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* [PATCH] x86: fix possible spectre-v1 in ptrace_get_debugreg()
@ 2019-05-24 12:57 Dianzhang Chen
  2019-06-23 11:52 ` Thomas Gleixner
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 2+ messages in thread
From: Dianzhang Chen @ 2019-05-24 12:57 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: oleg, tglx, mingo, bp; +Cc: hpa, x86, linux-kernel, Dianzhang Chen

The n in ptrace_get_debugreg() is indirectly controlled by userspace via syscall: ptrace(defined in kernel/ptrace.c), hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
The n can be controlled from: ptrace -> arch_ptrace -> ptrace_get_debugreg.

Fix this by sanitizing n before using it to index thread->ptrace_bps.

Signed-off-by: Dianzhang Chen <dianzhangchen0@gmail.com>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c
index 4b8ee05..3f8f158 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
 #include <linux/rcupdate.h>
 #include <linux/export.h>
 #include <linux/context_tracking.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
 
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
 #include <asm/pgtable.h>
@@ -644,7 +645,8 @@ static unsigned long ptrace_get_debugreg(struct task_struct *tsk, int n)
 	unsigned long val = 0;
 
 	if (n < HBP_NUM) {
-		struct perf_event *bp = thread->ptrace_bps[n];
+		struct perf_event *bp =
+			thread->ptrace_bps[array_index_nospec(n, HBP_NUM)];
 
 		if (bp)
 			val = bp->hw.info.address;
-- 
2.7.4


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH] x86: fix possible spectre-v1 in ptrace_get_debugreg()
  2019-05-24 12:57 [PATCH] x86: fix possible spectre-v1 in ptrace_get_debugreg() Dianzhang Chen
@ 2019-06-23 11:52 ` Thomas Gleixner
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 2+ messages in thread
From: Thomas Gleixner @ 2019-06-23 11:52 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Dianzhang Chen; +Cc: oleg, mingo, bp, hpa, x86, linux-kernel

On Fri, 24 May 2019, Dianzhang Chen wrote:

> Subject : [PATCH] x86: fix possible spectre-v1 in ptrace_get_debugreg()

Please use the proper prefix. Run git log on the file and you'll find
it. Also please start the short summary sentence after the prefix with an
upper case letter.

> The n in ptrace_get_debugreg() is indirectly controlled by userspace via syscall: ptrace(defined in kernel/ptrace.c), hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
> The n can be controlled from: ptrace -> arch_ptrace -> ptrace_get_debugreg.
>

Please format the text proper with a line break around column 70.

Also please refrain from '(defined in kernel/ptrace.c)'. Use sys_ptrace()
which is entirely clear.

> Fix this by sanitizing n before using it to index thread->ptrace_bps.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Dianzhang Chen <dianzhangchen0@gmail.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c | 4 +++-
>  1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c
> index 4b8ee05..3f8f158 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c
> @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
>  #include <linux/rcupdate.h>
>  #include <linux/export.h>
>  #include <linux/context_tracking.h>
> +#include <linux/nospec.h>
>  
>  #include <linux/uaccess.h>
>  #include <asm/pgtable.h>
> @@ -644,7 +645,8 @@ static unsigned long ptrace_get_debugreg(struct task_struct *tsk, int n)
>  	unsigned long val = 0;
>  
>  	if (n < HBP_NUM) {
> -		struct perf_event *bp = thread->ptrace_bps[n];
> +		struct perf_event *bp =
> +			thread->ptrace_bps[array_index_nospec(n, HBP_NUM)];

Please use an intermediate variable to calculate the index instead of this
weird line break.

Thanks,

	tglx

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread

end of thread, other threads:[~2019-06-23 11:53 UTC | newest]

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2019-05-24 12:57 [PATCH] x86: fix possible spectre-v1 in ptrace_get_debugreg() Dianzhang Chen
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