From: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Jeff Layton <jlayton@poochiereds.net>,
"J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 2/7] userns: Simpilify MNT_NODEV handling.
Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2015 14:46:03 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1436989569-69582-3-git-send-email-seth.forshee@canonical.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1436989569-69582-1-git-send-email-seth.forshee@canonical.com>
From: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
- Consolidate the testing if a device node may be opened in a new
function may_open_dev.
- Move the check for allowing access to device nodes on filesystems
not mounted in the initial user namespace from mount time to open
time and include it in may_open_dev.
This set of changes removes the implicit adding of MNT_NODEV which
simplifies the logic in fs/namespace.c and removes a potentially
problematic user visible difference in how normal and unprivileged
mount namespaces work.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
---
fs/block_dev.c | 2 +-
fs/namei.c | 9 ++++++++-
fs/namespace.c | 18 ++++--------------
include/linux/fs.h | 1 +
4 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/block_dev.c b/fs/block_dev.c
index 198243717da5..f8ce371c437c 100644
--- a/fs/block_dev.c
+++ b/fs/block_dev.c
@@ -1729,7 +1729,7 @@ struct block_device *lookup_bdev(const char *pathname)
if (!S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode))
goto fail;
error = -EACCES;
- if (path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NODEV)
+ if (!may_open_dev(&path))
goto fail;
error = -ENOMEM;
bdev = bd_acquire(inode);
diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index ae4e4c18b2ac..87c54cb34dce 100644
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -2635,6 +2635,13 @@ int vfs_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode,
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(vfs_create);
+bool may_open_dev(const struct path *path)
+{
+ return !(path->mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NODEV) &&
+ ((path->mnt->mnt_sb->s_user_ns == &init_user_ns) ||
+ (path->mnt->mnt_sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_USERNS_DEV_MOUNT));
+}
+
static int may_open(struct path *path, int acc_mode, int flag)
{
struct dentry *dentry = path->dentry;
@@ -2657,7 +2664,7 @@ static int may_open(struct path *path, int acc_mode, int flag)
break;
case S_IFBLK:
case S_IFCHR:
- if (path->mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NODEV)
+ if (!may_open_dev(path))
return -EACCES;
/*FALLTHRU*/
case S_IFIFO:
diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c
index f1f67d663d49..423001de32a2 100644
--- a/fs/namespace.c
+++ b/fs/namespace.c
@@ -2153,13 +2153,7 @@ static int do_remount(struct path *path, int flags, int mnt_flags,
}
if ((mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCK_NODEV) &&
!(mnt_flags & MNT_NODEV)) {
- /* Was the nodev implicitly added in mount? */
- if ((mnt->mnt_ns->user_ns != &init_user_ns) &&
- !(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_USERNS_DEV_MOUNT)) {
- mnt_flags |= MNT_NODEV;
- } else {
- return -EPERM;
- }
+ return -EPERM;
}
if ((mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCK_NOSUID) &&
!(mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)) {
@@ -2372,13 +2366,6 @@ static int do_new_mount(struct path *path, const char *fstype, int flags,
put_filesystem(type);
return -EPERM;
}
- /* Only in special cases allow devices from mounts
- * created outside the initial user namespace.
- */
- if (!(type->fs_flags & FS_USERNS_DEV_MOUNT)) {
- flags |= MS_NODEV;
- mnt_flags |= MNT_NODEV | MNT_LOCK_NODEV;
- }
if (type->fs_flags & FS_USERNS_VISIBLE) {
if (!fs_fully_visible(type, &mnt_flags))
return -EPERM;
@@ -3214,6 +3201,9 @@ static bool fs_fully_visible(struct file_system_type *type, int *new_mnt_flags)
mnt_flags = mnt->mnt.mnt_flags;
if (mnt->mnt.mnt_sb->s_iflags & SB_I_NOEXEC)
mnt_flags &= ~(MNT_LOCK_NOSUID | MNT_LOCK_NOEXEC);
+ if (mnt->mnt.mnt_sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns &&
+ !(mnt->mnt.mnt_sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_USERNS_DEV_MOUNT))
+ mnt_flags &= ~(MNT_LOCK_NODEV);
/* Verify the mount flags are equal to or more permissive
* than the proposed new mount.
diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
index 1876477ac9f8..a0db522196ab 100644
--- a/include/linux/fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/fs.h
@@ -1512,6 +1512,7 @@ extern void dentry_unhash(struct dentry *dentry);
*/
extern void inode_init_owner(struct inode *inode, const struct inode *dir,
umode_t mode);
+extern bool may_open_dev(const struct path *path);
/*
* VFS FS_IOC_FIEMAP helper definitions.
*/
--
1.9.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-07-15 19:47 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 106+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-07-15 19:46 [PATCH 0/7] Initial support for user namespace owned mounts Seth Forshee
2015-07-15 19:46 ` [PATCH 1/7] fs: Add user namesapace member to struct super_block Seth Forshee
2015-07-16 2:47 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-08-05 21:03 ` Seth Forshee
2015-08-05 21:19 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-08-06 14:20 ` Seth Forshee
2015-08-06 14:51 ` Stephen Smalley
2015-08-06 15:44 ` Seth Forshee
2015-08-06 16:11 ` Stephen Smalley
2015-08-07 14:16 ` Seth Forshee
2015-08-07 14:32 ` Seth Forshee
2015-08-07 18:35 ` Casey Schaufler
2015-08-07 18:57 ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-15 19:46 ` Seth Forshee [this message]
2015-07-15 19:46 ` [PATCH 3/7] fs: Ignore file caps in mounts from other user namespaces Seth Forshee
2015-07-15 21:48 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-07-15 21:50 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-15 22:35 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-16 1:14 ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-16 1:23 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-16 13:06 ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-16 1:19 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-16 4:23 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-16 4:49 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-16 5:04 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-16 5:15 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-16 5:44 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-16 13:13 ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-17 0:43 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-29 16:04 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-07-29 16:18 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-07-15 19:46 ` [PATCH 4/7] fs: Treat foreign mounts as nosuid Seth Forshee
2015-07-17 6:46 ` Nikolay Borisov
2015-07-15 19:46 ` [PATCH 5/7] security: Restrict security attribute updates for userns mounts Seth Forshee
2015-07-15 19:46 ` [PATCH 6/7] selinux: Ignore security labels on user namespace mounts Seth Forshee
2015-07-16 13:23 ` Stephen Smalley
2015-07-22 16:02 ` Stephen Smalley
2015-07-22 16:14 ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-22 20:25 ` Stephen Smalley
2015-07-22 20:40 ` Stephen Smalley
2015-07-23 13:57 ` Stephen Smalley
2015-07-23 14:39 ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-23 15:36 ` Stephen Smalley
2015-07-23 16:23 ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-24 15:11 ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-30 15:57 ` Stephen Smalley
2015-07-30 16:24 ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-15 19:46 ` [PATCH 7/7] smack: Don't use security labels for " Seth Forshee
2015-07-15 20:43 ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-15 20:36 ` [PATCH 0/7] Initial support for user namespace owned mounts Casey Schaufler
2015-07-15 21:06 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-15 21:48 ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-15 22:28 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-16 1:05 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-16 2:20 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-16 13:12 ` Stephen Smalley
2015-07-15 23:04 ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-15 22:39 ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-16 1:08 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-16 2:54 ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-16 4:47 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-17 0:09 ` Dave Chinner
2015-07-17 0:42 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-17 2:47 ` Dave Chinner
2015-07-21 17:37 ` J. Bruce Fields
2015-07-22 7:56 ` Dave Chinner
2015-07-22 14:09 ` J. Bruce Fields
2015-07-22 16:52 ` Austin S Hemmelgarn
2015-07-22 17:41 ` J. Bruce Fields
2015-07-23 1:51 ` Dave Chinner
2015-07-23 13:19 ` J. Bruce Fields
2015-07-23 23:48 ` Dave Chinner
2015-07-18 0:07 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-07-20 17:54 ` Colin Walters
2015-07-16 11:16 ` Lukasz Pawelczyk
2015-07-17 0:10 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-17 10:13 ` Lukasz Pawelczyk
2015-07-16 3:15 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-16 13:59 ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-16 15:09 ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-16 18:57 ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-16 21:42 ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-16 22:27 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-16 23:08 ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-16 23:29 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-17 0:45 ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-17 0:59 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-17 14:28 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-07-17 14:56 ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-21 20:35 ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-22 1:52 ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-22 15:56 ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-22 18:10 ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-22 19:32 ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-23 0:05 ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-23 0:15 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-23 5:15 ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-23 21:48 ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-28 20:40 ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-30 16:18 ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-30 17:05 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-30 17:25 ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-30 17:33 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-17 13:21 ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-17 17:14 ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-16 15:59 ` Seth Forshee
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