From: "Colin Walters" <walters@verbum.org>
To: "Christian Brauner" <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: "Giuseppe Scrivano" <gscrivan@redhat.com>,
"Aleksa Sarai" <cyphar@cyphar.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, "Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>,
bristot@redhat.com, "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
"Al Viro" <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
"Alexander Larsson" <alexl@redhat.com>,
"Peter Zijlstra" <peterz@infradead.org>,
bmasney@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 1/2] exec: add PR_HIDE_SELF_EXE prctl
Date: Mon, 30 Jan 2023 16:52:55 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1557ec53-2d9b-4f5d-b144-01ed0dd3c7a6@app.fastmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230130100602.elyvs6oorfzukjwh@wittgenstein>
On Mon, Jan 30, 2023, at 5:06 AM, Christian Brauner wrote:
> The good thing is that - even if it will take a longer - that Aleksa's
> patchset will provide a more general solution by making it possible for
> runc/crun/lxc to open the target binary with a restricted upgrade mask
> making it impossible to open the binary read-write again. This won't
> break criu and will fix this issue and is generally useful.
Had to go back up thread more carefully; looking at the referenced commits now in
https://github.com/cyphar/linux/commits/magiclink/open_how-reopen
I do agree that that direction is the most elegant. The main downside I can think of is the potential blast radius is larger, and more nontrivial code.
But...in practice I guess today for the runc/crun type attacks today there are commonly multiple mitigations (e.g. read-only rootfs, multiple LSMs, and finally the memfd copy fallback) so we can probably wait for that patchset to land.
In short: agreed!
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-01-30 21:53 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-01-20 10:25 Giuseppe Scrivano
2023-01-20 10:25 ` [PATCH v3 2/2] selftests: add tests for prctl(SET_HIDE_SELF_EXE) Giuseppe Scrivano
2023-01-20 16:05 ` Brian Masney
2023-01-23 18:41 ` [PATCH v3 1/2] exec: add PR_HIDE_SELF_EXE prctl Colin Walters
2023-01-23 19:21 ` Giuseppe Scrivano
2023-01-23 22:07 ` Colin Walters
2023-01-23 22:54 ` Giuseppe Scrivano
2023-01-23 23:14 ` Colin Walters
2023-01-24 1:53 ` Aleksa Sarai
2023-01-24 7:29 ` Giuseppe Scrivano
2023-01-25 15:28 ` Aleksa Sarai
2023-01-25 16:30 ` Giuseppe Scrivano
2023-01-29 13:59 ` Colin Walters
2023-01-29 16:58 ` Christian Brauner
2023-01-29 18:12 ` Colin Walters
2023-01-30 9:53 ` Christian Brauner
2023-01-30 10:06 ` Christian Brauner
2023-01-30 21:52 ` Colin Walters [this message]
2023-01-31 14:17 ` Giuseppe Scrivano
2023-02-25 0:27 ` Andrei Vagin
2023-02-28 14:19 ` Giuseppe Scrivano
2023-01-26 8:25 ` Christian Brauner
2023-01-24 19:17 ` Andrei Vagin
2023-01-27 12:31 ` Christian Brauner
2023-01-27 20:34 ` Kees Cook
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