From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
lasse.collin@tukaani.org,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v6 11/11] x86/KASLR: Allow randomization below load address
Date: Thu, 5 May 2016 15:13:56 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1462486436-3707-12-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1462486436-3707-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>
From: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Currently the physical randomization's lower boundary is the load
address. For bootloaders that load kernels into very high memory
(e.g. kexec), this means randomization takes place in a very small window
at the top of memory, ignoring the large region of physical memory below
the load address.
Since mem_avoid is already correctly tracking the regions that must be
avoided, this patch changes the minimum address to which ever is less:
512M (to conservatively avoid unknown things in lower memory) or the
load address. Now, for example, if the kernel is loaded at 8G, [512M,
8G) will be added into possible physical memory positions.
Signed-off-by: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
[kees: rewrote changelog, refactor to use min()]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c | 7 +++++--
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c
index 8cf705826bdc..ace41822d16f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c
@@ -464,7 +464,7 @@ void choose_random_location(unsigned char *input_ptr,
*/
unsigned long input = (unsigned long)input_ptr;
unsigned long output = (unsigned long)*output_ptr;
- unsigned long random_addr;
+ unsigned long random_addr, min_addr;
/* By default, keep output position unchanged. */
*virt_addr = *output_ptr;
@@ -486,8 +486,11 @@ void choose_random_location(unsigned char *input_ptr,
/* Record the various known unsafe memory ranges. */
mem_avoid_init(input, input_size, output);
+ /* Low end should be the smaller of 512M or initial location. */
+ min_addr = min(output, 512UL << 20);
+
/* Walk e820 and find a random address. */
- random_addr = find_random_phys_addr(output, output_size);
+ random_addr = find_random_phys_addr(min_addr, output_size);
if (!random_addr) {
warn("KASLR disabled: could not find suitable E820 region!");
} else {
--
2.6.3
prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-05-05 22:14 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-05-05 22:13 [PATCH v6 0/11] x86/KASLR: Randomize virtual address separately Kees Cook
2016-05-05 22:13 ` [PATCH v6 01/11] x86/boot: Clean up pointer casting Kees Cook
2016-05-06 7:45 ` [tip:x86/boot] " tip-bot for Kees Cook
2016-05-06 8:53 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-05-06 10:10 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-05-06 15:21 ` Kees Cook
2016-05-06 10:36 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-05-06 10:44 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-05-06 11:50 ` [PATCH -v1.1] x86/boot: Simplify pointer casting in choose_random_location() Borislav Petkov
2016-05-07 6:35 ` [tip:x86/boot] " tip-bot for Borislav Petkov
2016-05-05 22:13 ` [PATCH v6 02/11] x86/KASLR: Consolidate mem_avoid entries Kees Cook
2016-05-06 7:46 ` [tip:x86/boot] x86/KASLR: Consolidate mem_avoid[] entries tip-bot for Yinghai Lu
2016-05-06 16:08 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-05-06 18:16 ` Kees Cook
2016-05-06 19:29 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-05-05 22:13 ` [PATCH v6 03/11] x86/boot: Split out kernel_ident_mapping_init Kees Cook
2016-05-05 22:13 ` [PATCH v6 04/11] x86/KASLR: Build identity mappings on demand Kees Cook
2016-05-06 7:00 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-05-06 17:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-05-05 22:13 ` [PATCH v6 05/11] x86/KASLR: Add slot_area to manage random_addr slots Kees Cook
2016-05-05 22:13 ` [PATCH v6 06/11] x86/KASLR: Return earliest overlap when avoiding regions Kees Cook
2016-05-05 22:13 ` [PATCH v6 07/11] x86/KASLR: Add virtual address choosing function Kees Cook
2016-05-05 22:13 ` [PATCH v6 08/11] x86/KASLR: Clarify purpose of each get_random_long Kees Cook
2016-05-05 22:13 ` [PATCH v6 09/11] x86/KASLR: Randomize virtual address separately Kees Cook
2016-05-05 22:13 ` [PATCH v6 10/11] x86/KASLR: Add physical address randomization >4G Kees Cook
2016-05-06 8:27 ` Baoquan He
2016-05-06 15:31 ` Kees Cook
2016-05-08 9:17 ` Baoquan He
2016-05-05 22:13 ` Kees Cook [this message]
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