From: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 5/7] security: Restrict security attribute updates for userns mounts
Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2015 14:46:06 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1436989569-69582-6-git-send-email-seth.forshee@canonical.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1436989569-69582-1-git-send-email-seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Respecting security labels for mounts from user namespaces may
allow unprivileged users to introduce security labels into the
system. To stop this from happening prevent calling the
inode_post_setxattr, inode_setsecurity, inode_notifysecctx, and
inode_setsecctx hooks when s_user_ns != init_user_ns. There's no
purpose in actually blocking setting of these xattrs, as (for rw
mounts at least) the user must have write access to the
underlying filesystem and could set the xattrs by other means.
Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
---
security/security.c | 10 +++++++++-
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 062f3c997fdc..980710baa8f9 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -653,7 +653,9 @@ void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
{
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
return;
- call_void_hook(inode_post_setxattr, dentry, name, value, size, flags);
+ if (dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_user_ns == &init_user_ns)
+ call_void_hook(inode_post_setxattr, dentry, name, value, size,
+ flags);
evm_inode_post_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size);
}
@@ -712,6 +714,8 @@ int security_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void
int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
{
+ if (inode->i_sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns)
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
return call_int_hook(inode_setsecurity, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, name,
@@ -1168,12 +1172,16 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_release_secctx);
int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
{
+ if (inode->i_sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns)
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
return call_int_hook(inode_notifysecctx, 0, inode, ctx, ctxlen);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_notifysecctx);
int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
{
+ if (dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns)
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
return call_int_hook(inode_setsecctx, 0, dentry, ctx, ctxlen);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_setsecctx);
--
1.9.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-07-15 19:48 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 106+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-07-15 19:46 [PATCH 0/7] Initial support for user namespace owned mounts Seth Forshee
2015-07-15 19:46 ` [PATCH 1/7] fs: Add user namesapace member to struct super_block Seth Forshee
2015-07-16 2:47 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-08-05 21:03 ` Seth Forshee
2015-08-05 21:19 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-08-06 14:20 ` Seth Forshee
2015-08-06 14:51 ` Stephen Smalley
2015-08-06 15:44 ` Seth Forshee
2015-08-06 16:11 ` Stephen Smalley
2015-08-07 14:16 ` Seth Forshee
2015-08-07 14:32 ` Seth Forshee
2015-08-07 18:35 ` Casey Schaufler
2015-08-07 18:57 ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-15 19:46 ` [PATCH 2/7] userns: Simpilify MNT_NODEV handling Seth Forshee
2015-07-15 19:46 ` [PATCH 3/7] fs: Ignore file caps in mounts from other user namespaces Seth Forshee
2015-07-15 21:48 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-07-15 21:50 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-15 22:35 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-16 1:14 ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-16 1:23 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-16 13:06 ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-16 1:19 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-16 4:23 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-16 4:49 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-16 5:04 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-16 5:15 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-16 5:44 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-16 13:13 ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-17 0:43 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-29 16:04 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-07-29 16:18 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-07-15 19:46 ` [PATCH 4/7] fs: Treat foreign mounts as nosuid Seth Forshee
2015-07-17 6:46 ` Nikolay Borisov
2015-07-15 19:46 ` Seth Forshee [this message]
2015-07-15 19:46 ` [PATCH 6/7] selinux: Ignore security labels on user namespace mounts Seth Forshee
2015-07-16 13:23 ` Stephen Smalley
2015-07-22 16:02 ` Stephen Smalley
2015-07-22 16:14 ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-22 20:25 ` Stephen Smalley
2015-07-22 20:40 ` Stephen Smalley
2015-07-23 13:57 ` Stephen Smalley
2015-07-23 14:39 ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-23 15:36 ` Stephen Smalley
2015-07-23 16:23 ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-24 15:11 ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-30 15:57 ` Stephen Smalley
2015-07-30 16:24 ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-15 19:46 ` [PATCH 7/7] smack: Don't use security labels for " Seth Forshee
2015-07-15 20:43 ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-15 20:36 ` [PATCH 0/7] Initial support for user namespace owned mounts Casey Schaufler
2015-07-15 21:06 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-15 21:48 ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-15 22:28 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-16 1:05 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-16 2:20 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-16 13:12 ` Stephen Smalley
2015-07-15 23:04 ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-15 22:39 ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-16 1:08 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-16 2:54 ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-16 4:47 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-17 0:09 ` Dave Chinner
2015-07-17 0:42 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-17 2:47 ` Dave Chinner
2015-07-21 17:37 ` J. Bruce Fields
2015-07-22 7:56 ` Dave Chinner
2015-07-22 14:09 ` J. Bruce Fields
2015-07-22 16:52 ` Austin S Hemmelgarn
2015-07-22 17:41 ` J. Bruce Fields
2015-07-23 1:51 ` Dave Chinner
2015-07-23 13:19 ` J. Bruce Fields
2015-07-23 23:48 ` Dave Chinner
2015-07-18 0:07 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-07-20 17:54 ` Colin Walters
2015-07-16 11:16 ` Lukasz Pawelczyk
2015-07-17 0:10 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-17 10:13 ` Lukasz Pawelczyk
2015-07-16 3:15 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-16 13:59 ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-16 15:09 ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-16 18:57 ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-16 21:42 ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-16 22:27 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-16 23:08 ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-16 23:29 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-17 0:45 ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-17 0:59 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-17 14:28 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-07-17 14:56 ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-21 20:35 ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-22 1:52 ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-22 15:56 ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-22 18:10 ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-22 19:32 ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-23 0:05 ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-23 0:15 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-23 5:15 ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-23 21:48 ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-28 20:40 ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-30 16:18 ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-30 17:05 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-30 17:25 ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-30 17:33 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-17 13:21 ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-17 17:14 ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-16 15:59 ` Seth Forshee
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