Re: [PATCH v2] scsi: 3w-sas: validate request_id reported by controller

[James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>]

On Tue, 2025-12-16 at 14:43 +0800, Shipei Qu wrote:
[...]
> For context: some confidential-computing / virtualized deployments
> include a hostile or compromised VMM or passthrough device in the
> threat model, so bounds checks can reduce crash surface when the
> device isn't fully trusted. But if that's outside upstream scope
> here, we're fine either way. Thanks for the clarification.


We already had a massive fight over hardening device drivers for
confidential computing:

https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230327141816.2648615-1-carlos.bilbao@amd.com/

The summary is that if you can't trust the hardware or its emulation,
policing it is too huge a burden to place on ordinary drivers.  So
while there's no objection to specifically hardened drivers for
confidential computing, generally we don't add hardening to real
hardware drivers because it tanks performance.

Regards,

James