* [PATCH 0/2] KEYS: two fixes for the asymmetric keyctl operations
@ 2026-11-11 15:56 Florian Bauckholt via B4 Relay
2026-11-11 15:56 ` [PATCH 1/2] KEYS: fix signature length passed to KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY Florian Bauckholt via B4 Relay
2026-11-11 15:56 ` [PATCH 2/2] KEYS: asymmetric: Fix PKCS#1 decryption of an empty message Florian Bauckholt via B4 Relay
0 siblings, 2 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Florian Bauckholt via B4 Relay @ 2026-11-11 15:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: David Howells, Jarkko Sakkinen, Lukas Wunner, Ignat Korchagin,
Herbert Xu, David S. Miller
Cc: Paul Moore, James Morris, Serge E. Hallyn, Hui Peng, keyrings,
linux-crypto, linux-security-module, linux-kernel, stable,
Florian Bauckholt
Hi,
two small fixes for KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY and KEYCTL_PKEY_DECRYPT that I
ran into while doing differential testing of crypto implementations
with the kernel hooked up via UML:
Patch 1 fixes a regression from commit cb481e59ea6c ("KEYS: fix overflow
in keyctl_pkey_params_get_2()"), which was tagged for stable:
KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY ignores the signature length passed by the caller.
It also is a prerequisite for making the x962 ECDSA template reject
signatures that are not DER-encoded, which I'm posting separately to
linux-crypto.
Patch 2 fixes PKCS#1 decryption of an empty message returning the
ciphertext.
Both changes were part of a patch posted by Hui Peng in September that
did not get a reply [1]. That patch also changed the out_len checks in
keyctl_pkey_params_get_2(), which is not included here.
Thanks!
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260919221742.3709658-1-benquike@gmail.com/
---
Florian Bauckholt (2):
KEYS: fix signature length passed to KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY
KEYS: asymmetric: Fix PKCS#1 decryption of an empty message
crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c | 6 +++---
security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c | 2 +-
2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
---
base-commit: 6628e7d4c6b25c8d18f1345e3a20d21829aae7e4
change-id: 20261111-keyctl-pkey-fixes-26358a8707b6
Best regards,
--
Florian Bauckholt <florian.bauckholt@cispa.de>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread* [PATCH 1/2] KEYS: fix signature length passed to KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY 2026-11-11 15:56 [PATCH 0/2] KEYS: two fixes for the asymmetric keyctl operations Florian Bauckholt via B4 Relay @ 2026-11-11 15:56 ` Florian Bauckholt via B4 Relay 2026-11-11 22:56 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2026-11-17 13:21 ` Rodolfo Giometti 2026-11-11 15:56 ` [PATCH 2/2] KEYS: asymmetric: Fix PKCS#1 decryption of an empty message Florian Bauckholt via B4 Relay 1 sibling, 2 replies; 6+ messages in thread From: Florian Bauckholt via B4 Relay @ 2026-11-11 15:56 UTC (permalink / raw) To: David Howells, Jarkko Sakkinen, Lukas Wunner, Ignat Korchagin, Herbert Xu, David S. Miller Cc: Paul Moore, James Morris, Serge E. Hallyn, Hui Peng, keyrings, linux-crypto, linux-security-module, linux-kernel, stable, Florian Bauckholt From: Florian Bauckholt <florian.bauckholt@cispa.de> Commit cb481e59ea6c ("KEYS: fix overflow in keyctl_pkey_params_get_2()") made keyctl_pkey_params_get_2() set params->out_len to the maximum output size of the operation instead of the size provided by the caller. It does so for KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY as well, but verify has no output buffer: out_len shares a union with in2_len, the length of the signature. As a result keyctl_pkey_verify() ignores the signature length passed by the caller. It copies max_sig_size bytes from the signature pointer and passes max_sig_size as the signature size to the verification. This makes no difference for signatures that are always max_sig_size bytes long, such as RSA. A shorter signature, e.g. a DER-encoded ECDSA signature, is followed by whatever is behind it in the caller's memory, or the call fails with -EFAULT if that memory is not readable. The x962 ECDSA template currently ignores data following the signature, which hides the problem. Use the length provided by the caller, which has already been checked against max_sig_size. Fixes: cb481e59ea6c ("KEYS: fix overflow in keyctl_pkey_params_get_2()") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260919221742.3709658-1-benquike@gmail.com/ Signed-off-by: Florian Bauckholt <florian.bauckholt@cispa.de> --- security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c b/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c index 15b6bf6399b5..794fa3d01911 100644 --- a/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c +++ b/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c @@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ static int keyctl_pkey_params_get_2(const struct keyctl_pkey_params __user *_par uparams.in2_len > info.max_sig_size) return -EINVAL; - params->out_len = info.max_sig_size; + params->in2_len = uparams.in2_len; break; default: return -EOPNOTSUPP; -- 2.56.0 ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 1/2] KEYS: fix signature length passed to KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY 2026-11-11 15:56 ` [PATCH 1/2] KEYS: fix signature length passed to KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY Florian Bauckholt via B4 Relay @ 2026-11-11 22:56 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2026-11-17 13:21 ` Rodolfo Giometti 1 sibling, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2026-11-11 22:56 UTC (permalink / raw) To: florian.bauckholt Cc: David Howells, Lukas Wunner, Ignat Korchagin, Herbert Xu, David S. Miller, Paul Moore, James Morris, Serge E. Hallyn, Hui Peng, keyrings, linux-crypto, linux-security-module, linux-kernel, stable On Wed, Nov 11, 2026 at 04:56:07PM +0100, Florian Bauckholt via B4 Relay wrote: > From: Florian Bauckholt <florian.bauckholt@cispa.de> > > Commit cb481e59ea6c ("KEYS: fix overflow in keyctl_pkey_params_get_2()") > made keyctl_pkey_params_get_2() set params->out_len to the maximum > output size of the operation instead of the size provided by the caller. > It does so for KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY as well, but verify has no output > buffer: out_len shares a union with in2_len, the length of the > signature. > > As a result keyctl_pkey_verify() ignores the signature length passed by > the caller. It copies max_sig_size bytes from the signature pointer and > passes max_sig_size as the signature size to the verification. > > This makes no difference for signatures that are always max_sig_size > bytes long, such as RSA. A shorter signature, e.g. a DER-encoded ECDSA > signature, is followed by whatever is behind it in the caller's memory, > or the call fails with -EFAULT if that memory is not readable. The > x962 ECDSA template currently ignores data following the signature, > which hides the problem. > > Use the length provided by the caller, which has already been checked > against max_sig_size. > > Fixes: cb481e59ea6c ("KEYS: fix overflow in keyctl_pkey_params_get_2()") > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260919221742.3709658-1-benquike@gmail.com/ > Signed-off-by: Florian Bauckholt <florian.bauckholt@cispa.de> > --- > security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c | 2 +- > 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c b/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c > index 15b6bf6399b5..794fa3d01911 100644 > --- a/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c > +++ b/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c > @@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ static int keyctl_pkey_params_get_2(const struct keyctl_pkey_params __user *_par > uparams.in2_len > info.max_sig_size) > return -EINVAL; > > - params->out_len = info.max_sig_size; > + params->in2_len = uparams.in2_len; > break; > default: > return -EOPNOTSUPP; > > -- > 2.56.0 > > Thanks, good catch, and apologies for causing this bug. Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Br, Jarkko ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 1/2] KEYS: fix signature length passed to KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY 2026-11-11 15:56 ` [PATCH 1/2] KEYS: fix signature length passed to KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY Florian Bauckholt via B4 Relay 2026-11-11 22:56 ` Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2026-11-17 13:21 ` Rodolfo Giometti 1 sibling, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread From: Rodolfo Giometti @ 2026-11-17 13:21 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Florian Bauckholt, David Howells, Jarkko Sakkinen, Lukas Wunner, Ignat Korchagin, Herbert Xu, David S. Miller Cc: Paul Moore, James Morris, Serge E. Hallyn, Hui Peng, Stefan Berger, keyrings, linux-crypto, linux-security-module, linux-kernel, stable On 11/11/2026 16:56, Florian Bauckholt wrote: > Commit cb481e59ea6c ("KEYS: fix overflow in keyctl_pkey_params_get_2()") > made keyctl_pkey_params_get_2() set params->out_len to the maximum > output size of the operation instead of the size provided by the caller. > It does so for KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY as well, but verify has no output > buffer: out_len shares a union with in2_len, the length of the > signature. > > As a result keyctl_pkey_verify() ignores the signature length passed by > the caller. It copies max_sig_size bytes from the signature pointer and > passes max_sig_size as the signature size to the verification. > > This makes no difference for signatures that are always max_sig_size > bytes long, such as RSA. A shorter signature, e.g. a DER-encoded ECDSA > signature, is followed by whatever is behind it in the caller's memory, > or the call fails with -EFAULT if that memory is not readable. The > x962 ECDSA template currently ignores data following the signature, > which hides the problem. The test suite of craf (https://github.com/giometti/crypto-afalg, test3008) hits this with RSA too: it cuts a genuine 256-byte RSA-2048 PKCS#1 signature to 255 bytes and expects the verify to fail. On Ubuntu's 6.8.0-147 kernel, which carries the stable backport of cb481e59ea6c, the cut signature verifies about once in 256 runs. Over 2000 runs per build: plain: ok=1991 ko=9 asan: ok=1997 ko=3 and a failing run prints (line wrapped here): libkcrypto [pkey-cert]: kc-check pkey-verify cert:test3008.cert enc=pkcs1 hash=sha256 test3008.d256 test3008.bad: exit 0, not 1: KO! To reproduce it (the count printed is the number of failures; here it gave 3 out of 1000 runs): git clone https://github.com/giometti/crypto-afalg cd crypto-afalg/tests export TESTS_TMPDIR=$(mktemp -d) for i in $(seq 1000); do ./do_test.sh 3008; done | grep -c 'KO!' I also replayed the inputs of one failing run on a UML kernel of current mainline (666539eecdf4, after v7.4-rc3): the 255-byte signature verifies 20 times out of 20, and with your patch applied it is refused 20 times out of 20. Maybe it is worth saying so in the commit message, since this is going to stable? I'll send my Tested-by once test3008 has run 2000 times on a kernel with your patch applied. > > Use the length provided by the caller, which has already been checked > against max_sig_size. > > Fixes: cb481e59ea6c ("KEYS: fix overflow in keyctl_pkey_params_get_2()") > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260919221742.3709658-1-benquike@gmail.com/ > Signed-off-by: Florian Bauckholt <florian.bauckholt@cispa.de> > --- > security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c | 2 +- > 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c b/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c > index 15b6bf6399b5..794fa3d01911 100644 > --- a/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c > +++ b/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c > @@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ static int keyctl_pkey_params_get_2(const struct keyctl_pkey_params __user *_par > uparams.in2_len > info.max_sig_size) > return -EINVAL; > > - params->out_len = info.max_sig_size; > + params->in2_len = uparams.in2_len; > break; > default: > return -EOPNOTSUPP; > Ciao, Rodolfo -- GNU/Linux Solutions e-mail: giometti@enneenne.com Linux Device Driver giometti@linux.it Embedded Systems phone: +39 349 2432127 UNIX programming ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 2/2] KEYS: asymmetric: Fix PKCS#1 decryption of an empty message 2026-11-11 15:56 [PATCH 0/2] KEYS: two fixes for the asymmetric keyctl operations Florian Bauckholt via B4 Relay 2026-11-11 15:56 ` [PATCH 1/2] KEYS: fix signature length passed to KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY Florian Bauckholt via B4 Relay @ 2026-11-11 15:56 ` Florian Bauckholt via B4 Relay 2026-11-11 23:01 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 1 sibling, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread From: Florian Bauckholt via B4 Relay @ 2026-11-11 15:56 UTC (permalink / raw) To: David Howells, Jarkko Sakkinen, Lukas Wunner, Ignat Korchagin, Herbert Xu, David S. Miller Cc: Paul Moore, James Morris, Serge E. Hallyn, Hui Peng, keyrings, linux-crypto, linux-security-module, linux-kernel, stable, Florian Bauckholt From: Florian Bauckholt <florian.bauckholt@cispa.de> KEYCTL_PKEY_DECRYPT with enc=pkcs1 on a valid ciphertext of an empty message returns the key size instead of 0, and the output buffer is filled with the ciphertext. crypto_akcipher_sync_encrypt() returns 0 on success, so software_key_eds_op() maps a result of 0 to crypto_akcipher_maxsize(). The mapping is applied to decryption as well, but crypto_akcipher_sync_decrypt() returns the length of the plaintext, which is 0 for an empty message. By then crypto_akcipher_sync_post() has copied its scratch buffer to the output. pkcs1pad copied nothing into that buffer, so it still holds the ciphertext. Only the caller's own input is returned, so nothing is disclosed, and messages that are not empty are decrypted correctly. An empty message is valid, though: RFC 8017 section 7.2 only limits the message length to k - 11 octets. Apply the mapping to encryption only. Fixes: 63ba4d67594a ("KEYS: asymmetric: Use new crypto interface without scatterlists") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.5+ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260919221742.3709658-1-benquike@gmail.com/ Signed-off-by: Florian Bauckholt <florian.bauckholt@cispa.de> --- crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c index 09a0b83d5d77..d71747d93b2c 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c @@ -341,6 +341,9 @@ static int software_key_eds_op(struct kernel_pkey_params *params, break; ret = crypto_akcipher_sync_encrypt(tfm, in, params->in_len, out, params->out_len); + /* Returns 0 on success and always fills the whole output. */ + if (ret == 0) + ret = crypto_akcipher_maxsize(tfm); break; case kernel_pkey_decrypt: if (issig) @@ -358,9 +361,6 @@ static int software_key_eds_op(struct kernel_pkey_params *params, BUG(); } - if (!issig && ret == 0) - ret = crypto_akcipher_maxsize(tfm); - error_free_tfm: if (issig) crypto_free_sig(sig); -- 2.56.0 ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 2/2] KEYS: asymmetric: Fix PKCS#1 decryption of an empty message 2026-11-11 15:56 ` [PATCH 2/2] KEYS: asymmetric: Fix PKCS#1 decryption of an empty message Florian Bauckholt via B4 Relay @ 2026-11-11 23:01 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 0 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2026-11-11 23:01 UTC (permalink / raw) To: florian.bauckholt Cc: David Howells, Lukas Wunner, Ignat Korchagin, Herbert Xu, David S. Miller, Paul Moore, James Morris, Serge E. Hallyn, Hui Peng, keyrings, linux-crypto, linux-security-module, linux-kernel, stable On Wed, Nov 11, 2026 at 04:56:08PM +0100, Florian Bauckholt via B4 Relay wrote: > <SNIP> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> That said, I'd by default pick only 1/2 to my tree. Br, Jarkko ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2026-11-17 13:21 UTC | newest] Thread overview: 6+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed) -- links below jump to the message on this page -- 2026-11-11 15:56 [PATCH 0/2] KEYS: two fixes for the asymmetric keyctl operations Florian Bauckholt via B4 Relay 2026-11-11 15:56 ` [PATCH 1/2] KEYS: fix signature length passed to KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY Florian Bauckholt via B4 Relay 2026-11-11 22:56 ` Jarkko Sakkinen 2026-11-17 13:21 ` Rodolfo Giometti 2026-11-11 15:56 ` [PATCH 2/2] KEYS: asymmetric: Fix PKCS#1 decryption of an empty message Florian Bauckholt via B4 Relay 2026-11-11 23:01 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
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