Re: Patch 0/6 virtual address space randomisation

[David Weinehall <tao@debian.org>]

On Thu, Jan 27, 2005 at 09:13:04PM +0100, Arjan van de Ven wrote:
> On Thu, 2005-01-27 at 20:34 +0100, Julien TINNES wrote:
> > > 
> > > Yeah, if it came from PaX the randomization would actually be useful.
> > > Sorry, I've just woken up and already explained in another post.
> > > 
> > 
> > Please, no hard feelings.
> > 
> > Speaking about implementation of the non executable pages semantics on 
> > IA32, PaX and Exec-Shield are very different (well not that much since 
> > 2.6 in fact because PAGEEXEC is now "segmentation when I can").
> > But when it comes to ASLR it's pretty much the same thing.
> > 
> > The only difference may be the (very small) randomization of the brk() 
> > managed heap on ET_EXEC (which is probably the more "hackish" feature of 
> > PaX ASLR) but it seems that Arjan is even going to propose a patch for 
> > that (Is this in ES too ?).
> 
> Exec shield randomized brk() too yes.
> However that is a both more dangerous and more invasive change to do
> correctly (you have no idea how hard it is to get that right for
> emacs...) so that's reserved for the second batch of patches once this
> first batch is dealt with.

Oh, so you mean that we can both get a more secure system, *and* make
emacs stop working?  A win-win situation! =)


Regards: David Weinehall
-- 
 /) David Weinehall <tao@acc.umu.se> /) Northern lights wander      (\
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