From: "Tobin C. Harding" <me@tobin.cc>
To: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: "Tobin C. Harding" <me@tobin.cc>,
"Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>,
"Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Tycho Andersen <tycho@docker.com>,
"Roberts, William C" <william.c.roberts@intel.com>,
Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>,
Jordan Glover <Golden_Miller83@protonmail.ch>,
Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>, Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>,
Ian Campbell <ijc@hellion.org.uk>,
Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <wilal.deacon@arm.com>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
Chris Fries <cfries@google.com>,
Dave Weinstein <olorin@google.com>,
Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>,
Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@gmail.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH V8 0/2] printk: hash addresses printed with %p
Date: Thu, 26 Oct 2017 13:53:54 +1100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1508986436-31966-1-git-send-email-me@tobin.cc> (raw)
Currently there are many places in the kernel where addresses are being
printed using an unadorned %p. Kernel pointers should be printed using
%pK allowing some control via the kptr_restrict sysctl. Exposing
addresses gives attackers sensitive information about the kernel layout
in memory.
We can reduce the attack surface by hashing all addresses printed with
%p. This will of course break some users, forcing code printing needed
addresses to be updated.
With this version we include hashing of malformed specifiers also.
Malformed specifiers include incomplete (e.g %pi) and also non-existent
specifiers. checkpatch should warn for non-existent specifiers but
AFAICT won't warn for incomplete specifiers.
Here is the behaviour that this set implements.
For kpt_restrict==0
Randomness not ready:
printed with %p: (pointer) # NOTE: with padding
Valid pointer:
printed with %pK: deadbeefdeadbeef
printed with %p: 0xdeadbeef
malformed specifier (eg %i): 0xdeadbeef
NULL pointer:
printed with %pK: 0000000000000000
printed with %p: (null) # NOTE: no padding
malformed specifier (eg %i): (null)
For kpt_restrict==2
Valid pointer:
printed with %pK: 0000000000000000
All other output as for kptr_restrict==0
V8:
- Add second patch cleaning up null pointer printing in pointer()
- Move %pK handling to separate function, further cleaning up pointer()
- Move ptr_to_id() call outside of switch statement making hashing
the default behaviour (including malformed specifiers).
- Remove use of static_key, replace with simple boolean.
V7:
- Use tabs instead of spaces (ouch!).
V6:
- Use __early_initcall() to fill the SipHash key.
- Use static keys to guard hashing before the key is available.
V5:
- Remove spin lock.
- Add Jason A. Donenfeld to CC list by request.
- Add Theodore Ts'o to CC list due to comment on previous version.
V4:
- Remove changes to siphash.{ch}
- Do word size check, and return value cast, directly in ptr_to_id().
- Use add_ready_random_callback() to guard call to get_random_bytes()
V3:
- Use atomic_xchg() to guard setting [random] key.
- Remove erroneous white space change.
V2:
- Use SipHash to do the hashing.
The discussion related to this patch has been fragmented. There are
three threads associated with this patch. Email threads by subject:
[PATCH] printk: hash addresses printed with %p
[PATCH 0/3] add %pX specifier
[kernel-hardening] [RFC V2 0/6] add more kernel pointer filter options
Tobin C. Harding (2):
printk: remove tabular output for NULL pointer
printk: hash addresses printed with %p
lib/vsprintf.c | 166 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
1 file changed, 108 insertions(+), 58 deletions(-)
--
2.7.4
next reply other threads:[~2017-10-26 2:54 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-10-26 2:53 Tobin C. Harding [this message]
2017-10-26 2:53 ` [PATCH V8 1/2] printk: remove tabular output for NULL pointer Tobin C. Harding
2017-10-26 4:57 ` Joe Perches
2017-10-26 6:27 ` Tobin C. Harding
2017-10-26 8:05 ` Joe Perches
2017-10-26 9:37 ` Tobin C. Harding
2017-10-26 14:47 ` Joe Perches
2017-10-26 23:57 ` Tobin C. Harding
2017-10-27 0:11 ` Joe Perches
2017-10-26 2:53 ` [PATCH V8 2/2] printk: hash addresses printed with %p Tobin C. Harding
2017-10-26 2:58 ` Tobin C. Harding
2017-10-30 21:33 ` Steven Rostedt
2017-10-30 22:41 ` Tobin C. Harding
2017-10-31 0:00 ` Steven Rostedt
2017-10-31 2:00 ` Tobin C. Harding
2017-10-26 3:11 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-10-27 13:33 ` [PATCH V8 0/2] " Sergey Senozhatsky
2017-10-31 23:35 ` Tobin C. Harding
2017-11-02 8:23 ` Sergey Senozhatsky
2017-11-02 10:14 ` Tobin C. Harding
2017-11-02 13:43 ` Roberts, William C
2017-11-02 16:04 ` Sergey Senozhatsky
2017-10-30 22:03 ` Kees Cook
2017-10-30 22:33 ` Tobin C. Harding
2017-10-31 2:08 ` Joe Perches
2017-10-31 23:16 ` Tobin C. Harding
2017-10-31 23:33 ` Joe Perches
2017-11-03 5:13 ` Vinod Koul
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