From: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
To: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Oliver Neukum <oneukum@suse.de>,
Chris Friesen <chris.friesen@genband.com>,
Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>,
Josh Boyer <jwboyer@gmail.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC] Second attempt at kernel secure boot support
Date: Thu, 01 Nov 2012 09:38:23 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1351762703.2391.31.camel@dabdike.int.hansenpartnership.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <alpine.LNX.2.00.1211011017230.6606@pobox.suse.cz>
On Thu, 2012-11-01 at 10:20 +0100, Jiri Kosina wrote:
> On Thu, 1 Nov 2012, James Bottomley wrote:
>
> > The point I'm making is that given that the majority of exploits will
> > already be able to execute arbitrary code in-kernel, there's not much
> > point trying to consider features like this as attacker prevention. We
> > should really be focusing on discussing why we'd want to prevent a
> > legitimate local root from writing to the suspend partition in a secure
> > boot environment.
>
> Well, this is being repeated over and over again when talking about secure
> boot, right?
>
> My understanding is that we are not trying to protect against root
> exploiting the kernel. We are trying to protect against root tampering
> with the kernel code and data through legitimate use of kernel-provided
> facilitiies (/dev/mem, ioperm, reprogramming devices to DMA to arbitrary
> memory locations, resuming from hibernation image that has been tampered
> with, etc).
>
> Or perhaps I just misunderstood the point you were trying to make?
I'm actually just struggling to understand the use case for these more
esoteric protections.
So the assumption is malice on the part of a legitimate local root? I
just don't see what such a user would gain by compromising resume in
this way (given that their scope for damage in the rest of the system
and data is huge) and I don't really see why a non-malicious local root
would be interested. A legitimate local root entails quite a measure of
trust, so what I don't really see is the use case for investing all that
trust in someone but not trusting them with the boot system. In a
proper capability separated limited trust environment, you simply don't
allow less trusted users raw access to all or some devices and that
solves the problem far more simply.
James
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2012-11-01 9:38 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 224+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2012-09-20 14:40 Matthew Garrett
2012-09-20 14:40 ` [PATCH V2 01/10] Secure boot: Add new capability Matthew Garrett
2012-09-28 3:10 ` Serge Hallyn
2012-10-20 0:15 ` joeyli
2012-10-20 9:02 ` Matt Fleming
2012-09-20 14:40 ` [PATCH V2 02/10] PCI: Lock down BAR access in secure boot environments Matthew Garrett
2012-09-20 14:40 ` [PATCH V2 03/10] x86: Lock down IO port " Matthew Garrett
2012-09-20 14:40 ` [PATCH V2 04/10] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method Matthew Garrett
2012-09-20 14:41 ` [PATCH V2 05/10] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface Matthew Garrett
2012-09-20 14:41 ` [PATCH V2 06/10] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem in secure boot setups Matthew Garrett
2012-09-20 14:41 ` [PATCH V2 07/10] Secure boot: Add a dummy kernel parameter that will switch on Secure Boot mode Matthew Garrett
2012-09-20 16:32 ` Greg KH
2012-09-20 17:40 ` Josh Boyer
2012-09-25 13:08 ` [PATCH V3 " Josh Boyer
2012-10-29 9:00 ` joeyli
2012-10-30 17:48 ` Josh Boyer
2012-10-30 19:27 ` joeyli
2012-09-21 8:20 ` [PATCH V2 " joeyli
2012-09-28 3:20 ` Serge Hallyn
2012-09-20 14:41 ` [PATCH V2 08/10] efi: Enable secure boot lockdown automatically when enabled in firmware Matthew Garrett
2012-09-28 3:21 ` Serge Hallyn
2012-10-22 13:22 ` Matt Fleming
2012-09-20 14:41 ` [PATCH V2 09/10] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel parameter in a secure boot environment Matthew Garrett
2012-09-20 14:41 ` [PATCH V2 10/10] SELinux: define mapping for new Secure Boot capability Matthew Garrett
2012-09-21 22:55 ` [RFC] Second attempt at kernel secure boot support Eric W. Biederman
2012-09-22 15:21 ` Matthew Garrett
2012-10-29 7:49 ` Jiri Kosina
2012-10-29 17:41 ` Matthew Garrett
2012-10-31 14:50 ` Jiri Kosina
2012-10-31 14:54 ` Josh Boyer
2012-10-31 14:59 ` Shea Levy
2012-10-31 15:55 ` Alan Cox
2012-10-31 15:55 ` Jiri Kosina
2012-10-31 17:03 ` Alan Cox
2012-10-31 17:01 ` Shea Levy
2012-10-31 17:17 ` Alan Cox
2012-10-31 17:10 ` Matthew Garrett
2012-10-31 17:21 ` Alan Cox
2012-10-31 17:17 ` Matthew Garrett
2012-10-31 17:39 ` Alan Cox
2012-10-31 17:37 ` Matthew Garrett
2012-10-31 17:49 ` Alan Cox
2012-10-31 17:45 ` Matthew Garrett
2012-10-31 20:14 ` Oliver Neukum
2012-10-31 21:58 ` Chris Friesen
2012-10-31 22:00 ` Jiri Kosina
2012-10-31 22:19 ` Oliver Neukum
2012-11-01 9:08 ` James Bottomley
2012-11-01 9:20 ` Jiri Kosina
2012-11-01 9:38 ` James Bottomley [this message]
2012-11-01 9:45 ` Jiri Kosina
2012-11-01 9:59 ` James Bottomley
2012-11-01 10:06 ` Jiri Kosina
2012-11-01 14:29 ` Eric Paris
2012-11-01 14:42 ` James Bottomley
2012-11-01 14:49 ` Matthew Garrett
2012-11-01 15:06 ` James Bottomley
2012-11-01 15:17 ` Eric Paris
2012-11-01 16:26 ` Matthew Garrett
2012-11-01 15:06 ` Alan Cox
2012-11-01 16:29 ` Matthew Garrett
2012-11-01 16:40 ` Alan Cox
2012-11-01 14:59 ` Eric Paris
2012-11-01 15:11 ` Alan Cox
2012-11-01 15:18 ` James Bottomley
2012-11-01 17:50 ` Eric Paris
2012-11-01 21:03 ` James Bottomley
2012-11-01 21:06 ` Matthew Garrett
2012-11-01 21:14 ` James Bottomley
2012-11-01 21:18 ` Matthew Garrett
2012-11-01 21:35 ` Alan Cox
2012-11-01 21:31 ` Alan Cox
2012-11-01 21:28 ` Matthew Garrett
2012-11-01 21:37 ` Alan Cox
2012-11-01 21:34 ` Matthew Garrett
2012-11-01 21:58 ` Alan Cox
2012-11-01 21:57 ` Matthew Garrett
2012-11-02 8:49 ` Eric W. Biederman
2012-11-02 14:00 ` Matthew Garrett
2012-11-02 22:03 ` Eric W. Biederman
2012-11-02 22:19 ` Chris Friesen
2012-11-02 23:46 ` Alan Cox
2012-11-03 0:23 ` Matthew Garrett
2012-11-03 0:55 ` Alan Cox
2012-11-03 0:20 ` Matthew Garrett
2012-11-03 0:47 ` Eric W. Biederman
2012-11-03 1:03 ` Alan Cox
2012-11-03 1:43 ` Matthew Garrett
2012-11-03 16:31 ` Alan Cox
2012-11-03 16:37 ` Matthew Garrett
2012-11-03 16:37 ` Eric Paris
2012-11-03 16:42 ` Matthew Garrett
2012-11-02 17:19 ` Vivek Goyal
2012-11-01 14:46 ` Alan Cox
2012-11-01 15:04 ` Eric Paris
2012-11-01 20:27 ` Pavel Machek
2012-11-01 21:02 ` Chris Friesen
2012-11-02 15:48 ` Vivek Goyal
2012-11-02 16:54 ` Chris Friesen
2012-11-02 17:03 ` Vivek Goyal
2012-11-03 23:09 ` Jiri Kosina
2012-11-05 6:38 ` Eric W. Biederman
2012-11-05 14:40 ` Jiri Kosina
2012-11-05 15:31 ` Jiri Kosina
2012-11-05 15:37 ` Chris Friesen
2012-11-05 18:22 ` Vivek Goyal
2012-11-02 16:33 ` Pavel Machek
2012-11-02 16:52 ` James Bottomley
2012-11-02 16:54 ` Matthew Garrett
2012-11-02 17:48 ` James Bottomley
2012-11-02 17:54 ` Matthew Garrett
2012-11-02 17:57 ` James Bottomley
2012-11-02 18:04 ` Matthew Garrett
2012-11-02 19:18 ` Eric Paris
2012-11-02 23:38 ` James Bottomley
2012-11-03 0:22 ` Matthew Garrett
2012-11-03 12:03 ` James Bottomley
2012-11-03 13:46 ` Matthew Garrett
2012-11-03 22:56 ` James Bottomley
2012-11-04 4:28 ` Matthew Garrett
2012-11-04 9:14 ` James Bottomley
2012-11-04 13:52 ` Matthew Garrett
2012-11-05 6:14 ` Eric W. Biederman
2012-11-05 7:12 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-11-05 7:24 ` Eric W. Biederman
2012-11-05 7:40 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-11-05 8:50 ` Eric W. Biederman
2012-11-05 8:53 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-11-05 12:38 ` Matthew Garrett
2012-11-05 13:44 ` Alan Cox
2012-11-05 13:46 ` Matthew Garrett
2012-11-05 19:16 ` Eric W. Biederman
2012-11-05 20:25 ` Matthew Garrett
2012-11-06 2:46 ` Eric W. Biederman
2012-11-06 3:12 ` Matthew Garrett
2012-11-06 3:36 ` Eric W. Biederman
2012-11-06 3:53 ` Matthew Garrett
2012-11-06 5:19 ` Eric W. Biederman
2012-11-06 5:34 ` Matthew Garrett
2012-11-06 7:56 ` Florian Weimer
2012-11-06 15:14 ` Chris Friesen
2012-11-06 15:19 ` Jiri Kosina
2012-11-06 21:51 ` Florian Weimer
2012-11-06 21:55 ` Matthew Garrett
2012-11-06 22:06 ` Florian Weimer
2012-11-06 22:31 ` Matthew Garrett
2012-11-06 22:49 ` Alan Cox
2012-11-06 22:47 ` Matthew Garrett
[not found] ` <CAMFK0gt7oAr4ArD8FmD8QE+i4g4rSTmQjbbLcjs02xwQeXGx-A@mail.gmail.com>
2012-11-07 14:55 ` Matthew Garrett
2012-11-08 10:18 ` James Courtier-Dutton
[not found] ` <CAAMvbhFF=kb8TJ4oE+40Zrx7HD1OkD0NOYj7QEZegZKGtqDm_A@mail.gmail.com>
2012-11-08 11:19 ` Alan Cox
2012-11-06 9:12 ` Alan Cox
2012-11-06 13:17 ` Matthew Garrett
2012-11-06 8:13 ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2012-11-05 8:20 ` James Bottomley
2012-11-05 12:36 ` Matthew Garrett
2012-11-04 11:53 ` Pavel Machek
2012-11-05 21:25 ` Florian Weimer
2012-11-02 14:55 ` Vivek Goyal
2012-11-01 10:12 ` Oliver Neukum
2012-10-31 17:21 ` Jiri Kosina
2012-10-31 15:56 ` Matthew Garrett
2012-10-31 17:08 ` Alan Cox
2012-10-31 17:08 ` Shea Levy
2012-10-31 16:04 ` Jiri Kosina
2012-10-31 16:10 ` Josh Boyer
2012-10-31 15:02 ` Matthew Garrett
2012-10-31 15:05 ` Shea Levy
2012-10-31 15:09 ` Matthew Garrett
2012-11-02 15:30 ` Vivek Goyal
2012-11-02 15:42 ` Matthew Garrett
2012-11-02 15:52 ` Vivek Goyal
2012-11-02 16:22 ` Jiri Kosina
2012-11-02 18:30 ` Vivek Goyal
2012-11-02 16:35 ` Shuah Khan
2012-11-06 12:51 ` Jiri Kosina
2012-11-06 13:16 ` Matthew Garrett
2012-10-31 17:28 ` Takashi Iwai
2012-10-31 17:37 ` Matthew Garrett
2012-10-31 17:44 ` Alan Cox
2012-10-31 17:44 ` Matthew Garrett
2012-10-31 18:53 ` Takashi Iwai
2012-11-01 4:21 ` joeyli
2012-11-01 13:18 ` Alan Cox
2012-11-05 17:13 ` Takashi Iwai
2012-11-05 17:18 ` [PATCH RFC 0/4] Add firmware signature file check Takashi Iwai
2012-11-05 17:19 ` [PATCH RFC 1/4] scripts/sign-file: Allow specifying hash algorithm via -a option Takashi Iwai
2012-11-05 17:19 ` [PATCH RFC 2/4] scripts/sign-file: Support firmware signing Takashi Iwai
2012-11-05 17:20 ` [PATCH RFC 3/4] firmware: Add a signature check Takashi Iwai
2012-11-06 6:03 ` Mimi Zohar
2012-11-05 17:20 ` [PATCH RFC 4/4] firmware: Install signature files automatically Takashi Iwai
2012-11-05 18:12 ` [PATCH RFC 0/4] Add firmware signature file check Takashi Iwai
2012-11-05 20:43 ` Josh Boyer
2012-11-06 6:46 ` Takashi Iwai
2012-11-06 9:20 ` Alan Cox
2012-11-06 10:05 ` Takashi Iwai
2012-11-06 2:30 ` Ming Lei
2012-11-06 5:46 ` lee joey
2012-11-06 7:03 ` Takashi Iwai
2012-11-06 7:16 ` Ming Lei
2012-11-06 7:32 ` Takashi Iwai
2012-11-06 8:04 ` Ming Lei
2012-11-06 8:18 ` Takashi Iwai
2012-11-06 10:04 ` Ming Lei
2012-11-06 10:17 ` Takashi Iwai
2012-11-06 10:40 ` Ming Lei
2012-11-06 10:53 ` Takashi Iwai
2012-11-06 11:03 ` Ming Lei
2012-11-06 11:15 ` Alan Cox
[not found] ` <CAGB3EUTrSMDhja9Gu3h7nuZX+H2_owp8MnUNwbZuCW=_GuawqQ@mail.gmail.com>
2012-11-06 7:06 ` Takashi Iwai
2012-11-06 7:30 ` Ming Lei
2012-11-08 17:35 ` [PATCH RFC v2 " Takashi Iwai
2012-11-08 17:35 ` [PATCH RFC v2 1/4] firmware: Add the firmware signing support to scripts/sign-file Takashi Iwai
2012-11-23 6:51 ` joeyli
2012-11-08 17:35 ` [PATCH RFC v2 2/4] firmware: Add -a option " Takashi Iwai
2012-11-23 6:51 ` joeyli
2012-11-08 17:35 ` [PATCH RFC v2 3/4] firmware: Add support for signature checks Takashi Iwai
2012-11-23 6:56 ` joeyli
2012-11-23 7:34 ` Takashi Iwai
2012-11-08 17:35 ` [PATCH RFC v2 4/4] firmware: Install firmware signature files automatically Takashi Iwai
2012-11-23 6:52 ` joeyli
2012-11-06 0:01 ` [PATCH RFC 0/4] Add firmware signature file check David Howells
2012-11-06 7:01 ` Takashi Iwai
2012-11-06 0:05 ` David Howells
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