[PATCH] selinux: Fix SBLABEL_MNT for NFS mounts

[PATCH] selinux: Fix SBLABEL_MNT for NFS mounts

[Tomeu Vizoso]

Labelling of files in a NFSv4.2 currently fails with ENOTSUPP because
the mount point doesn't have SBLABEL_MNT.

Add specific condition for NFS4 filesystems so it gets correctly
labeled.

Signed-off-by: Tomeu Vizoso <tomeu.vizoso@collabora.com>
Cc: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>

---

Hi,

cannot remotely say that I currently understand how selinux is expected
to work within NFS mounts, but this change allowed me to fully boot AOSP
with its rootfs and ramdisk on a single NFS share.

Thanks,

Tomeu
---
 security/selinux/hooks.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 0c2ac318aa7f..71cd1d8c67c2 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -485,6 +485,7 @@ static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb)
 		!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
 		!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tracefs") ||
 		!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "rootfs") ||
+		!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "nfs4") ||
 		(selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel &&
 		 (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") ||
 		  !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2")));
-- 
2.9.3

Re: [PATCH] selinux: Fix SBLABEL_MNT for NFS mounts

[J. Bruce Fields]

On Wed, Mar 29, 2017 at 05:27:23PM +0200, Tomeu Vizoso wrote:
> Labelling of files in a NFSv4.2 currently fails with ENOTSUPP because
> the mount point doesn't have SBLABEL_MNT.
> 
> Add specific condition for NFS4 filesystems so it gets correctly
> labeled.

Huh.  Looking at the code, I think this is meant to be handled by the
SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE case--there was a similar failure fixed some time
ago by 9fc2b4b436cf.  What kernel are you seeing this on?  Is it a
recent regression (in which case, what's the latest kernel that worked
for you)?

--b.

> 
> Signed-off-by: Tomeu Vizoso <tomeu.vizoso@collabora.com>
> Cc: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
> 
> ---
> 
> Hi,
> 
> cannot remotely say that I currently understand how selinux is expected
> to work within NFS mounts, but this change allowed me to fully boot AOSP
> with its rootfs and ramdisk on a single NFS share.
> 
> Thanks,
> 
> Tomeu
> ---
>  security/selinux/hooks.c | 1 +
>  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
> 
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index 0c2ac318aa7f..71cd1d8c67c2 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -485,6 +485,7 @@ static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb)
>  		!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
>  		!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tracefs") ||
>  		!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "rootfs") ||
> +		!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "nfs4") ||
>  		(selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel &&
>  		 (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") ||
>  		  !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2")));
> -- 
> 2.9.3
> 

Re: [PATCH] selinux: Fix SBLABEL_MNT for NFS mounts

[Tomeu Vizoso]

On 29 March 2017 at 23:34, J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com> wrote:
> On Wed, Mar 29, 2017 at 05:27:23PM +0200, Tomeu Vizoso wrote:
>> Labelling of files in a NFSv4.2 currently fails with ENOTSUPP because
>> the mount point doesn't have SBLABEL_MNT.
>>
>> Add specific condition for NFS4 filesystems so it gets correctly
>> labeled.
>
> Huh.  Looking at the code, I think this is meant to be handled by the
> SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE case--there was a similar failure fixed some time
> ago by 9fc2b4b436cf.  What kernel are you seeing this on?  Is it a
> recent regression (in which case, what's the latest kernel that worked
> for you)?

I have seen this on 4.11-rc4, but I never tried to get this working before.

I will try to find time to see why SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE isn't working here.

Thanks,

Tomeu

> --b.
>
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Tomeu Vizoso <tomeu.vizoso@collabora.com>
>> Cc: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
>>
>> ---
>>
>> Hi,
>>
>> cannot remotely say that I currently understand how selinux is expected
>> to work within NFS mounts, but this change allowed me to fully boot AOSP
>> with its rootfs and ramdisk on a single NFS share.
>>
>> Thanks,
>>
>> Tomeu
>> ---
>>  security/selinux/hooks.c | 1 +
>>  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
>> index 0c2ac318aa7f..71cd1d8c67c2 100644
>> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
>> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
>> @@ -485,6 +485,7 @@ static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb)
>>               !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
>>               !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tracefs") ||
>>               !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "rootfs") ||
>> +             !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "nfs4") ||
>>               (selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel &&
>>                (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") ||
>>                 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2")));
>> --
>> 2.9.3
>>

Re: [PATCH] selinux: Fix SBLABEL_MNT for NFS mounts

[Stephen Smalley]

On Thu, 2017-03-30 at 09:49 +0200, Tomeu Vizoso wrote:
> On 29 March 2017 at 23:34, J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
> wrote:
> > On Wed, Mar 29, 2017 at 05:27:23PM +0200, Tomeu Vizoso wrote:
> > > Labelling of files in a NFSv4.2 currently fails with ENOTSUPP
> > > because
> > > the mount point doesn't have SBLABEL_MNT.
> > > 
> > > Add specific condition for NFS4 filesystems so it gets correctly
> > > labeled.
> > 
> > Huh.  Looking at the code, I think this is meant to be handled by
> > the
> > SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE case--there was a similar failure fixed some
> > time
> > ago by 9fc2b4b436cf.  What kernel are you seeing this on?  Is it a
> > recent regression (in which case, what's the latest kernel that
> > worked
> > for you)?
> 
> I have seen this on 4.11-rc4, but I never tried to get this working
> before.
> 
> I will try to find time to see why SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE isn't
> working here.

Does your exports file specify the "security_label" option, e.g.
/path/to/dir example.com(rw,security_label)

It appears that with recent kernels that is now required; otherwise,
the mount defaults to not enabling native labeling and all of the files
are treated as having a single, fixed label defined by the client
policy (and hence setxattr is not supported).  This was kernel commit
32ddd944a056c786f6acdd95ed29e994adc613a2.  I don't recall seeing any
discussion of this on selinux list.  I understand the rationale, but it
seems like a user-visible regression and at the very least, it seems
odd that they didn't just use "seclabel" as the kernel does in
/proc/mounts to signify a filesystem that supports security labeling by
userspace.

Re: [PATCH] selinux: Fix SBLABEL_MNT for NFS mounts

[J. Bruce Fields]

On Thu, Mar 30, 2017 at 01:27:07PM -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On Thu, 2017-03-30 at 09:49 +0200, Tomeu Vizoso wrote:
> > On 29 March 2017 at 23:34, J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
> > wrote:
> > > On Wed, Mar 29, 2017 at 05:27:23PM +0200, Tomeu Vizoso wrote:
> > > > Labelling of files in a NFSv4.2 currently fails with ENOTSUPP
> > > > because
> > > > the mount point doesn't have SBLABEL_MNT.
> > > > 
> > > > Add specific condition for NFS4 filesystems so it gets correctly
> > > > labeled.
> > > 
> > > Huh.  Looking at the code, I think this is meant to be handled by
> > > the
> > > SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE case--there was a similar failure fixed some
> > > time
> > > ago by 9fc2b4b436cf.  What kernel are you seeing this on?  Is it a
> > > recent regression (in which case, what's the latest kernel that
> > > worked
> > > for you)?
> > 
> > I have seen this on 4.11-rc4, but I never tried to get this working
> > before.
> > 
> > I will try to find time to see why SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE isn't
> > working here.
> 
> Does your exports file specify the "security_label" option, e.g.
> /path/to/dir example.com(rw,security_label)

Oops, right, that should have been the first thing I asked about....

> It appears that with recent kernels that is now required; otherwise,
> the mount defaults to not enabling native labeling and all of the files
> are treated as having a single, fixed label defined by the client
> policy (and hence setxattr is not supported).  This was kernel commit
> 32ddd944a056c786f6acdd95ed29e994adc613a2.  I don't recall seeing any
> discussion of this on selinux list.  I understand the rationale, but it
> seems like a user-visible regression

It is.  I also want to keep new protocol upgrades free of user
regressions, which the 4.1->4.2 upgrade is in most cases if we turn on
security labeling by default.  So I was stuck choosing between two
regresisons, and figured 4.2 user depending on security labeling was
still the much rarer case.

So I'd like to keep security labeling off by default, but if there's
anything I can do to smooth the transition obviously that's good.

> and at the very least, it seems odd that they didn't just use
> "seclabel" as the kernel does in /proc/mounts to signify a filesystem
> that supports security labeling by userspace.

I see logic in sb_finish_set_opts() that sets SBLABEL_MNT in the
selinux_is_sblabel_mnt() case.  Doesn't that mean "seclabel" shows up in
/proc/mounts when we nfs sets SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS?

I may not understand your comment, I'm pretty unfamiliar with this area.

--b.

Re: [PATCH] selinux: Fix SBLABEL_MNT for NFS mounts

[Stephen Smalley]

On Thu, 2017-03-30 at 13:41 -0400, J. Bruce Fields wrote:
> On Thu, Mar 30, 2017 at 01:27:07PM -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> > On Thu, 2017-03-30 at 09:49 +0200, Tomeu Vizoso wrote:
> > > On 29 March 2017 at 23:34, J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
> > > wrote:
> > > > On Wed, Mar 29, 2017 at 05:27:23PM +0200, Tomeu Vizoso wrote:
> > > > > Labelling of files in a NFSv4.2 currently fails with ENOTSUPP
> > > > > because
> > > > > the mount point doesn't have SBLABEL_MNT.
> > > > > 
> > > > > Add specific condition for NFS4 filesystems so it gets
> > > > > correctly
> > > > > labeled.
> > > > 
> > > > Huh.  Looking at the code, I think this is meant to be handled
> > > > by
> > > > the
> > > > SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE case--there was a similar failure fixed
> > > > some
> > > > time
> > > > ago by 9fc2b4b436cf.  What kernel are you seeing this on?  Is
> > > > it a
> > > > recent regression (in which case, what's the latest kernel that
> > > > worked
> > > > for you)?
> > > 
> > > I have seen this on 4.11-rc4, but I never tried to get this
> > > working
> > > before.
> > > 
> > > I will try to find time to see why SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE isn't
> > > working here.
> > 
> > Does your exports file specify the "security_label" option, e.g.
> > /path/to/dir example.com(rw,security_label)
> 
> Oops, right, that should have been the first thing I asked about....
> 
> > It appears that with recent kernels that is now required;
> > otherwise,
> > the mount defaults to not enabling native labeling and all of the
> > files
> > are treated as having a single, fixed label defined by the client
> > policy (and hence setxattr is not supported).  This was kernel
> > commit
> > 32ddd944a056c786f6acdd95ed29e994adc613a2.  I don't recall seeing
> > any
> > discussion of this on selinux list.  I understand the rationale,
> > but it
> > seems like a user-visible regression
> 
> It is.  I also want to keep new protocol upgrades free of user
> regressions, which the 4.1->4.2 upgrade is in most cases if we turn
> on
> security labeling by default.  So I was stuck choosing between two
> regresisons, and figured 4.2 user depending on security labeling was
> still the much rarer case.
> 
> So I'd like to keep security labeling off by default, but if there's
> anything I can do to smooth the transition obviously that's good.

Yes, I understand - wish though that it could have been communicated
better, e.g. on selinux list (unless I just missed it somehow).

> 
> > and at the very least, it seems odd that they didn't just use
> > "seclabel" as the kernel does in /proc/mounts to signify a
> > filesystem
> > that supports security labeling by userspace.
> 
> I see logic in sb_finish_set_opts() that sets SBLABEL_MNT in the
> selinux_is_sblabel_mnt() case.  Doesn't that mean "seclabel" shows up
> in
> /proc/mounts when we nfs sets SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS?
> 
> I may not understand your comment, I'm pretty unfamiliar with this
> area.

Correct, I just meant it seems potentially confusing to users to use
"security_label" in exports when we show it as "seclabel" in
/proc/mounts.  I know, they are totally different namespaces (in the
conventional sense), but consistency might have been more user-
friendly.

Re: [PATCH] selinux: Fix SBLABEL_MNT for NFS mounts

[J. Bruce Fields]

On Thu, Mar 30, 2017 at 01:52:14PM -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On Thu, 2017-03-30 at 13:41 -0400, J. Bruce Fields wrote:
> > It is.  I also want to keep new protocol upgrades free of user
> > regressions, which the 4.1->4.2 upgrade is in most cases if we turn
> > on
> > security labeling by default.  So I was stuck choosing between two
> > regresisons, and figured 4.2 user depending on security labeling was
> > still the much rarer case.
> > 
> > So I'd like to keep security labeling off by default, but if there's
> > anything I can do to smooth the transition obviously that's good.
> 
> Yes, I understand - wish though that it could have been communicated
> better, e.g. on selinux list (unless I just missed it somehow).

No, I didn't think of it, apologies, I agree that would have been
smarter.

> > > and at the very least, it seems odd that they didn't just use
> > > "seclabel" as the kernel does in /proc/mounts to signify a
> > > filesystem
> > > that supports security labeling by userspace.
> > 
> > I see logic in sb_finish_set_opts() that sets SBLABEL_MNT in the
> > selinux_is_sblabel_mnt() case.  Doesn't that mean "seclabel" shows up
> > in
> > /proc/mounts when we nfs sets SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS?
> > 
> > I may not understand your comment, I'm pretty unfamiliar with this
> > area.
> 
> Correct, I just meant it seems potentially confusing to users to use
> "security_label" in exports when we show it as "seclabel" in
> /proc/mounts.  I know, they are totally different namespaces (in the
> conventional sense), but consistency might have been more user-
> friendly.

Oh, got it.

We've had problems when NFS client mount and server export options are
spelled the same but have subtle differences in semantics (I'm thinking
of "async").  But maybe that wouldn't have been an issue here.

--b.