From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>, Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>,
Geremy Condra <gcondra@google.com>,
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Subject: [PATCH 2/4] arch/arm: move secure_computing into trace
Date: Thu, 1 Nov 2012 12:46:37 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1351799199-6853-3-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1351799199-6853-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>
There is very little difference in the TIF_SECCOMP and TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE
path in entry-common.S. In order to add support for
CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER without mangling the assembly too badly,
seccomp was moved into the syscall_trace_enter() handler.
Expanded ptrace_syscall_trace() into both callers to make code more
readable, as requested by Al Viro.
Additionally, the return value for secure_computing() is now checked
and a -1 value will result in the system call being skipped.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S | 9 ++-------
arch/arm/kernel/ptrace.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S b/arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S
index 3471175..c781012 100644
--- a/arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S
@@ -418,13 +418,8 @@ local_restart:
stmdb sp!, {r4, r5} @ push fifth and sixth args
#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
- tst r10, #_TIF_SECCOMP
- beq 1f
- mov r0, scno
- bl __secure_computing
- add r0, sp, #S_R0 + S_OFF @ pointer to regs
- ldmia r0, {r0 - r3} @ have to reload r0 - r3
-1:
+ tst r10, #_TIF_SECCOMP @ is seccomp enabled?
+ bne __sys_trace
#endif
tst r10, #_TIF_SYSCALL_WORK @ are we tracing syscalls?
diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/arm/kernel/ptrace.c
index 739db3a..6b0e14b 100644
--- a/arch/arm/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -916,13 +916,15 @@ enum ptrace_syscall_dir {
PTRACE_SYSCALL_EXIT,
};
-static int ptrace_syscall_trace(struct pt_regs *regs, int scno,
- enum ptrace_syscall_dir dir)
+asmlinkage int syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs, int scno)
{
unsigned long ip;
current_thread_info()->syscall = scno;
+ if (secure_computing(scno) == -1)
+ return -1;
+
if (!test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE))
return scno;
@@ -931,20 +933,13 @@ static int ptrace_syscall_trace(struct pt_regs *regs, int scno,
* IP = 0 -> entry, =1 -> exit
*/
ip = regs->ARM_ip;
- regs->ARM_ip = dir;
-
- if (dir == PTRACE_SYSCALL_EXIT)
- tracehook_report_syscall_exit(regs, 0);
- else if (tracehook_report_syscall_entry(regs))
+ regs->ARM_ip = PTRACE_SYSCALL_ENTER;
+ if (tracehook_report_syscall_entry(regs))
current_thread_info()->syscall = -1;
-
regs->ARM_ip = ip;
- return current_thread_info()->syscall;
-}
-asmlinkage int syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs, int scno)
-{
- scno = ptrace_syscall_trace(regs, scno, PTRACE_SYSCALL_ENTER);
+ scno = current_thread_info()->syscall;
+
if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT))
trace_sys_enter(regs, scno);
audit_syscall_entry(AUDIT_ARCH_ARM, scno, regs->ARM_r0, regs->ARM_r1,
@@ -954,7 +949,23 @@ asmlinkage int syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs, int scno)
asmlinkage int syscall_trace_exit(struct pt_regs *regs, int scno)
{
- scno = ptrace_syscall_trace(regs, scno, PTRACE_SYSCALL_EXIT);
+ unsigned long ip;
+
+ current_thread_info()->syscall = scno;
+
+ if (!test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE))
+ return scno;
+
+ /*
+ * IP is used to denote syscall entry/exit:
+ * IP = 0 -> entry, =1 -> exit
+ */
+ ip = regs->ARM_ip;
+ regs->ARM_ip = PTRACE_SYSCALL_EXIT;
+ tracehook_report_syscall_exit(regs, 0);
+ regs->ARM_ip = ip;
+
+ scno = current_thread_info()->syscall;
if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT))
trace_sys_exit(regs, scno);
audit_syscall_exit(regs);
--
1.7.9.5
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2012-11-01 19:47 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2012-11-01 19:46 [PATCH v2 0/4] arch/arm: support seccomp Kees Cook
2012-11-01 19:46 ` [PATCH 1/4] arch/arm: add syscall_get_arch Kees Cook
2012-11-01 19:46 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2012-11-01 20:33 ` [PATCH 2/4] arch/arm: move secure_computing into trace Russell King - ARM Linux
2012-11-01 20:50 ` Kees Cook
2012-11-01 19:46 ` [PATCH 3/4] arch/arm: allow a scno of -1 to not cause a SIGILL Kees Cook
2012-11-01 20:25 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2012-11-01 21:51 ` Kees Cook
2012-11-01 19:46 ` [PATCH 4/4] arch/arm: select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER Kees Cook
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2012-11-10 22:44 [PATCH v5 0/4] arch/arm: support seccomp Kees Cook
2012-11-10 22:44 ` [PATCH 2/4] arch/arm: move secure_computing into trace Kees Cook
2012-11-08 20:59 [PATCH v4 0/4] arch/arm: support seccomp Kees Cook
2012-11-08 20:59 ` [PATCH 2/4] arch/arm: move secure_computing into trace Kees Cook
2012-11-09 11:56 ` Will Deacon
2012-11-02 0:14 [PATCH v3 0/4] arch/arm: support seccomp Kees Cook
2012-11-02 0:14 ` [PATCH 2/4] arch/arm: move secure_computing into trace Kees Cook
2012-10-30 0:41 [PATCH 0/4] arch/arm: support seccomp Kees Cook
2012-10-30 0:41 ` [PATCH 2/4] arch/arm: move secure_computing into trace Kees Cook
2012-10-30 2:05 ` Al Viro
2012-10-31 0:13 ` Kees Cook
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