* [PATCH] btrfs: fix out of bounds array access while reading extent buffer
@ 2019-06-14 11:51 Young Xiao
2019-06-14 13:52 ` Qu Wenruo
0 siblings, 1 reply; 2+ messages in thread
From: Young Xiao @ 2019-06-14 11:51 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: clm, josef, dsterba, linux-btrfs, linux-kernel; +Cc: Young Xiao
There is a corner case that slips through the checkers in functions
reading extent buffer, ie.
if (start < eb->len) and (start + len > eb->len), then:
the checkers in read_extent_buffer_to_user(), and memcmp_extent_buffer()
WARN_ON(start > eb->len) and WARN_ON(start + len > eb->start + eb->len),
both are OK in this corner case, but it'd actually try to access the eb->pages
out of bounds because of (start + len > eb->len).
This is adding proper checks in order to avoid invalid memory access,
ie. 'general protection fault', before it's too late.
See commit f716abd55d1e ("Btrfs: fix out of bounds array access while
reading extent buffer") for details.
Signed-off-by: Young Xiao <92siuyang@gmail.com>
---
fs/btrfs/extent_io.c | 16 ++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/btrfs/extent_io.c b/fs/btrfs/extent_io.c
index db337e5..dcf3b2e 100644
--- a/fs/btrfs/extent_io.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/extent_io.c
@@ -5476,8 +5476,12 @@ int read_extent_buffer_to_user(const struct extent_buffer *eb,
unsigned long i = (start_offset + start) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
int ret = 0;
- WARN_ON(start > eb->len);
- WARN_ON(start + len > eb->start + eb->len);
+ if (start + len > eb->len) {
+ WARN(1, KERN_ERR "btrfs bad mapping eb start %llu len %lu, wanted %lu %lu\n",
+ eb->start, eb->len, start, len);
+ memset(dst, 0, len);
+ return;
+ }
offset = offset_in_page(start_offset + start);
@@ -5554,8 +5558,12 @@ int memcmp_extent_buffer(const struct extent_buffer *eb, const void *ptrv,
unsigned long i = (start_offset + start) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
int ret = 0;
- WARN_ON(start > eb->len);
- WARN_ON(start + len > eb->start + eb->len);
+ if (start + len > eb->len) {
+ WARN(1, KERN_ERR "btrfs bad mapping eb start %llu len %lu, wanted %lu %lu\n",
+ eb->start, eb->len, start, len);
+ memset(ptr, 0, len);
+ return;
+ }
offset = offset_in_page(start_offset + start);
--
2.7.4
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] btrfs: fix out of bounds array access while reading extent buffer
2019-06-14 11:51 [PATCH] btrfs: fix out of bounds array access while reading extent buffer Young Xiao
@ 2019-06-14 13:52 ` Qu Wenruo
0 siblings, 0 replies; 2+ messages in thread
From: Qu Wenruo @ 2019-06-14 13:52 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Young Xiao, clm, josef, dsterba, linux-btrfs, linux-kernel
[-- Attachment #1.1: Type: text/plain, Size: 2840 bytes --]
On 2019/6/14 下午7:51, Young Xiao wrote:
> There is a corner case that slips through the checkers in functions
> reading extent buffer, ie.
>
> if (start < eb->len) and (start + len > eb->len), then:
> the checkers in read_extent_buffer_to_user(), and memcmp_extent_buffer()
> WARN_ON(start > eb->len) and WARN_ON(start + len > eb->start + eb->len),
> both are OK in this corner case, but it'd actually try to access the eb->pages
> out of bounds because of (start + len > eb->len).
>
> This is adding proper checks in order to avoid invalid memory access,
> ie. 'general protection fault', before it's too late.
>
> See commit f716abd55d1e ("Btrfs: fix out of bounds array access while
> reading extent buffer") for details.
>
> Signed-off-by: Young Xiao <92siuyang@gmail.com>
> ---
> fs/btrfs/extent_io.c | 16 ++++++++++++----
> 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/btrfs/extent_io.c b/fs/btrfs/extent_io.c
> index db337e5..dcf3b2e 100644
> --- a/fs/btrfs/extent_io.c
> +++ b/fs/btrfs/extent_io.c
> @@ -5476,8 +5476,12 @@ int read_extent_buffer_to_user(const struct extent_buffer *eb,
> unsigned long i = (start_offset + start) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
> int ret = 0;
>
> - WARN_ON(start > eb->len);
> - WARN_ON(start + len > eb->start + eb->len);
> + if (start + len > eb->len) {
The original (start + len > eb->start + eb->len) check is so wrong from
the very beginning. eb->start makes no sense in the context.
So your patch makes sense.
But it's not 100% fixed.
If @start and @len overflow u64, e.g @start = 1 << 63 + 8k, @len = 1<<
63 + 8K. it can still skip the check.
So, we still need to check @start against eb->len, then @start + @len
against eb->len.
Also, shouldn't we include the equal case for @start? (although start +
len == eb->len should be OK)
> + WARN(1, KERN_ERR "btrfs bad mapping eb start %llu len %lu, wanted %lu %lu\n",
> + eb->start, eb->len, start, len);
> + memset(dst, 0, len);
I'd prefer not to do the memset, as @start and @len is already wrong, I
doubt the @dst could be completely some wild pointer, and set them could
easily screw up the whole kernel.
Thanks,
Qu
> + return;
> + }
>
> offset = offset_in_page(start_offset + start);
>
> @@ -5554,8 +5558,12 @@ int memcmp_extent_buffer(const struct extent_buffer *eb, const void *ptrv,
> unsigned long i = (start_offset + start) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
> int ret = 0;
>
> - WARN_ON(start > eb->len);
> - WARN_ON(start + len > eb->start + eb->len);
> + if (start + len > eb->len) {
> + WARN(1, KERN_ERR "btrfs bad mapping eb start %llu len %lu, wanted %lu %lu\n",
> + eb->start, eb->len, start, len);
> + memset(ptr, 0, len);
> + return;
> + }
>
> offset = offset_in_page(start_offset + start);
>
>
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