[tip: x86/seves] x86/boot/compressed/64: Sanity-check CPUID results in the early #VC handler

["tip-bot2 for Joerg Roedel" <tip-bot2@linutronix.de>]

The following commit has been merged into the x86/seves branch of tip:

Commit-ID:     ed7b895f3efb5df184722f5a30f8164fcaffceb1
Gitweb:        https://git.kernel.org/tip/ed7b895f3efb5df184722f5a30f8164fcaffceb1
Author:        Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
AuthorDate:    Wed, 28 Oct 2020 17:46:56 +01:00
Committer:     Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
CommitterDate: Thu, 29 Oct 2020 13:48:49 +01:00

x86/boot/compressed/64: Sanity-check CPUID results in the early #VC handler

The early #VC handler which doesn't have a GHCB can only handle CPUID
exit codes. It is needed by the early boot code to handle #VC exceptions
raised in verify_cpu() and to get the position of the C-bit.

But the CPUID information comes from the hypervisor which is untrusted
and might return results which trick the guest into the no-SEV boot path
with no C-bit set in the page-tables. All data written to memory would
then be unencrypted and could leak sensitive data to the hypervisor.

Add sanity checks to the early #VC handler to make sure the hypervisor
can not pretend that SEV is disabled.

 [ bp: Massage a bit. ]

Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201028164659.27002-3-joro@8bytes.org
---
 arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c
index 5f83cca..7d04b35 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c
@@ -178,6 +178,32 @@ void __init do_vc_no_ghcb(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long exit_code)
 		goto fail;
 	regs->dx = val >> 32;
 
+	/*
+	 * This is a VC handler and the #VC is only raised when SEV-ES is
+	 * active, which means SEV must be active too. Do sanity checks on the
+	 * CPUID results to make sure the hypervisor does not trick the kernel
+	 * into the no-sev path. This could map sensitive data unencrypted and
+	 * make it accessible to the hypervisor.
+	 *
+	 * In particular, check for:
+	 *	- Hypervisor CPUID bit
+	 *	- Availability of CPUID leaf 0x8000001f
+	 *	- SEV CPUID bit.
+	 *
+	 * The hypervisor might still report the wrong C-bit position, but this
+	 * can't be checked here.
+	 */
+
+	if ((fn == 1 && !(regs->cx & BIT(31))))
+		/* Hypervisor bit */
+		goto fail;
+	else if (fn == 0x80000000 && (regs->ax < 0x8000001f))
+		/* SEV leaf check */
+		goto fail;
+	else if ((fn == 0x8000001f && !(regs->ax & BIT(1))))
+		/* SEV bit */
+		goto fail;
+
 	/* Skip over the CPUID two-byte opcode */
 	regs->ip += 2;