From: "Nikunj A. Dadhania" <nikunj@amd.com>
To: Christophe JAILLET <christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, thomas.lendacky@amd.com,
bp@alien8.de, x86@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: mingo@redhat.com, tglx@linutronix.de,
dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, pgonda@google.com,
seanjc@google.com, pbonzini@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v13 01/13] x86/sev: Carve out and export SNP guest messaging init routines
Date: Tue, 22 Oct 2024 09:42:23 +0530 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <134c03b8-aa94-6d61-6d2b-965154c72949@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <5350829a-d30f-41b4-82db-8ed822e13d09@wanadoo.fr>
On 10/21/2024 1:18 PM, Christophe JAILLET wrote:
> Le 21/10/2024 à 07:51, Nikunj A Dadhania a écrit :
>> Currently, the SEV guest driver is the only user of SNP guest messaging.
>> All routines for initializing SNP guest messaging are implemented within
>> the SEV guest driver. To add Secure TSC guest support, these initialization
>> routines need to be available during early boot.
>>
>> Carve out common SNP guest messaging buffer allocations and message
>> initialization routines to core/sev.c and export them. These newly added
>> APIs set up the SNP message context (snp_msg_desc), which contains all the
>> necessary details for sending SNP guest messages.
>>
>> At present, the SEV guest platform data structure is used to pass the
>> secrets page physical address to SEV guest driver. Since the secrets page
>> address is locally available to the initialization routine, use the cached
>> address. Remove the unused SEV guest platform data structure.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
>> Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
>> ---
>
> ...
>
>> +static inline bool is_vmpck_empty(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc)
>> +{
>> + char zero_key[VMPCK_KEY_LEN] = {0};
>
> Nitpick: I think this could be a static const.
>
As the primary objective of this patch is to move the code, I have retained the
previous implementation.
Regards
Nikunj
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-10-22 4:12 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 35+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-10-21 5:51 [PATCH v13 00/13] Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-21 5:51 ` [PATCH v13 01/13] x86/sev: Carve out and export SNP guest messaging init routines Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-21 7:48 ` Christophe JAILLET
2024-10-22 4:12 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania [this message]
2024-10-21 5:51 ` [PATCH v13 02/13] x86/sev: Relocate SNP guest messaging routines to common code Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-21 5:51 ` [PATCH v13 03/13] x86/sev: Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-21 8:12 ` Christophe JAILLET
2024-10-22 4:15 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-21 5:51 ` [PATCH v13 04/13] x86/sev: Change TSC MSR behavior for Secure TSC enabled guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-23 3:25 ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-10-24 6:24 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-24 7:31 ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-10-24 10:16 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-21 5:51 ` [PATCH v13 05/13] x86/sev: Prevent RDTSC/RDTSCP interception " Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-24 7:56 ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-10-24 8:44 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-24 15:34 ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-10-21 5:51 ` [PATCH v13 06/13] x86/sev: Prevent GUEST_TSC_FREQ MSR " Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-21 14:08 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-10-22 4:20 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-21 5:51 ` [PATCH v13 07/13] x86/sev: Mark Secure TSC as reliable clocksource Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-21 5:51 ` [PATCH v13 08/13] x86/cpu/amd: Do not print FW_BUG for Secure TSC Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-21 5:51 ` [PATCH v13 09/13] tsc: Use the GUEST_TSC_FREQ MSR for discovering TSC frequency Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-21 14:33 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-10-22 4:24 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-21 5:51 ` [PATCH v13 10/13] tsc: Upgrade TSC clocksource rating Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-21 5:51 ` [PATCH v13 11/13] tsc: Switch to native sched clock Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-21 14:37 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-10-22 4:26 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-21 21:30 ` kernel test robot
2024-10-21 23:03 ` kernel test robot
2024-10-21 5:51 ` [PATCH v13 12/13] x86/kvmclock: Abort SecureTSC enabled guest when kvmclock is selected Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-21 15:00 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-10-22 4:28 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-21 5:51 ` [PATCH v13 13/13] x86/sev: Allow Secure TSC feature for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
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