From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: jmattson@google.com, aliguori@amazon.com,
thomas.lendacky@amd.com, dwmw@amazon.co.uk, bp@alien8.de
Subject: [PATCH 6/7] x86/svm: Set IBPB when running a different VCPU
Date: Mon, 8 Jan 2018 19:08:44 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1515434925-10250-7-git-send-email-pbonzini@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1515434925-10250-1-git-send-email-pbonzini@redhat.com>
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Set IBPB (Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier) when the current CPU is
going to run a VCPU different from what was previously run. Nested
virtualization uses the same VMCB for the second level guest, but the
L1 hypervisor should be using IBRS to protect itself.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 31 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
index 779981a00d01..dd744d896cec 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -289,6 +289,7 @@ struct amd_svm_iommu_ir {
module_param(vgif, int, 0444);
static bool __read_mostly have_spec_ctrl;
+static bool __read_mostly have_ibpb_support;
static void svm_set_cr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr0);
static void svm_flush_tlb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool invalidate_gpa);
@@ -540,6 +541,7 @@ struct svm_cpu_data {
struct kvm_ldttss_desc *tss_desc;
struct page *save_area;
+ struct vmcb *current_vmcb;
};
static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct svm_cpu_data *, svm_data);
@@ -1151,6 +1153,11 @@ static __init int svm_hardware_setup(void)
pr_info("kvm: SPEC_CTRL available\n");
else
pr_info("kvm: SPEC_CTRL not available\n");
+ have_ibpb_support = have_spec_ctrl || cpu_has_ibpb_support();
+ if (have_ibpb_support)
+ pr_info("kvm: IBPB_SUPPORT available\n");
+ else
+ pr_info("kvm: IBPB_SUPPORT not available\n");
return 0;
@@ -1725,11 +1732,19 @@ static void svm_free_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
__free_pages(virt_to_page(svm->nested.msrpm), MSRPM_ALLOC_ORDER);
kvm_vcpu_uninit(vcpu);
kmem_cache_free(kvm_vcpu_cache, svm);
+
+ /*
+ * The VMCB could be recycled, causing a false negative in
+ * svm_vcpu_load; block speculative execution.
+ */
+ if (have_ibpb_support)
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, FEATURE_SET_IBPB);
}
static void svm_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
{
struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+ struct svm_cpu_data *sd = per_cpu(svm_data, cpu);
int i;
if (unlikely(cpu != vcpu->cpu)) {
@@ -1758,6 +1773,12 @@ static void svm_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP))
wrmsrl(MSR_TSC_AUX, svm->tsc_aux);
+ if (sd->current_vmcb != svm->vmcb) {
+ sd->current_vmcb = svm->vmcb;
+ if (have_ibpb_support)
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, FEATURE_SET_IBPB);
+ }
+
avic_vcpu_load(vcpu, cpu);
}
@@ -2798,6 +2819,11 @@ static int nested_svm_vmexit(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
if (!nested_vmcb)
return 1;
+ /*
+ * No need for IBPB here, the L1 hypervisor should be running with
+ * IBRS=1 and inserts one already when switching L2 VMs.
+ */
+
/* Exit Guest-Mode */
leave_guest_mode(&svm->vcpu);
svm->nested.vmcb = 0;
@@ -3061,6 +3087,11 @@ static bool nested_svm_vmrun(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
if (!nested_vmcb)
return false;
+ /*
+ * No need for IBPB here, since the nested VM is less privileged. The
+ * L1 hypervisor inserts one already when switching L2 VMs.
+ */
+
if (!nested_vmcb_checks(nested_vmcb)) {
nested_vmcb->control.exit_code = SVM_EXIT_ERR;
nested_vmcb->control.exit_code_hi = 0;
--
1.8.3.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-01-08 18:09 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 61+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-01-08 18:08 [PATCH 0/7] KVM: x86: expose CVE-2017-5715 ("Spectre variant 2") mitigations to guest Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-08 18:08 ` [PATCH 1/7] KVM: x86: add SPEC_CTRL and IBPB_SUPPORT accessors Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-08 18:33 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-01-08 19:09 ` Liran Alon
2018-01-09 10:32 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-09 11:14 ` David Hildenbrand
2018-01-09 11:18 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-08 18:08 ` [PATCH 2/7] x86/msr: add definitions for indirect branch predictor MSRs Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-08 18:35 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-01-08 18:52 ` Jim Mattson
2018-01-08 19:10 ` Liran Alon
2018-01-08 18:08 ` [PATCH 3/7] kvm: vmx: pass MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL and MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD down to the guest Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-08 18:43 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-01-08 19:18 ` Jim Mattson
2018-01-08 20:23 ` Liran Alon
2018-01-08 22:32 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-08 23:19 ` Jim Mattson
2018-01-09 10:11 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-08 19:22 ` Liran Alon
2018-01-08 19:41 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-08 22:33 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-08 22:09 ` Ashok Raj
2018-01-08 22:25 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-11 2:47 ` Tim Chen
2018-01-11 10:41 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-08 18:08 ` [PATCH 4/7] kvm: vmx: Set IBPB when running a different VCPU Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-08 19:23 ` Liran Alon
2018-01-08 19:36 ` Jim Mattson
2018-01-09 8:33 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-09 11:01 ` David Hildenbrand
2018-01-08 18:08 ` [PATCH 5/7] kvm: svm: pass MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL and MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD down to guest Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-08 19:41 ` Liran Alon
2018-01-08 18:08 ` Paolo Bonzini [this message]
2018-01-08 20:00 ` [PATCH 6/7] x86/svm: Set IBPB when running a different VCPU Liran Alon
2018-01-09 11:07 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-08 18:08 ` [PATCH 7/7] KVM: x86: add SPEC_CTRL and IBPB_SUPPORT to MSR and CPUID lists Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-08 20:07 ` Liran Alon
2018-01-08 20:15 ` Jim Mattson
2018-01-09 10:15 ` [PATCH 0/7] KVM: x86: expose CVE-2017-5715 ("Spectre variant 2") mitigations to guest Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-09 11:12 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-09 12:03 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-09 14:06 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-09 11:31 [PATCH 6/7] x86/svm: Set IBPB when running a different VCPU Liran Alon
2018-01-09 11:41 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-09 14:30 ` Arjan van de Ven
2018-01-09 15:00 Liran Alon
2018-01-09 15:19 ` Arjan van de Ven
2018-01-09 16:17 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-09 16:23 ` Arjan van de Ven
2018-01-09 16:49 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-09 20:39 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-01-09 20:47 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-01-09 20:57 ` Jim Mattson
2018-01-09 21:11 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-01-09 21:19 ` Jim Mattson
2018-01-09 21:42 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-09 21:59 ` Jim Mattson
2018-01-09 21:56 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-09 15:33 Liran Alon
2018-01-09 15:56 ` Arjan van de Ven
2018-01-09 16:01 Liran Alon
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