* [PATCH 0/3] random driver improvements
@ 2014-06-11 3:30 Theodore Ts'o
2014-06-11 3:30 ` [PATCH 1/3] random: always update the entropy pool under the spinlock Theodore Ts'o
` (2 more replies)
0 siblings, 3 replies; 4+ messages in thread
From: Theodore Ts'o @ 2014-06-11 3:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Theodore Ts'o
After going through a very long thread, and trying to work out things in
words, I was frustrated enough that I decided a good way to improve the
conversation was to do it in code instead of words.
I don't think any of this should be controversial...
- Ted
Theodore Ts'o (3):
random: always update the entropy pool under the spinlock
random: remove unneeded hash of a portion of the entropy pool
random: only update the last_pulled time if we actually transferred
entropy
drivers/char/random.c | 98 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------------
1 file changed, 46 insertions(+), 52 deletions(-)
--
2.0.0
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 1/3] random: always update the entropy pool under the spinlock
2014-06-11 3:30 [PATCH 0/3] random driver improvements Theodore Ts'o
@ 2014-06-11 3:30 ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-06-11 3:30 ` [PATCH 2/3] random: remove unneeded hash of a portion of the entropy pool Theodore Ts'o
2014-06-11 3:30 ` [PATCH 3/3] random: only update the last_pulled time if we actually transferred entropy Theodore Ts'o
2 siblings, 0 replies; 4+ messages in thread
From: Theodore Ts'o @ 2014-06-11 3:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Theodore Ts'o, George Spelvin
Instead of using lockless techniques introduced in commit
902c098a3663, use spin_trylock to try to grab entropy pool's lock. If
we can't get the lock, then just try again on the next interrupt.
Based on discussions with George Spelvin.
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: George Spelvin <linux@horizon.com>
---
drivers/char/random.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index 102c50d..76d2f53 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -495,9 +495,8 @@ static void _mix_pool_bytes(struct entropy_store *r, const void *in,
tap4 = r->poolinfo->tap4;
tap5 = r->poolinfo->tap5;
- smp_rmb();
- input_rotate = ACCESS_ONCE(r->input_rotate);
- i = ACCESS_ONCE(r->add_ptr);
+ input_rotate = r->input_rotate;
+ i = r->add_ptr;
/* mix one byte at a time to simplify size handling and churn faster */
while (nbytes--) {
@@ -524,9 +523,8 @@ static void _mix_pool_bytes(struct entropy_store *r, const void *in,
input_rotate = (input_rotate + (i ? 7 : 14)) & 31;
}
- ACCESS_ONCE(r->input_rotate) = input_rotate;
- ACCESS_ONCE(r->add_ptr) = i;
- smp_wmb();
+ r->input_rotate = input_rotate;
+ r->add_ptr = i;
if (out)
for (j = 0; j < 16; j++)
@@ -860,17 +858,31 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags)
if ((fast_pool->count & 63) && !time_after(now, fast_pool->last + HZ))
return;
- fast_pool->last = now;
-
r = nonblocking_pool.initialized ? &input_pool : &nonblocking_pool;
+ if (!spin_trylock(&r->lock)) {
+ fast_pool->count--;
+ return;
+ }
+ fast_pool->last = now;
__mix_pool_bytes(r, &fast_pool->pool, sizeof(fast_pool->pool), NULL);
/*
+ * If we have architectural seed generator, produce a seed and
+ * add it to the pool. For the sake of paranoia count it as
+ * 50% entropic.
+ */
+ credit = 1;
+ if (arch_get_random_seed_long(&seed)) {
+ __mix_pool_bytes(r, &seed, sizeof(seed), NULL);
+ credit += sizeof(seed) * 4;
+ }
+ spin_unlock(&r->lock);
+
+ /*
* If we don't have a valid cycle counter, and we see
* back-to-back timer interrupts, then skip giving credit for
* any entropy, otherwise credit 1 bit.
*/
- credit = 1;
if (cycles == 0) {
if (irq_flags & __IRQF_TIMER) {
if (fast_pool->last_timer_intr)
@@ -880,16 +892,6 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags)
fast_pool->last_timer_intr = 0;
}
- /*
- * If we have architectural seed generator, produce a seed and
- * add it to the pool. For the sake of paranoia count it as
- * 50% entropic.
- */
- if (arch_get_random_seed_long(&seed)) {
- __mix_pool_bytes(r, &seed, sizeof(seed), NULL);
- credit += sizeof(seed) * 4;
- }
-
credit_entropy_bits(r, credit);
}
--
2.0.0
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 2/3] random: remove unneeded hash of a portion of the entropy pool
2014-06-11 3:30 [PATCH 0/3] random driver improvements Theodore Ts'o
2014-06-11 3:30 ` [PATCH 1/3] random: always update the entropy pool under the spinlock Theodore Ts'o
@ 2014-06-11 3:30 ` Theodore Ts'o
2014-06-11 3:30 ` [PATCH 3/3] random: only update the last_pulled time if we actually transferred entropy Theodore Ts'o
2 siblings, 0 replies; 4+ messages in thread
From: Theodore Ts'o @ 2014-06-11 3:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Theodore Ts'o, George Spelvin
We previously extracted a portion of the entropy pool in
mix_pool_bytes() and hashed it in to avoid racing CPU's from returning
duplicate random values. Now that we are using a spinlock to prevent
this from happening, this is no longer necessary. So remove it, to
simplify the code a bit.
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: George Spelvin <linux@horizon.com>
---
drivers/char/random.c | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------------
1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index 76d2f53..97f390b 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -481,9 +481,9 @@ static __u32 const twist_table[8] = {
* the entropy is concentrated in the low-order bits.
*/
static void _mix_pool_bytes(struct entropy_store *r, const void *in,
- int nbytes, __u8 out[64])
+ int nbytes)
{
- unsigned long i, j, tap1, tap2, tap3, tap4, tap5;
+ unsigned long i, tap1, tap2, tap3, tap4, tap5;
int input_rotate;
int wordmask = r->poolinfo->poolwords - 1;
const char *bytes = in;
@@ -525,27 +525,23 @@ static void _mix_pool_bytes(struct entropy_store *r, const void *in,
r->input_rotate = input_rotate;
r->add_ptr = i;
-
- if (out)
- for (j = 0; j < 16; j++)
- ((__u32 *)out)[j] = r->pool[(i - j) & wordmask];
}
static void __mix_pool_bytes(struct entropy_store *r, const void *in,
- int nbytes, __u8 out[64])
+ int nbytes)
{
trace_mix_pool_bytes_nolock(r->name, nbytes, _RET_IP_);
- _mix_pool_bytes(r, in, nbytes, out);
+ _mix_pool_bytes(r, in, nbytes);
}
static void mix_pool_bytes(struct entropy_store *r, const void *in,
- int nbytes, __u8 out[64])
+ int nbytes)
{
unsigned long flags;
trace_mix_pool_bytes(r->name, nbytes, _RET_IP_);
spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags);
- _mix_pool_bytes(r, in, nbytes, out);
+ _mix_pool_bytes(r, in, nbytes);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags);
}
@@ -737,13 +733,13 @@ void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, unsigned int size)
trace_add_device_randomness(size, _RET_IP_);
spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags);
- _mix_pool_bytes(&input_pool, buf, size, NULL);
- _mix_pool_bytes(&input_pool, &time, sizeof(time), NULL);
+ _mix_pool_bytes(&input_pool, buf, size);
+ _mix_pool_bytes(&input_pool, &time, sizeof(time));
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags);
spin_lock_irqsave(&nonblocking_pool.lock, flags);
- _mix_pool_bytes(&nonblocking_pool, buf, size, NULL);
- _mix_pool_bytes(&nonblocking_pool, &time, sizeof(time), NULL);
+ _mix_pool_bytes(&nonblocking_pool, buf, size);
+ _mix_pool_bytes(&nonblocking_pool, &time, sizeof(time));
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&nonblocking_pool.lock, flags);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_device_randomness);
@@ -776,7 +772,7 @@ static void add_timer_randomness(struct timer_rand_state *state, unsigned num)
sample.cycles = random_get_entropy();
sample.num = num;
r = nonblocking_pool.initialized ? &input_pool : &nonblocking_pool;
- mix_pool_bytes(r, &sample, sizeof(sample), NULL);
+ mix_pool_bytes(r, &sample, sizeof(sample));
/*
* Calculate number of bits of randomness we probably added.
@@ -864,7 +860,7 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags)
return;
}
fast_pool->last = now;
- __mix_pool_bytes(r, &fast_pool->pool, sizeof(fast_pool->pool), NULL);
+ __mix_pool_bytes(r, &fast_pool->pool, sizeof(fast_pool->pool));
/*
* If we have architectural seed generator, produce a seed and
@@ -873,7 +869,7 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags)
*/
credit = 1;
if (arch_get_random_seed_long(&seed)) {
- __mix_pool_bytes(r, &seed, sizeof(seed), NULL);
+ __mix_pool_bytes(r, &seed, sizeof(seed));
credit += sizeof(seed) * 4;
}
spin_unlock(&r->lock);
@@ -954,7 +950,7 @@ static void _xfer_secondary_pool(struct entropy_store *r, size_t nbytes)
ENTROPY_BITS(r), ENTROPY_BITS(r->pull));
bytes = extract_entropy(r->pull, tmp, bytes,
random_read_wakeup_bits / 8, rsvd_bytes);
- mix_pool_bytes(r, tmp, bytes, NULL);
+ mix_pool_bytes(r, tmp, bytes);
credit_entropy_bits(r, bytes*8);
}
@@ -1029,7 +1025,6 @@ static void extract_buf(struct entropy_store *r, __u8 *out)
unsigned long l[LONGS(20)];
} hash;
__u32 workspace[SHA_WORKSPACE_WORDS];
- __u8 extract[64];
unsigned long flags;
/*
@@ -1058,15 +1053,9 @@ static void extract_buf(struct entropy_store *r, __u8 *out)
* brute-forcing the feedback as hard as brute-forcing the
* hash.
*/
- __mix_pool_bytes(r, hash.w, sizeof(hash.w), extract);
+ __mix_pool_bytes(r, hash.w, sizeof(hash.w));
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags);
- /*
- * To avoid duplicates, we atomically extract a portion of the
- * pool while mixing, and hash one final time.
- */
- sha_transform(hash.w, extract, workspace);
- memset(extract, 0, sizeof(extract));
memset(workspace, 0, sizeof(workspace));
/*
@@ -1253,14 +1242,14 @@ static void init_std_data(struct entropy_store *r)
unsigned long rv;
r->last_pulled = jiffies;
- mix_pool_bytes(r, &now, sizeof(now), NULL);
+ mix_pool_bytes(r, &now, sizeof(now));
for (i = r->poolinfo->poolbytes; i > 0; i -= sizeof(rv)) {
if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&rv) &&
!arch_get_random_long(&rv))
rv = random_get_entropy();
- mix_pool_bytes(r, &rv, sizeof(rv), NULL);
+ mix_pool_bytes(r, &rv, sizeof(rv));
}
- mix_pool_bytes(r, utsname(), sizeof(*(utsname())), NULL);
+ mix_pool_bytes(r, utsname(), sizeof(*(utsname())));
}
/*
@@ -1323,7 +1312,7 @@ static int arch_random_refill(void)
if (n) {
unsigned int rand_bytes = n * sizeof(unsigned long);
- mix_pool_bytes(&input_pool, buf, rand_bytes, NULL);
+ mix_pool_bytes(&input_pool, buf, rand_bytes);
credit_entropy_bits(&input_pool, rand_bytes*4);
}
@@ -1413,7 +1402,7 @@ write_pool(struct entropy_store *r, const char __user *buffer, size_t count)
count -= bytes;
p += bytes;
- mix_pool_bytes(r, buf, bytes, NULL);
+ mix_pool_bytes(r, buf, bytes);
cond_resched();
}
--
2.0.0
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 3/3] random: only update the last_pulled time if we actually transferred entropy
2014-06-11 3:30 [PATCH 0/3] random driver improvements Theodore Ts'o
2014-06-11 3:30 ` [PATCH 1/3] random: always update the entropy pool under the spinlock Theodore Ts'o
2014-06-11 3:30 ` [PATCH 2/3] random: remove unneeded hash of a portion of the entropy pool Theodore Ts'o
@ 2014-06-11 3:30 ` Theodore Ts'o
2 siblings, 0 replies; 4+ messages in thread
From: Theodore Ts'o @ 2014-06-11 3:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Theodore Ts'o, George Spelvin
In xfer_secondary_pull(), check to make sure we need to pull from the
secondary pool before checking and potentially updating the
last_pulled time.
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: George Spelvin <linux@horizon.com>
---
drivers/char/random.c | 11 +++++++----
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index 97f390b..4bb6e37 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -919,6 +919,11 @@ static ssize_t extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf,
static void _xfer_secondary_pool(struct entropy_store *r, size_t nbytes);
static void xfer_secondary_pool(struct entropy_store *r, size_t nbytes)
{
+ if (!r->pull ||
+ r->entropy_count >= (nbytes << (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3)) ||
+ r->entropy_count > r->poolinfo->poolfracbits)
+ return;
+
if (r->limit == 0 && random_min_urandom_seed) {
unsigned long now = jiffies;
@@ -927,10 +932,8 @@ static void xfer_secondary_pool(struct entropy_store *r, size_t nbytes)
return;
r->last_pulled = now;
}
- if (r->pull &&
- r->entropy_count < (nbytes << (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3)) &&
- r->entropy_count < r->poolinfo->poolfracbits)
- _xfer_secondary_pool(r, nbytes);
+
+ _xfer_secondary_pool(r, nbytes);
}
static void _xfer_secondary_pool(struct entropy_store *r, size_t nbytes)
--
2.0.0
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2014-06-11 3:31 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2014-06-11 3:30 [PATCH 0/3] random driver improvements Theodore Ts'o
2014-06-11 3:30 ` [PATCH 1/3] random: always update the entropy pool under the spinlock Theodore Ts'o
2014-06-11 3:30 ` [PATCH 2/3] random: remove unneeded hash of a portion of the entropy pool Theodore Ts'o
2014-06-11 3:30 ` [PATCH 3/3] random: only update the last_pulled time if we actually transferred entropy Theodore Ts'o
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox
all inboxes | Powered by JetHome®