there are incoming transactions. I don't
> understand how it helps by pass ulimit. Did you try running your test
> with the Binder ioctl removed? I'd guess that if it passes now, it
> still passes with the Binder ioctl deleted.
You're right. I ran the test you suggested and confirmed there is no
bypass — RLIMIT_NPROC is enforced by copy_process() at clone() time,
regardless of binder's max_threads value:
// Test: uid=65534, RLIMIT_NPROC=50, with and without SET_MAX_THREADS
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <stdio.h>
#include <pthread.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/mount.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/resource.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <linux/android/binder.h>
static void *thread_fn(void *arg) { pause(); return NULL; }
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
int use_binder = (argc > 1 && strcmp(argv[1], "binder") == 0);
mkdir("/dev/binderfs", 0755);
mount("binder", "/dev/binderfs", "binder", 0, NULL);
chmod("/dev/binderfs/binder", 0666);
struct rlimit rl = { .rlim_cur = 50, .rlim_max = 50 };
setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, &rl);
setgid(65534);
setuid(65534);
if (use_binder) {
int fd = open("/dev/binderfs/binder", O_RDWR);
if (fd >= 0) {
mmap(NULL, 128*1024, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, fd, 0);
uint32_t max = 0xFFFFFFFF;
ioctl(fd, BINDER_SET_MAX_THREADS, &max);
}
}
int created = 0;
pthread_attr_t attr;
pthread_attr_init(&attr);
pthread_attr_setstacksize(&attr, 16384);
for (int i = 0; i < 300; i++) {
pthread_t t;
if (pthread_create(&t, &attr, thread_fn, NULL)) break;
pthread_detach(t);
created++;
}
printf("[%s] uid=%d RLIMIT_NPROC=50 -> threads: %d\n",
use_binder ? "WITH binder" : "NO binder", getuid(), created);
return 0;
}
Result:
[NO binder] uid=65534 RLIMIT_NPROC=50 -> threads: 49
[WITH binder] uid=65534 RLIMIT_NPROC=50 -> threads: 49
Identical. SET_MAX_THREADS has no effect on the thread creation limit.
My original PoC was flawed — it ran as root where RLIMIT_NPROC is not
enforced, making the binder ioctl irrelevant.
I think accepting 0xFFFFFFFF for a thread pool size is arguably poor input
validation. no sane userspace would request 4 billion threads.
Would a separate patch (without Fixes tag) that caps max_threads at a
reasonable upper bound be welcome, or is it not worth the churn? this is
hardening, not a security fix.
> Alice
Thanks again Alice for the careful review.
Kind regards,
Yunseong
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-06-04 20:27 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-06-03 18:01 Yunseong Kim
2026-06-03 18:01 ` [PATCH 1/4] binder: cap BINDER_SET_MAX_THREADS at RLIMIT_NPROC Yunseong Kim
2026-06-03 18:01 ` [PATCH 2/4] binder: reject duplicate BC_ENTER_LOOPER commands Yunseong Kim
2026-06-03 18:01 ` [PATCH 3/4] rust_binder: cap set_max_threads at RLIMIT_NPROC Yunseong Kim
2026-06-03 18:01 ` [PATCH 4/4] rust_binder: reject duplicate BC_ENTER_LOOPER in looper_enter Yunseong Kim
2026-06-03 18:57 ` [PATCH 0/4] binder: cap max_threads and reject duplicate looper entry Alice Ryhl
2026-06-04 20:27 ` Yunseong Kim [this message]
2026-06-05 9:55 ` Alice Ryhl
2026-06-05 11:31 ` Yunseong Kim
2026-06-06 14:51 ` Carlos Llamas
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