mirror of https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: jmattson@google.com, aliguori@amazon.com,
	thomas.lendacky@amd.com, dwmw@amazon.co.uk, bp@alien8.de
Subject: [PATCH 6/7] x86/svm: Set IBPB when running a different VCPU
Date: Mon,  8 Jan 2018 19:08:44 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1515434925-10250-7-git-send-email-pbonzini@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1515434925-10250-1-git-send-email-pbonzini@redhat.com>

From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>

Set IBPB (Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier) when the current CPU is
going to run a VCPU different from what was previously run.  Nested
virtualization uses the same VMCB for the second level guest, but the
L1 hypervisor should be using IBRS to protect itself.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
index 779981a00d01..dd744d896cec 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -289,6 +289,7 @@ struct amd_svm_iommu_ir {
 module_param(vgif, int, 0444);
  
 static bool __read_mostly have_spec_ctrl;
+static bool __read_mostly have_ibpb_support;
 
 static void svm_set_cr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr0);
 static void svm_flush_tlb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool invalidate_gpa);
@@ -540,6 +541,7 @@ struct svm_cpu_data {
 	struct kvm_ldttss_desc *tss_desc;
 
 	struct page *save_area;
+	struct vmcb *current_vmcb;
 };
 
 static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct svm_cpu_data *, svm_data);
@@ -1151,6 +1153,11 @@ static __init int svm_hardware_setup(void)
 		pr_info("kvm: SPEC_CTRL available\n");
 	else
 		pr_info("kvm: SPEC_CTRL not available\n");
+	have_ibpb_support = have_spec_ctrl || cpu_has_ibpb_support();
+	if (have_ibpb_support)
+		pr_info("kvm: IBPB_SUPPORT available\n");
+	else
+		pr_info("kvm: IBPB_SUPPORT not available\n");
 
 	return 0;
 
@@ -1725,11 +1732,19 @@ static void svm_free_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	__free_pages(virt_to_page(svm->nested.msrpm), MSRPM_ALLOC_ORDER);
 	kvm_vcpu_uninit(vcpu);
 	kmem_cache_free(kvm_vcpu_cache, svm);
+
+	/*
+	 * The VMCB could be recycled, causing a false negative in
+	 * svm_vcpu_load; block speculative execution.
+	 */
+	if (have_ibpb_support)
+		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, FEATURE_SET_IBPB);
 }
 
 static void svm_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
 {
 	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+	struct svm_cpu_data *sd = per_cpu(svm_data, cpu);
 	int i;
 
 	if (unlikely(cpu != vcpu->cpu)) {
@@ -1758,6 +1773,12 @@ static void svm_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
 	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP))
 		wrmsrl(MSR_TSC_AUX, svm->tsc_aux);
 
+	if (sd->current_vmcb != svm->vmcb) {
+		sd->current_vmcb = svm->vmcb;
+		if (have_ibpb_support)
+			wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, FEATURE_SET_IBPB);
+	}
+
 	avic_vcpu_load(vcpu, cpu);
 }
 
@@ -2798,6 +2819,11 @@ static int nested_svm_vmexit(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
 	if (!nested_vmcb)
 		return 1;
 
+	/*
+	 * No need for IBPB here, the L1 hypervisor should be running with
+	 * IBRS=1 and inserts one already when switching L2 VMs.
+	 */
+
 	/* Exit Guest-Mode */
 	leave_guest_mode(&svm->vcpu);
 	svm->nested.vmcb = 0;
@@ -3061,6 +3087,11 @@ static bool nested_svm_vmrun(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
 	if (!nested_vmcb)
 		return false;
 
+	/*
+	 * No need for IBPB here, since the nested VM is less privileged.  The
+	 * L1 hypervisor inserts one already when switching L2 VMs.
+	 */
+
 	if (!nested_vmcb_checks(nested_vmcb)) {
 		nested_vmcb->control.exit_code    = SVM_EXIT_ERR;
 		nested_vmcb->control.exit_code_hi = 0;
-- 
1.8.3.1

  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-01-08 18:09 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 61+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-01-08 18:08 [PATCH 0/7] KVM: x86: expose CVE-2017-5715 ("Spectre variant 2") mitigations to guest Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-08 18:08 ` [PATCH 1/7] KVM: x86: add SPEC_CTRL and IBPB_SUPPORT accessors Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-08 18:33   ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-01-08 19:09   ` Liran Alon
2018-01-09 10:32     ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-09 11:14   ` David Hildenbrand
2018-01-09 11:18     ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-08 18:08 ` [PATCH 2/7] x86/msr: add definitions for indirect branch predictor MSRs Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-08 18:35   ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-01-08 18:52     ` Jim Mattson
2018-01-08 19:10   ` Liran Alon
2018-01-08 18:08 ` [PATCH 3/7] kvm: vmx: pass MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL and MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD down to the guest Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-08 18:43   ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-01-08 19:18   ` Jim Mattson
2018-01-08 20:23     ` Liran Alon
2018-01-08 22:32     ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-08 23:19       ` Jim Mattson
2018-01-09 10:11         ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-08 19:22   ` Liran Alon
2018-01-08 19:41   ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-08 22:33     ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-08 22:09   ` Ashok Raj
2018-01-08 22:25     ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-11  2:47   ` Tim Chen
2018-01-11 10:41     ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-08 18:08 ` [PATCH 4/7] kvm: vmx: Set IBPB when running a different VCPU Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-08 19:23   ` Liran Alon
2018-01-08 19:36   ` Jim Mattson
2018-01-09  8:33     ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-09 11:01   ` David Hildenbrand
2018-01-08 18:08 ` [PATCH 5/7] kvm: svm: pass MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL and MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD down to guest Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-08 19:41   ` Liran Alon
2018-01-08 18:08 ` Paolo Bonzini [this message]
2018-01-08 20:00   ` [PATCH 6/7] x86/svm: Set IBPB when running a different VCPU Liran Alon
2018-01-09 11:07     ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-08 18:08 ` [PATCH 7/7] KVM: x86: add SPEC_CTRL and IBPB_SUPPORT to MSR and CPUID lists Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-08 20:07   ` Liran Alon
2018-01-08 20:15     ` Jim Mattson
2018-01-09 10:15 ` [PATCH 0/7] KVM: x86: expose CVE-2017-5715 ("Spectre variant 2") mitigations to guest Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-09 11:12   ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-09 12:03     ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-09 14:06       ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-09 11:31 [PATCH 6/7] x86/svm: Set IBPB when running a different VCPU Liran Alon
2018-01-09 11:41 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-09 14:30   ` Arjan van de Ven
2018-01-09 15:00 Liran Alon
2018-01-09 15:19 ` Arjan van de Ven
2018-01-09 16:17   ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-09 16:23     ` Arjan van de Ven
2018-01-09 16:49       ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-09 20:39         ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-01-09 20:47           ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-01-09 20:57             ` Jim Mattson
2018-01-09 21:11               ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-01-09 21:19                 ` Jim Mattson
2018-01-09 21:42               ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-09 21:59                 ` Jim Mattson
2018-01-09 21:56           ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-09 15:33 Liran Alon
2018-01-09 15:56 ` Arjan van de Ven
2018-01-09 16:01 Liran Alon

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=1515434925-10250-7-git-send-email-pbonzini@redhat.com \
    --to=pbonzini@redhat.com \
    --cc=aliguori@amazon.com \
    --cc=bp@alien8.de \
    --cc=dwmw@amazon.co.uk \
    --cc=jmattson@google.com \
    --cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=thomas.lendacky@amd.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox

all inboxes | Powered by JetHome®