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From: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
To: Zhouyi Zhou <yizhouzhou@ict.ac.cn>
Cc: Zhouyi Zhou <zhouzhouyi@gmail.com>,
	pablo@netfilter.org, kaber@trash.net, kadlec@blackhole.kfki.hu,
	davem@davemloft.net, netfilter-devel@vger.kernel.org,
	coreteam@netfilter.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: Re: [PATCH V2] netfilter: h323: avoid potential attack
Date: Thu, 28 Jan 2016 06:07:43 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1453990063.7627.34.camel@edumazet-glaptop2.roam.corp.google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1453989650.7627.30.camel@edumazet-glaptop2.roam.corp.google.com>

On Thu, 2016-01-28 at 06:00 -0800, Eric Dumazet wrote:
> On Thu, 2016-01-28 at 21:14 +0800, Zhouyi Zhou wrote:
> 
> > My patch is intend to prevent kernel panic, to prevent reading garbage
> > or read data from a prior frame and leak secrets, the prototypes of the 
> > get_h2x5_addr functions and the functions that call get_h2x5_addr should
> > be changed, should we do this? 
> 
> In term of security, panics are better than allowing attacker to read
> data from other people, like a password.
> 
> BTW, are you able to trigger any panic ?
> 
> I am not familiar with this code, it is not obvious.
> 
> If a fix is needed, better doing it right.
> 


BTW, this module is protected by a lock (nf_h323_lock)

So adding a variable like 'h323_buffer_valid_bytes' that would contain
the number of valid bytes would not require to change prototypes.

This variable would be written when skb_header_pointer() is used in
get_tpkt_data() / get_udp_data()

  reply	other threads:[~2016-01-28 14:07 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
     [not found] <1453971597-4811-1-git-send-email-zhouzhouyi@gmail.com>
     [not found] ` <1453985821.7627.17.camel@edumazet-glaptop2.roam.corp.google.com>
2016-01-28 13:14   ` Zhouyi Zhou
2016-01-28 14:00     ` Eric Dumazet
2016-01-28 14:07       ` Eric Dumazet [this message]
2016-01-28 14:15       ` One Thousand Gnomes
     [not found] ` <20160128142959.GB30994@breakpoint.cc>
2016-01-28 15:13   ` Zhouyi Zhou

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