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From: "Nikunj A. Dadhania" <nikunj@amd.com>
To: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, thomas.lendacky@amd.com,
	bp@alien8.de, x86@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: mingo@redhat.com, tglx@linutronix.de,
	dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, pgonda@google.com,
	seanjc@google.com, pbonzini@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v13 04/13] x86/sev: Change TSC MSR behavior for Secure TSC enabled guests
Date: Thu, 24 Oct 2024 11:54:20 +0530	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <33300e68-dde5-0456-2a6d-4fb585d188a6@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <c0596432-a20c-4cb7-8eb4-f8f23a1ec24b@intel.com>



On 10/23/2024 8:55 AM, Xiaoyao Li wrote:
> On 10/21/2024 1:51 PM, Nikunj A Dadhania wrote:
>> Secure TSC enabled guests should not write to MSR_IA32_TSC(10H) register as
>> the subsequent TSC value reads are undefined. MSR_IA32_TSC read/write
>> accesses should not exit to the hypervisor for such guests.
>>
>> Accesses to MSR_IA32_TSC needs special handling in the #VC handler for the
>> guests with Secure TSC enabled. Writes to MSR_IA32_TSC should be ignored,
>> and reads of MSR_IA32_TSC should return the result of the RDTSC
>> instruction.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
>> Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
>> Tested-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
>> ---
>>   arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
>>   1 file changed, 24 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c b/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
>> index 965209067f03..2ad7773458c0 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
>> @@ -1308,6 +1308,30 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_msr(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
>>           return ES_OK;
>>       }
>>   +    /*
>> +     * TSC related accesses should not exit to the hypervisor when a
>> +     * guest is executing with SecureTSC enabled, so special handling
>> +     * is required for accesses of MSR_IA32_TSC:
>> +     *
>> +     * Writes: Writing to MSR_IA32_TSC can cause subsequent reads
>> +     *         of the TSC to return undefined values, so ignore all
>> +     *         writes.
>> +     * Reads:  Reads of MSR_IA32_TSC should return the current TSC
>> +     *         value, use the value returned by RDTSC.
>> +     */
> 
> Why doesn't handle it by returning ES_VMM_ERROR when hypervisor intercepts
> RD/WR of MSR_IA32_TSC? With SECURE_TSC enabled, it seems not need to be
> intercepted.

ES_VMM_ERROR will terminate the guest, which is not the expected behaviour. As
documented, writes to the MSR is ignored and reads are done using RDTSC.

> I think the reason is that SNP guest relies on interception to do the ignore
> behavior for WRMSR in #VC handler because the writing leads to undefined
> result.

For legacy and secure guests MSR_IA32_TSC is always intercepted(for both RD/WR).
Moreover, this is a legacy MSR, RDTSC and RDTSCP is the what modern OSes should
use. The idea is the catch any writes to TSC MSR and handle them gracefully.

> Then the question is what if the hypervisor doesn't intercept write to
> MSR_IA32_TSC in the first place?

I have tried to disable interception of MSR_IA32_TSC, and writes are ignored by
the HW as well. I would like to continue the current documented HW as per the APM.

Regards,
Nikunj

  reply	other threads:[~2024-10-24  6:24 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 35+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-10-21  5:51 [PATCH v13 00/13] Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-21  5:51 ` [PATCH v13 01/13] x86/sev: Carve out and export SNP guest messaging init routines Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-21  7:48   ` Christophe JAILLET
2024-10-22  4:12     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-21  5:51 ` [PATCH v13 02/13] x86/sev: Relocate SNP guest messaging routines to common code Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-21  5:51 ` [PATCH v13 03/13] x86/sev: Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-21  8:12   ` Christophe JAILLET
2024-10-22  4:15     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-21  5:51 ` [PATCH v13 04/13] x86/sev: Change TSC MSR behavior for Secure TSC enabled guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-23  3:25   ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-10-24  6:24     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania [this message]
2024-10-24  7:31       ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-10-24 10:16         ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-21  5:51 ` [PATCH v13 05/13] x86/sev: Prevent RDTSC/RDTSCP interception " Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-24  7:56   ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-10-24  8:44     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-24 15:34       ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-10-21  5:51 ` [PATCH v13 06/13] x86/sev: Prevent GUEST_TSC_FREQ MSR " Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-21 14:08   ` Tom Lendacky
2024-10-22  4:20     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-21  5:51 ` [PATCH v13 07/13] x86/sev: Mark Secure TSC as reliable clocksource Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-21  5:51 ` [PATCH v13 08/13] x86/cpu/amd: Do not print FW_BUG for Secure TSC Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-21  5:51 ` [PATCH v13 09/13] tsc: Use the GUEST_TSC_FREQ MSR for discovering TSC frequency Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-21 14:33   ` Tom Lendacky
2024-10-22  4:24     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-21  5:51 ` [PATCH v13 10/13] tsc: Upgrade TSC clocksource rating Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-21  5:51 ` [PATCH v13 11/13] tsc: Switch to native sched clock Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-21 14:37   ` Tom Lendacky
2024-10-22  4:26     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-21 21:30   ` kernel test robot
2024-10-21 23:03   ` kernel test robot
2024-10-21  5:51 ` [PATCH v13 12/13] x86/kvmclock: Abort SecureTSC enabled guest when kvmclock is selected Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-21 15:00   ` Tom Lendacky
2024-10-22  4:28     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-21  5:51 ` [PATCH v13 13/13] x86/sev: Allow Secure TSC feature for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania

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