From: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org>
To: linux-os@analogic.com
Cc: John Richard Moser <nigelenki@comcast.net>,
Linux kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
akpm@osdl.org
Subject: Re: Patch 4/6 randomize the stack pointer
Date: Thu, 27 Jan 2005 21:02:58 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1106856178.5624.128.camel@laptopd505.fenrus.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <Pine.LNX.4.61.0501271414010.23221@chaos.analogic.com>
On Thu, 2005-01-27 at 14:19 -0500, linux-os wrote:
> Gentlemen,
>
> Isn't the return address on the stack an offset in the
> code (.text) segment?
>
> How would a random stack-pointer value help? I think you would
> need to start a program at a random offset, not the stack!
> No stack-smasher that worked would care about the value of
> the stack-pointer.
the simple stack exploit works by overflowing a buffer ON THE STACK with
a "dirty payload and then also overwriting the return address to point
back into that buffer.
(all the security guys on this list will now cringe about this over
simplification; yes reality is more complex but lets keep the
explenation simple for Richard)
pointing back into that buffer needs the address of that buffer. That
buffer is on the stack, which is now randomized.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2005-01-27 20:03 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 91+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2005-01-27 10:11 Patch 0/6 virtual address space randomisation Arjan van de Ven
2005-01-27 10:12 ` Patch 1/6 introduce sysctl Arjan van de Ven
2005-01-27 10:36 ` Andi Kleen
2005-01-27 11:13 ` Arjan van de Ven
2005-01-27 18:16 ` Pavel Machek
2005-01-27 19:11 ` Ingo Molnar
2005-01-27 19:46 ` Dave Jones
2005-01-27 19:53 ` Ingo Molnar
2005-01-27 19:53 ` Arjan van de Ven
2005-02-04 21:27 ` Benoit Boissinot
2005-01-27 10:12 ` Patch 2/6 introduce helper infrastructure Arjan van de Ven
2005-01-27 10:41 ` Andi Kleen
2005-01-27 11:58 ` Arjan van de Ven
2005-01-27 12:27 ` Andi Kleen
2005-01-27 12:43 ` Arjan van de Ven
2005-02-01 21:14 ` Matt Mackall
2005-01-27 10:12 ` Patch 3/6 per process flag Arjan van de Ven
2005-01-27 10:13 ` Patch 4/6 randomize the stack pointer Arjan van de Ven
2005-01-27 10:21 ` Christoph Hellwig
2005-01-27 17:38 ` John Richard Moser
2005-01-27 17:47 ` Arjan van de Ven
2005-01-27 18:04 ` John Richard Moser
2005-01-27 18:09 ` Arjan van de Ven
2005-01-27 18:12 ` Christoph Hellwig
2005-01-27 18:16 ` Linus Torvalds
2005-01-27 18:28 ` Linus Torvalds
2005-01-27 18:55 ` John Richard Moser
2005-01-27 18:49 ` John Richard Moser
2005-01-27 19:30 ` Linus Torvalds
2005-01-27 19:48 ` Arjan van de Ven
2005-01-27 19:59 ` Linus Torvalds
2005-01-27 20:04 ` Arjan van de Ven
2005-01-27 20:08 ` John Richard Moser
2005-01-27 19:19 ` linux-os
2005-01-27 19:52 ` Julien TINNES
2005-01-27 20:02 ` Arjan van de Ven [this message]
2005-01-27 20:13 ` John Richard Moser
2005-01-27 21:33 ` jnf
2005-01-28 17:22 ` Paulo Marques
2005-01-28 17:51 ` John Richard Moser
2005-01-28 18:42 ` Ingo Molnar
2005-01-29 6:04 ` John Richard Moser
2005-01-27 20:37 ` linux-os
2005-01-27 20:45 ` John Richard Moser
2005-01-27 21:39 ` John Richard Moser
2005-01-27 21:53 ` Arjan van de Ven
2005-01-27 22:34 ` John Richard Moser
2005-01-29 2:50 ` Rik van Riel
2005-01-29 6:31 ` John Richard Moser
2005-01-29 8:10 ` Arjan van de Ven
[not found] ` <41FBB821.3000403@comcast.net>
2005-01-29 16:42 ` Arjan van de Ven
2005-01-29 16:59 ` John Richard Moser
2005-01-29 16:46 ` Arjan van de Ven
2005-01-29 17:04 ` John Richard Moser
2005-01-29 17:37 ` Jakub Jelinek
2005-01-29 17:49 ` John Richard Moser
2005-01-29 17:55 ` Christoph Hellwig
2005-01-29 18:10 ` John Richard Moser
2005-01-29 18:12 ` Rik van Riel
2005-01-29 18:16 ` Christoph Hellwig
2005-01-29 7:46 ` John Richard Moser
2005-01-27 18:40 ` Felipe Alfaro Solana
2005-01-27 22:31 ` Jirka Kosina
2005-01-28 5:58 ` Ingo Molnar
2005-01-28 19:02 ` David Lang
2005-01-28 7:33 ` Arjan van de Ven
2005-01-27 19:43 ` Julien TINNES
2005-01-28 0:10 ` H. Peter Anvin
2005-01-28 0:23 ` Roland Dreier
2005-01-28 1:06 ` H. Peter Anvin
2005-01-28 2:03 ` Horst von Brand
2005-01-28 8:45 ` Julien TINNES
2005-01-27 20:23 ` Christoph Hellwig
2005-01-27 20:27 ` Arjan van de Ven
2005-01-27 20:32 ` Christoph Hellwig
2005-01-27 20:35 ` Arjan van de Ven
2005-01-27 20:40 ` Rik van Riel
2005-01-27 20:42 ` Christoph Hellwig
2005-01-27 20:56 ` Arjan van de Ven
2005-01-27 21:13 ` Linus Torvalds
2005-01-27 10:13 ` Patch 5/6 randomize mmap addresses Arjan van de Ven
2005-01-27 10:14 ` Patch 6/6 default enable randomisation for -mm Arjan van de Ven
2005-01-27 11:45 ` Patch 0/6 virtual address space randomisation Julien TINNES
2005-01-27 11:57 ` Arjan van de Ven
2005-01-27 17:42 ` John Richard Moser
2005-01-27 19:34 ` Julien TINNES
2005-01-27 19:57 ` John Richard Moser
2005-01-27 20:13 ` Arjan van de Ven
2005-01-28 8:45 ` David Weinehall
2005-01-31 10:55 Patch 4/6 randomize the stack pointer linux
2005-01-31 17:28 ` John Richard Moser
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