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* [PATCH] btrfs: fix out of bounds array access while reading extent buffer
@ 2019-06-14 11:51 Young Xiao
  2019-06-14 13:52 ` Qu Wenruo
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 2+ messages in thread
From: Young Xiao @ 2019-06-14 11:51 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: clm, josef, dsterba, linux-btrfs, linux-kernel; +Cc: Young Xiao

There is a corner case that slips through the checkers in functions
reading extent buffer, ie.

if (start < eb->len) and (start + len > eb->len), then:
the checkers in read_extent_buffer_to_user(), and memcmp_extent_buffer()
WARN_ON(start > eb->len) and WARN_ON(start + len > eb->start + eb->len),
both are OK in this corner case, but it'd actually try to access the eb->pages
out of bounds because of (start + len > eb->len).

This is adding proper checks in order to avoid invalid memory access,
ie. 'general protection fault', before it's too late.

See commit f716abd55d1e ("Btrfs: fix out of bounds array access while
reading extent buffer") for details.

Signed-off-by: Young Xiao <92siuyang@gmail.com>
---
 fs/btrfs/extent_io.c | 16 ++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/btrfs/extent_io.c b/fs/btrfs/extent_io.c
index db337e5..dcf3b2e 100644
--- a/fs/btrfs/extent_io.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/extent_io.c
@@ -5476,8 +5476,12 @@ int read_extent_buffer_to_user(const struct extent_buffer *eb,
 	unsigned long i = (start_offset + start) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
 	int ret = 0;
 
-	WARN_ON(start > eb->len);
-	WARN_ON(start + len > eb->start + eb->len);
+	if (start + len > eb->len) {
+		WARN(1, KERN_ERR "btrfs bad mapping eb start %llu len %lu, wanted %lu %lu\n",
+		     eb->start, eb->len, start, len);
+		memset(dst, 0, len);
+		return;
+	}
 
 	offset = offset_in_page(start_offset + start);
 
@@ -5554,8 +5558,12 @@ int memcmp_extent_buffer(const struct extent_buffer *eb, const void *ptrv,
 	unsigned long i = (start_offset + start) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
 	int ret = 0;
 
-	WARN_ON(start > eb->len);
-	WARN_ON(start + len > eb->start + eb->len);
+	if (start + len > eb->len) {
+		WARN(1, KERN_ERR "btrfs bad mapping eb start %llu len %lu, wanted %lu %lu\n",
+		     eb->start, eb->len, start, len);
+		memset(ptr, 0, len);
+		return;
+	}
 
 	offset = offset_in_page(start_offset + start);
 
-- 
2.7.4


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH] btrfs: fix out of bounds array access while reading extent buffer
  2019-06-14 11:51 [PATCH] btrfs: fix out of bounds array access while reading extent buffer Young Xiao
@ 2019-06-14 13:52 ` Qu Wenruo
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 2+ messages in thread
From: Qu Wenruo @ 2019-06-14 13:52 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Young Xiao, clm, josef, dsterba, linux-btrfs, linux-kernel


[-- Attachment #1.1: Type: text/plain, Size: 2840 bytes --]



On 2019/6/14 下午7:51, Young Xiao wrote:
> There is a corner case that slips through the checkers in functions
> reading extent buffer, ie.
> 
> if (start < eb->len) and (start + len > eb->len), then:
> the checkers in read_extent_buffer_to_user(), and memcmp_extent_buffer()
> WARN_ON(start > eb->len) and WARN_ON(start + len > eb->start + eb->len),
> both are OK in this corner case, but it'd actually try to access the eb->pages
> out of bounds because of (start + len > eb->len).
> 
> This is adding proper checks in order to avoid invalid memory access,
> ie. 'general protection fault', before it's too late.
> 
> See commit f716abd55d1e ("Btrfs: fix out of bounds array access while
> reading extent buffer") for details.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Young Xiao <92siuyang@gmail.com>
> ---
>  fs/btrfs/extent_io.c | 16 ++++++++++++----
>  1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/fs/btrfs/extent_io.c b/fs/btrfs/extent_io.c
> index db337e5..dcf3b2e 100644
> --- a/fs/btrfs/extent_io.c
> +++ b/fs/btrfs/extent_io.c
> @@ -5476,8 +5476,12 @@ int read_extent_buffer_to_user(const struct extent_buffer *eb,
>  	unsigned long i = (start_offset + start) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
>  	int ret = 0;
>  
> -	WARN_ON(start > eb->len);
> -	WARN_ON(start + len > eb->start + eb->len);
> +	if (start + len > eb->len) {
The original (start + len > eb->start + eb->len) check is so wrong from
the very beginning. eb->start makes no sense in the context.
So your patch makes sense.

But it's not 100% fixed.

If @start and @len overflow u64, e.g @start = 1 << 63 + 8k, @len = 1<<
63 + 8K. it can still skip the check.

So, we still need to check @start against eb->len, then @start + @len
against eb->len.

Also, shouldn't we include the equal case for @start? (although start +
len == eb->len should be OK)

> +		WARN(1, KERN_ERR "btrfs bad mapping eb start %llu len %lu, wanted %lu %lu\n",
> +		     eb->start, eb->len, start, len);
> +		memset(dst, 0, len);

I'd prefer not to do the memset, as @start and @len is already wrong, I
doubt the @dst could be completely some wild pointer, and set them could
easily screw up the whole kernel.

Thanks,
Qu

> +		return;
> +	}
>  
>  	offset = offset_in_page(start_offset + start);
>  
> @@ -5554,8 +5558,12 @@ int memcmp_extent_buffer(const struct extent_buffer *eb, const void *ptrv,
>  	unsigned long i = (start_offset + start) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
>  	int ret = 0;
>  
> -	WARN_ON(start > eb->len);
> -	WARN_ON(start + len > eb->start + eb->len);
> +	if (start + len > eb->len) {
> +		WARN(1, KERN_ERR "btrfs bad mapping eb start %llu len %lu, wanted %lu %lu\n",
> +		     eb->start, eb->len, start, len);
> +		memset(ptr, 0, len);
> +		return;
> +	}
>  
>  	offset = offset_in_page(start_offset + start);
>  
> 


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^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread

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